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Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-89-010
Tuesday
17 January 1989

Daily Report
Soviet Union

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CSCE Follow-up Meeting Opens in Vienna

LD1301143889 Moscow TASS in English 1428 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Vienna January 13 TASS—The Vienna followup meeting went into a full-scale session on Friday to consider a draft final document of neutral and non-aligned states, which has been revised one more time.

Simultaneously, 23 member nations of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO are holding consultations on a mandate for talks on armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. They are searching for a way out of a deadlock formed by a dispute between Greece and Turkey.

Final Document Adopted

LD1501144889 Moscow TASS in English 1445 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] Vienna January 15 TASS—At today's plenary meeting, representatives of 33 European countries as well as the United States and Canada adopted a final document of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The document, which has been the result of complex talks which continued for more than two years, contains accords on continuation and development of cooperation among the 35 countries in all areas mapped out by the final act of the Helsinki conference.

These are military and political cooperation aimed at building the security of all the participating countries, cooperation and expansion of contacts in the fields of the economy, science, technology, and ecology, and humanitarian cooperation.

The Vienna accords are a new exceptionally important stride in the development of the CSCE process. The successful completion of the forum in Vienna was promoted in many respects by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's U.N. address in which he put forward big ideas of democratising the entire world order, of building a more safe and humane world, and announced the Soviet Union's decision on a unilateral reduction in its armed forces and armaments.

Gorbachev Assessment

LD1601183589 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 16 TASS—The editorial board of the newspaper PRAVDA asked Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the National Parliament, several questions in connection with a final document adopted at the Vienna followup meeting of representatives of countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Follow the questions and answers:

Q: The foreign ministers of 35 countries these days are concluding the Vienna meeting with decisions which can bring about serious progress to the peaceful period you spoke about at the United Nations on December 7, 1988. What is your view of this accomplishment?

A: First of all, I would like to congratulate the governments of the European countries, the United States and Canada on the outstanding success which testifies to the effectiveness of new and realistic approaches to international affairs.

The Helsinki process has been raised to a new high.

The final document along with a mandate for talks on conventional arms and armed forces is an unprecedented event for its substance, its objectives and its possible and diverse positive implications not only for Europe but also for the world as a whole.

It is unprecedented and instructive also for the nature of preparation of such practical decisions by so many most different countries.

If experience gained in this field is preserved and carried forward, "co-development" and "co-creativity" in building a world worthy of the 21st century will become a norm of state-to-state contacts and make it possible to create political and moral prerequisites for mankind's survival and for its progress based on principles of common sense, a balance of interests and the priority of values that are shared by all the people on earth.

Q: Was it always during these past two and a half years that you were convinced that such a result could be achieved?

A: There was everything. There were more than once situations at the talks where emotions could break loose and scuttle the whole thing. But we were always restrained by the awareness that peace is not a gift from above and nobody will present it to us.

Therefore it is essential to work stubbornly, perseveringly and patiently, looking for solutions and accord suiting everyone.

While inviting others to make reasonable compromises, we covered a no small distance ourselves as well over these years in grasping and sizing up some of the problems in the focus of what at times were sharp clashes in Vienna.

I cannot but point out one meaningful coincidence: The final document in Vienna was hammered out on January 15, exactly three years after we published our forward-looking program for creating a nuclear-free world and eliminating all kinds of weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000.

Subsequent events and processes have demonstrated that it was not a utopia but a blueprint based on an evaluation of real possibilities.

The Vienna decisions are among the compelling evidence bearing this out.

At one with the Warsaw Treaty nations we shall keep working stubbornly and in good faith for this kind of evidence to grow.

The adoption of a new military doctrine has reflected the will of socialist countries to turn about from the principle of superarmament to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

The Soviet Union has decided to unilaterally reduce its troops by 500,000 men along with effecting significant cuts in conventional weapons, change the entire deployment pattern of its armed forces in a defensive spirit, scale down military spending, and begin destroying chemical weapons stocks even before the signature of a corresponding international convention.

Together with our allies we're preparing for a very serious and businesslike discussion of all issues on the agenda of the talks under the Vienna mandate.

Q: Can the results of the Vienna meeting be seen as a step towards realizing the idea of a "common European home"?

A: They certainly can.

By rearranging our own, Soviet "apartment" in this "home", we shall be making the case for the socialist choice made by our people. But we are not going to isolate ourselves, fence ourselves in and oppose ourselves to the outside world.

And we have already proved our readiness to broad dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation based on new attitudes characteristic of perestroika.

We do not demand for ourselves either privileges or exemption from rules that are mandatory for all. A stable peace bearing welcome material and spiritual fruit for all those involved in its creation is a continuous process based on blending the interests of states and internationalizing really international problems with regard for vital national requirements.

The decision to hold humanitarian conferences in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow within the framework of the Helsinki process attests to the dying out of "cold war" stereotypes and to a changeover from confrontation to mutual understanding and interaction even in such delicate issues as seem to be unable ever to bring representatives of different ideologies together round the same table.

The Soviet Union is prepared for dialogue, for discussions, for a search for solutions to all issues without jointly resolving which the world community cannot get rid of global dangers and pave the way to the period of peace.

Document Lays 'Foundation'

LD1601201989 Moscow TASS in English 1948 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 16 TASS—TASS observer on military issues Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

A final document of the meeting of participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which is coming to a close in Vienna has laid a foundation for talks on the armed forces and conventional armaments in the continent from the Atlantic to the Urals. The coordinated goal of the talks is to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and safe balance of conventional armed forces, including conventional armaments and hardware, on lower levels, the removal of a potential for a surprise attack and the beginning of large-scale combat operations.

A mandate of the talks coordinated by 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries shows that they have displayed political will and the intention to perceptibly reduce armed forces and armaments of the two sides standing in opposition to each other, and to dramatically improve mutual trust. There are several factors that should objectively promote the success of the coming talks.

The first one is a possibility to exchange detailed figures on the armed forces and armaments and to check the presented information, including with the help of on-site inspections. The putting into practice of this proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member states would permit to avoid the "figures discussion" which formed an insurmountable obstacle at the talks on the reduction of the armed forces and armaments in central Europe for 15 years.

The second factor is a pledge of the participants recorded in the coodinated mandate to eliminate the existing disbalances and asymmetry in the armed forces and armaments. By finding and removing spheres of inequality undermining stability and security, the sides would ensure a possibility of passing over in the future to the reduction of the personnel and certain types of armaments and hardware that would be equal in volume or in percentage.

The third factor is a possibility to control in a most thorough way all the reductions and the remaining levels of the armed forces. This problem has not been resolved at the talks on central Europe, and it was continually a topic of discussions and a source of mutual accusations.

A new approach of the Soviet Union to security problems set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in his U.N. speech, as well as steps taken by the USSR and allied socialist countries for reducing the armed forces and armaments are a guarantee that the socialist countries will do their utmost for putting into practice all the provisions of the mandate of the coming talks. One should like to hope that no unexpected steps will be taken by the NATO countries.

Karpov Interview on 'Irreversible' Disarmament

PM1501185589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov by correspondents A. Lopukhin and A. Maslennikov: "Into the 21st Century Without Weapons. Making the Disarmament Process Irreversible"; first four paragraphs are introduction; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Three years ago—15 January 1986—a statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev was promulgated in which he set out a program for the creation of a nuclear-free world before the end of the century and the elimination of all types of mass destruction weapons, including chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union's bold initiative opened up a new chapter in the struggle for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and for mankind's survival.

The year 1988 is past. What kind of year was it for the implementation of the program of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons? What has been done and what remains to be done in that sphere?

Questions by the PRAVDA correspondents are answered by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov.

[Karpov] I think last year was interesting from the viewpoint of the theoretical treatment of ideas associated with disarmament and the restructuring of international relations. At the same time it was notable for major practical measures which materially reinforce these ideas. One must put first, of course, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although it was signed in December 1987, its implementation began in 1988.

M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Krasnoyarsk was a mighty fillip to the dialogue on matters of security and disarmament in the Asian-Pacific region. The speech continued the serious and practical discussion, started in Vladivostok, with our Asian neighbors and countries more distant from us, geared to getting questions of safeguarding peace and stability in this very important part of the world moving and onto a practical footing.

The initiatives put forward in Warsaw at the session of the Warsaw Pact Permanent Consultative Committee, which are connected with the practical implementation of the Warsaw Pact's defensive doctrine, were of considerable importance in terms of improving the situation in Europe.

Finally, the last, but not least significant item of the year, was M.S. Gorbachev's address to the UN General Assembly. This formulated, I would say, a new philosophy of international relations and demonstrated practical ways of restructuring mutual relations between peoples and states on a new basis and humanizing and internationalizing international contacts. At the same time, it specified the concrete measures which the Soviet Union is adopting, in cooperation with its Warsaw Pact allies, to reinforce the new defense doctrine concept announced in Berlin.

Last year was also marked by major developments in the resolution of regional conflicts. One would give pride of place here, of course, to the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan. Hostilities have ceased between Iran and Iraq and a settlement process has started in southern Africa, opening up the prospect of granting long-awaited independence to the people of Namibia.

Summing up briefly, I would say that the world has become a safer place. But the question still remains: Is the process irreversible?

[PRAVDA] What, in your view, must be done to build guarantees of inviolability into the process of creating a safe world? What are the most urgent, paramount tasks on this path?

[Karpov] If one is talking about the biggest fundamental problems, they are, above all, the complex of Soviet-American talks on strategic armaments, questions of space, and the cessation of nuclear tests. Take the complex of nuclear problems. Here negotiations already have an established history. We reckon that as soon as the new U.S. Administration decides on its specific positions and approaches to the talks they will be resumed. Substantial groundwork has already been done here in the course of talks with the outgoing administration. We expect there to be a sufficient amount of continuity. In this respect we attach fundamental importance to M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with R. Reagan and G. Bush in New York last December.

Life is placing ever-increasing emphasis on the range of questions connected with reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. A real opportunity has arisen of completing the protracted Vienna meeting with an accord on all "three baskets" and thereby ensuring, as early as February, the switch to practical talks on conventional armaments in Europe involving the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

Finally, there are the questions connected with holding a whole range of all-European forums on matters of scientific-technical, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. This includes the matter of the international conference on human rights and humanitarian issues, planned for 1991 in Moscow, to which we attach very great importance. I must also mention the problem of completing work on the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of stocks.

[PRAVDA] As is known, our Western partners often associate the success of talks in the sphere of strategic armaments with the achievement of accords on conventional armaments. And they often cite the Soviet Union's superiority in these types of armaments in order to delay the talks on nuclear armaments. What is the actual relationship between the talks in these two areas?

[Karpov] I would not say there is a direct relationship. These problems, taken separately, are so big that that if we were to tie them up in a tight bundle it would only complicate the solution, I think. At the same time, certainly, progress in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments creates new conditions for the discussion of questions of the reduction of conventional armaments. The possibility arises of looking at the problem of security in the conventional armaments sphere from a somewhat different angle, and this creates, at the same time, the need to look at ways of reinforcing the reduction of nuclear armaments with the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. That is why at the moment, in our view, the problem of commencing talks on conventional armaments is such an acute one.

Progress itself in the armaments sphere dictates the need for a new approach to them. That is why when we talk about starting talks on the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe we are thinking primarily of how to give NATO and Warsaw Pct armed forces a character that would preclude their waging offensive operations and the use of them for a surprise attack and, at the same time, would enable them to conduct defensive operations. That is why we are proposing that the entire process of reduction of forces and armaments in Europe be implemented in such a way that it pays attention from the outset not only to eliminating imbalances and asymmetries, but also to reducing the offensive potentials of both blocs.

It is important that this process not stop at the end of the first stage, when, after the imbalances and asymmetries have been eliminated, someone says: Okay, now we can have a quiet life. But it is not that simple. Since the opportunities for scientific-technical progress in the armaments sphere have not been eliminated, this process at the first stage of reduction of offensive armaments may not lead to a sufficiently stable situation. So a continuous process is needed until the absolute minimum levels of armaments are ensured, levels that are strictly monitored and observed.

This process is not a matter of a few months, of course. But one would hope that, having started it this year, we will be able to complete at least the first phase—initial reduction and elimination of imbalances and asymmetries—in the next year or two and, perhaps, create a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and also a zone of reduced war danger. That is, implement the ideas which are laid down in our proposals and also in the proposals by other Warsaw Pact states, such as the Jaruzelski plan, the Jakes plan, and the joint initiatives by the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the West German Social Democrats.

[PRAVDA] Much has been written in the Soviet and foreign press about the relationship between the problem of SDI and observance of the ABM Treaty. How does this problem look today?

[Karpov] As is known, the announcement of SDI in 1983 was sharply criticized on all sides, including from the standpoint of negotiations. The criticism was that if SDI is implemented it will undermine the ABM Treaty and then hopes of a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments will vanish. This still stands. But the question of SDI itself and of its implementation is not as simple as it was portrayed by the authors of the program in 1983. The problems have turned out to be so complex that it will be difficult to resolve them even in this century, if not impossible.

There is the problem of delivery vehicles that place ultraheavy loads in outer space. There is the problem of the technology to make the system effective. For instance, in order to put the SDI system out of action you need to spend far less money and create much simpler systems, which will be 90-percent cheaper than SDI or cheaper still. So even the authors of SDI are having their doubts about the emphasis that was placed on the program as soon as it was announced. I hope this trend develops, that realism about the SDI program and its place and role in potential U.S. strategic plans will become more and more evident. This certainly would help the talks.

But it must be said that we have never conducted talks on SDI itself. We have always discussed combining two factors: observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed and ratified in 1972 and reduction of strategic offensive armaments. These two aspects of the talks remain and it is very important to ensure that the ABM Treaty operates, and operates effectively.

[PRAVDA] As you have said, talks on reducing armaments are taking place in several areas. What main difficulties would you single out?

[Karpov] The main difficulty is overcoming the old stereotypes in thinking. This applies particularly to the talks concerning the most sensitive aspects of the strategic relationship between the USSR and the United States, questions of security in Europe, and problems of chemical weapons.

Cold war notions often persist; take questions of nuclear weapons. The most difficult problem here is regarding or not regarding nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding peace. It is very difficult to overcome this stereotype in our partners' thinking. It is an ingrained stereotype.

We, however, believe that nuclear weapons are not a guarantee of peace and the sooner mankind gets rid of nuclear weapons; and at the same time, effects a reduction in the level of armed forces and conventional armaments; eliminates chemical weapons; and creates new guarantees of a nuclear-free world, the more effective will be the solution of the problem of mankind's survival. But the concept of reliance on nuclear weapons is still very popular in the West. I would even say that the idea that it is a blessing to have nuclear weapons in the hands of those who do not want to use them to harm mankind, is not alien to some of our theorists.

Personally, I have grave doubts about this. The presence of nuclear weapons is dangerous not only in itself. It brings with it a gamut of additional scientific-technical problems which drain vast sums from the ordinary taxpayer's pocket to improve guidance and delivery systems for these devastating weapons. Here is just one example. The refinement of the potential to penetrate defenses was what prompted the United States to replace the B-52 bomber with the new B-1 bomber, which already costs far more. The new B-2 bomber, incorporating "Stealth" technology, will cost a fantastic sum. This is typical not only of the Americans, but of everyone, including us. So even from the economic viewpoint, from the viewpoint of ensuring the effective restructuring of our economic system, we cannot forget about this side of things.

With present-day conditions the problem of chemical weapons is becoming increasingly acute. They try to justify them by arguing that they are allegedly the "poor man's nuclear weapons." In my view, there is nothing more mistaken. What does having chemical weapons mean? It means opening up competition in yet another sphere of mass destruction weapons.

[PRAVDA] Perhaps one should consider psychological stereotypes here?

[Karpov] Of course, and the chief one is the enemy image, which was an essential component of former military doctrines. Why are armed forces created; who are they created against? They are created to oppose a potential enemy who for some reason or other must exist. But if you take the view that no one should have an enemy as such, then we have a new psychological approach to the solution of international problems. From this viewpoint the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles between the USSR and the United States to some extent has already enabled us and the Americans to reinterpret this formula, this psychological aspect of relations. The unilateral reduction of our armed forces and armaments announced by M.S. Gorbachev on 7 December 1988 is of colossal significance in this sphere.

[PRAVDA] The absolute majority of PRAVDA readers greeted this new peace-loving step by the USSR with enthusiasm. But something that has to be mentioned is the fact that some letters to the editorial office betray fears that this unilateral action may weaken our country's defense capability.

[Karpov] We also get such letters. The concern stems from the fact that war has in the past caught us unaware. However, the point is not that we did not have enough weapons. We had several thousand more tanks than Hitler, yet he reached Moscow.

If we have proclaimed our defensive doctrine, it is not enough to just say it; we must also build our armed forces on the basis of these principles. For this it is necessary to see what we really need to ensure reliable defenses. We have now conducted an analysis and it turns out that we can quite well reduce the total size of our armed forces by 500,000 men over 2 years and reduce armaments by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft. And it turns out that our defensive capability will not suffer as a result.

[PRAVDA] Perhaps it is in precisely this sphere that we do not have enough glasnost? Isn't this why many people have questions?

[Karpov] I agree. Unlike a whole series of countries, we have had practically no glasnost in the sphere of the creation, maintenance, and financing of our armed forces. Soviet people still do not know the total numerical strength of our forces. This is a total secret in our country, like everything to do with the armament [vooruzhennost] of our armies and their financing, since the official military expenditure of about R20 billion that is portrayed as the military budget in our country is only a part of defense spending. We are now saying this openly. It is important to know the actual size of our military spending and the precise amount that we spend on scientific research for military purposes in order to see whether we are not spending too much. Perhaps a considerable portion of this can be channeled into the national economy for peaceful purposes. And such measures are already being taken in our country. At his recent meeting with scientific and cultural figures M.S. Gorbachev spoke of the necessity and possibility of reducing military spending without damaging the country's security and defense capability.

[PRAVDA] Allow us to return to the question of trust, which is inevitably bound up with the problems of monitoring. What specifically is the situation with regard to these questions at the talks now being held?

[Karpov] The problem has two aspects. The first consists of overcoming in ourselves the old complex of secretiveness and excessive secrecy. We have done much in this sphere thanks primarily to the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. A ramified system of verification has been set up within which framework about 300 inspections in both directions have been conducted.

There is monitoring [kontrol] of spheres of military activity that have always been closed. This was simply unimaginable before the conclusion of the treaty.

Now that we and the Americans are formulating a system for verification of the 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, we are proposing, now on the basis of existing experience, a reliable, effective system of comprehensive verification. And we are coming up against a fear of openness, this time on the American side. Strange though it may seem, those who have always boasted about their society's openness are now beginning to experience certain waverings with regard to verification: Isn't too much being opened up to the Soviet Union? And here they are contending that it is necessary to conduct matters with the Soviet Union in such a way as to prevent it from taking advantage of the fruits of the technical progress achieved in the West. It is from this viewpoint that we now view the evolution of the U.S. position.

We note the desire of Americans to close plants for the production of strategic offensive arms to our inspectors in order to remove altogether the possibility of verification on site, on submarines, and on ships equipped with nuclear weapons. This trend on the U.S. side has now emerged very clearly in the talks. We have overcome this stereotype; we are showing [idem na] openness, even in spheres like the production of strategic weapons, but the Americans have proven unable to totally overcome their prejudices.

[PRAVDA] One final question: How do you assess the progress achieved in the 3 years since the Soviet Union put forward the program for creating a nuclear-free, nonviolent world? And, most importantly, what are the prospects of achieving this goal?

[Karpov] When this program was published on 15 January 1986, most of the reaction in various quarters both political and social, voiced approval. However, many were skeptical about how realistic it was. The past period answers these skeptics. Today we already have the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. That is the first real contribution to implementing the 15 January 1986 program. Talks are under way on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. The talks within the framework of the disarmament conference on formulating a convention on the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons have made considerable headway. This convention is now 80-85 percent ready.

An international conference on chemical weapons ended in Paris the other day. In the assessment of many political observers, the new Soviet initiative had a substantial influence on the success of this major forum. In his speech at the Paris conference Soviet delegation head E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, stated the Soviet Union's intention to begin unilaterally eliminating its stocks of chemical weapons even before the conclusion of the relevant international convention. As a result, a totally new situation has arisen in the world community and more favorable conditions have been created for solving a cardinal question of disarmament. The year 1989 has been given a good start in this sphere.

Now, on the eve of the start of talks on conventional arms, we are introducing into the system of international relations the new approaches and new principles that form, as it were, the background or theoretical basis of the 15 January 1986 program. In short, a considerable amount has already been done. It is certainly difficult to estimate what has been done in terms of percentages, but there is no question that a process has begun of restructuring the very approach toward disarmament problems; of reducing all this disarmament activity to a single common denominator, as it were; and to ensuring a more humane and more secure world based not on confrontation between different blocs and states, but on the principles of pooling their efforts and seeking common approaches.

A considerable amount has also been done in advancing mankind along the path of great openness and greater glasnost, not only in our country, but also in others. This too is an important part of the general process of the humanization of international relations.

Is it feasible to implement the 15 January 1986 program within the timeframe that it envisaged—before the year 2000? If it is possible to reach agreement this year on a 50-percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms and if it is possible to make 1989 the year of a breakthrough with regard to preparing the convention banning chemical weapons and to begin serious discussions on reducing conventional arms, then I think this will open up a real prospect of implementing the program before the year 2000.

This will be very hard. I don't want to create the impression that everything is going smoothly for us. It will be hard; it will take colossal efforts at various levels, including the highest, in order to define the most important priority directions in which fundamental issues must be resolved. The most effective ways of achieving the set goal must be sought. All this work will require tremendous effort, organization, and concentrated will on the part of the many people interested in achieving results. But the task is feasible. That is the main thing.

Military Official on Krasnoyarsk Radar, SDI

PM1301113789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Jan 89 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant General V. Pavlov article: "Radar Problem"; first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "The Americans are constructing new radar stations, while we are dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar station. I am concerned at our tractability and the U.S. side's obvious reluctance to meet us halfway. Doubters may be labeled as 'not understanding the essence of the new political thinking.' We do not understand, so explain it to us. Our 'friends' hold the radar station against us, while at the same time they themselves adopt the SDI program and will put into orbit the first satellite with weapons on board in 1989. Perhaps I am not taking into account some political niceties of the present relationship between the USSR and the United States. But even so, I have the right to an explanation...." (V. Goryaynov, Tokmak, Kirghiz SSR)

For a number of years now the U.S. Administration has been seeking to achieve military superiority through SDI. However, the chief task of SDI—to create a shield against a missile counterstrike—is opposed to the aims of the ABM Treaty. Consequently, sooner or later the administration will have to choose one or the other—either the SDI program or the treaty.

But the unilateral rejection of the treaty means major political problems. Moreover, the Pentagon would not like to "untie the hands" of the Soviet Union beforehand; hence, the desire to make a "broad interpretation" of the treaty, which would enable the United States to create an ABM defense of the country's territory seemingly within the framework of the treaty, while in fact disregarding its provisions. The public charges of alleged "violations" by the USSR and the ignoring of U.S. pledges are also understandable.

But, of course, the supporters of SDI are not interested in preserving the ABM Treaty. Therefore, they act according to the principle: The worse things are for the treaty, the better for SDI! At the same time, however, they adhere strictly to the rule: Keep totally quiet about U.S. violations while fanning anti-Soviet campaigns. This is done very skillfully. For example, the whole world knows about the Soviet radar in the Krasnoyarsk region, which is supposedly being constructed in violation of the ABM Treaty, although, as a station designed to track objects in space, it does not come under the treaty's limitations. At the same time, very few people in the West know about the large U.S. phased-array radar station at Thule (Greenland), which has undoubtedly been deployed in violation of the ABM Treaty.

As for the USSR, as the 27th CPSU Congress specified, the main direction of its activity in the world arena is struggle against nuclear danger and the arms race, and for the preservation and strengthening of world peace. In this matter the ABM Treaty is, in point of fact, the foundation of the whole process of limiting and reducing strategic arms, and consequently, of eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Hence, the USSR's desire to preserve it.

Of course, this does not mean that we are all-forgiving with regard to U.S. actions to undermine the treaty. The Soviet side has repeatedly complained to Washington, including the government level, about this; through USSR Supreme Soviet commissions, at other levels; and also in the Soviet-U.S. Permanent Consultative Commission especially set up in 1972. The list of complaints made by the Soviet side is considerable. We have made repeated assessments of U.S. actions within the SDI framework too. In general, as a memorandum sent to the U.S. State Department said, the Soviet side has "shown patience and restraint in the hope that the U.S. side will take appropriate measures to rectify the situation."

The USSR proposals for a radical solution to the "radar problem"—on a mutual basis—were intended to rectify the situation, not to help SDI supporters destroy the ABM Treaty. The decision to hand over the Krasnoyarsk radar to the USSR Academy of Sciences and to adapt it for the needs of a world space organization which would function under UN auspices (this certainly does not mean "dismantling" the radar) is also aimed at this. In this way any concern of the U.S. side with regard to the radar's purpose (if, of course, such concern really exists) would be dispelled.

However, in adopting the unilateral decision with regard to the Krasnoyarsk radar, as the Soviet Government statement of 27 October 1988 states, the Soviet Union is firmly counting on the United States to "take measures to dispel its concern at the violation of the ABM Treaty as a result of deploying a large U.S. phased-array radar station in Greenland and constructing a similar radar station in Britain."

It is important that Washington should realize that not only the Soviet Union is interested in the struggle to deliver mankind from the nuclear threat. A threat hangs over everyone. It will hardly be possible to cope with it without strict compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

Gorbachev Urges International Space Cooperation

LD1701143489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 17 Jan 89

[Excerpts] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in the Kremlin today conferred high state awards of the USSR upon the Soviet and French cosmonauts who participated in the most prolonged manned flight and in the second Soviet-French expedition. Addressing those who had gathered, Comrade Gorbachev said:

[Begin Gorbachev recording] Dear Comrades Vladimir Georgiyevich Titov and Musa Romanovich Manarov, I cordially congratulate you on behalf of the Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, our government, and all Soviet people in connection with the successful completion of an outstanding orbital flight—outstanding because this was the first flight to last for 1 year. I warmly congratulate you, dear friends, on the excellent fulfillment of your tasks and on your safe return to earth to the embraces of your compatriots, relatives, and loved ones.

On behalf of the government and the Soviet people I also sincerely and cordially congratulate your friends and brothers in space, Brigadier General Jean-Loup Chretien, hero of the Soviet Union, and Colonel Michel Tognini. Congratulating you and your French comrades, I would like to note that for a citizen of France, Comrade Jean-Loup Chretien, this was his second flight with Soviet cosmonauts. I believe that as well as it being a record flight for you [addressing Titov and Manarov] lasting 1 year, it was also a record joint flight—the longest flight in the course of which important research was conducted and a large program was fulfilled.

Noting all the particularities in your flight and work, I would like in this connection to say: People have already become accustomed to the fact that man has visited the moon, that unmanned craft have researched Mars and other planets, that there are cosmonauts virtually constantly on board obital stations, and that space walks and prolonged work have become an ordinary, not to say, everyday matter.

Nevertheless, behind all of this there is the enormous courage and high level of skill of the cosmonauts and the complex and unusually responsible work of tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, workers, and specialists in the widest variety of fields. In greeting you today, dear friends, I would like to say a heartfelt thank you to all those who are making their contribution to the peaceful mastery of space.

The scientific and technical revolution has embraced the majority of industrially-developed states. Problems that were recently regarded as being national have today been transformed into global ones the solution of which is unthinkable without broad international cooperation. The conquest of space is one of those most important international problems. Only yesterday many people considered competition in space between states to be perfectly natural. Now, however, when space programs have become substantially more complicated, their fulfillment requires the concentration of the technical, economic, and intellectual efforts of many countries and peoples. Space is a global medium: It is the common property of mankind.

The mastery of space is based upon the use of the latest achievements in science and technology. Enormous, truly limitless possibilities for cooperation by the whole of mankind over many decades—and I would even say centuries—are to be found here. It is often possible to hear people ask nowadays whether it is necessary to be involved in space. I would say in reply to this question, which is certainly no idle one, that the answer has in fact already been supplied by life itself. Launches of space vehicles of a scientific and applied nature are being carried out every year by an increasing number of countries.

The results of space research are exerting a huge influence on the development of the fundamental sciences, enriching them with new methods of studying nature, and with new unique knowledge in the interests of the progress of the whole of the world community. But this isn't all. It is difficult today to imagine the economic activity of states and whole continents without communications, television, meteorological, navigational, geophysical, and other satellites. The contours of the future space industry are taking an ever sharper outline, which contains enormous possibilities for the resolution of the tasks of informatics, power engineering, and medicine. Among these tasks of enormous significance I would say that of special importance is the organization of a global system, encompassing the whole planet, for observing and monitoring the natural environment, in the interests of resolving the problems of ecology, and this is also a huge problem common to the whole world. The Soviet Union takes account of all of this, and is doing a lot in order to turn terrestrial space into an arena of peaceful cooperation among states.

At the contemporary stage, it seems to us, the world community could elaborate and adopt an international program for the research and conquest of space. In our view such a program would indisputably be of benefit to all peoples of the world. We are deeply convinced that space has to be peaceful. By united efforts it is essential and possible to prevent the militarization of space. The conquest of space for peaceful purposes, and not preparations for star wars—this is what meets the aspirations of all peace-loving people, of all peoples and nations. Back to the outstanding significance of your flight on board the orbital complex "Mir": I congratulate you on fulfilling the wide-ranging research under the international cooperation programs. I would like to make note once again of your high skill, which showed itself particularly in the hours of work in open space, while implementing mounting operations and technical experiments. Your flight is not just testimony to the enormous strength of human knowledge but one of the greatest manifestations of the human spirit and we thank you for this example of service to the people, to science, and to mankind.

The present occasion gives me the agreeable opportunity to express great satisfaction over the expansion of our cooperation with France, with the people of France, in the field of the study of outer space. The French cosmonaut, Jean-Loup Chretien, as I have already said, is the first of the foreigners to have flown twice on a Soviet spacecraft. He exited into open space together with Aleksandr Volkov, and in so doing both cosmonauts demonstrated doggedness, enormous endurance—and that was needed on that occasion—and resourcefulness in carrying out scientific and technical experiments.

Once again I give you my hearty congratulations, dear friends, on the occasion of your brilliant performance of the space research program and on your return to earth. Permit me to present you with the awards of the Soviet state. [end recording]

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev presented the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to USSR pilot-cosmonaut Vladimir Georgiyevich Titov.

[Begin Titov recording] Comrade General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. I am deeply grateful to the Central Committee and to the Soviet Government for the confidence expressed in my conducting a year-long mission as commander of the crew of the "Mir" scientific orbital complex, for the high awards assessing my work. Our flight took place in the year of the 19th party conference. We understood all the labor feats of the Soviet people and in that connection our labor in orbit was responsible, purposeful, and concerted. Yes, our expedition, the basic expedition with Musa Manarov; we received three international expeditions on board the station. On three occasions we had to carry out complicated assembly work in open space. We understood the responsibility placed upon our shoulders and tried to carry it out as well as possible. We are now able to say that our Soviet-manufactured space equipment works reliably. We confirm the correctness of the methods that have been chosen for training the crew for the flight, for maintaining the health of the crew and its work-capability during the process of prolonged flight, and also for restoring their health following their return to earth. We are grateful to the people who trained us for this flight and to the people who provided back-up for this flight. In receiving these high awards today I am placed under an obligation to invest the knowledge and experience that I have in the cause—my cause, to which I have devoted my life—the development of Soviet space exploration. Once again I thank you and am prepared to carry out new missions for the homeland. Thank you. [applause] [end recording]

The Order of Lenin and Gold Star medal is presented to pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR Musa Romanovich Manarov. [passage omitted]

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev presented the Order of the Labor Red Banner to cosmonaut-researcher Jean-Loup Chretien, citizen of the French Republic. [passage omitted]

Citizen of the French Republic, cosmonaut-researcher Michel Tognini, was presented with the Order of the Friendship of the Peoples. [passage omitted] Following the presentation, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev addressed concluding remarks to the recipients.

[Begin Gorbachev recording] Well, I once again congratulate all of you, and I congratulate those who are sitting there behind you, those who represent this front of ours, of space exploration, the frontranking vanguard of our people, remarkable people, representatives of our working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, educated people, courageous people, people devoted to the cause, people who love their country—thank you for everything that you are doing, dear friends, I thank all of you. [applause] [end recording]

Foreign Ministry 13 January News Conference

LD1301135689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1147 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Excerpts] Moscow, 13 Jan (TASS)—In our understanding, a nuclear-free world represents a fundamentally new, humane, and democratic world order in which national and international security alike is safeguarded not by military and technological, but by political, means; not by the right of might, but by the power of the law, stated Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister. He addressed a news conference held here today devoted to the third anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement, which put forward a program for ridding the world by the year 2000 of nuclear and other mass destruction weaponry.

Having noted that the UN's role in the contemporary and mutually interdependent world was growing, Vladimir Petrovskiy pointed out that a strict fulfillment of all obligations to international organizations represented a distinguishing feature of the new policy of Soviet thinking. In this context, he announced that the USSR has handed over to the United Nations the first half of its annual contribution for 1989 amounting to $37.1 million and that it plans to transfer the remainder somewhat later. [passage omitted]

Replying to a question asked by an Arab journalist regarding the danger of the appearance of nuclear weapons in Israel, Vladimir Petrovskiy pointed out that there could only be one way out—the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

All of the press conference participants noted that the process of disarmament opens up broad possibilities for converting the economy. In this context, General Shabanov said that the Soviet defense industry's volume of military production currently amounts to less than 50 percent. The remaining proportion went to civilian production, including consumer goods.

Replying to a question regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, General Shabanov said that the Soviet Union firmly intends to observe its commitments set by the Geneva accords. Vladimir Petrovskiy added in this connection that the Geneva accords provide for the commitments not only of the USSR but of all the parties who signed them as well.

Vladimir Petrovskiy noted that the working out in Vienna of a mandate for the talks on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe may be completed "in the very near future, even in the next few hours." Up to the present moment only the question of including the littoral strip of the Mediterranean in the region of the Asian part of Turkey remains unresolved.

Academician Roald Sagdayev, the chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, stressed that it is already necessary to think about how the tasks of disarmament should be resolved after the conclusion of the treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. "The discussion of a 'scenario' for attaining a minimal level of the sides' nuclear potentials would be a convenient bridgehead for the leap to a genuinely nuclear-free world," he said.

Academician Vladimir Sokolov, another participant in the press conference, pointed out the urgency of resolving ecological problems. He stressed that the program of ecological space monitoring currently being discussed is opening up extremely broad possibilities for keeping track of changes in man's habitat on the planet. The Soviet scientist drew attention to the importance of the problem of preserving biological variety on the Earth, without which the existence of the biosphere, the existence of mankind, is impossible.

United States & Canada

USSR Journalists Barred From Bush Inauguration

LD1601164789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1548 GMT 16 Jan 89

[From "The World Today" program presented by Vitaliy Ilyashenko]

[Excerpts] The final preparations are underway in Washington for the official ceremony to swear in U.S. President Bush. [passage omitted]

To round off this topic, I would add that there will be 9,000 U.S. and foreign journalists covering the swearing-in ceremony for the 41st president of the United States. However, alas, our colleagues from PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, TASS, and the other media will not be among them—although they work permanently in Washington, they have been refused accreditation to cover the ceremonial event, moreover, without any explanation being given.

Reagan's 15 January Farewell Radio Address Cited

LD1501182789 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] In a farewell radio address on Saturday, Ronald Reagan summed up his efforts as president of the United States. On the key changes on the world scene over this time he singled out signs of easing tension. The trend, the President pointed out, was especially promising. It holds out the promise that the coming generations of Americans will not have to live under the threat of a nuclear nightmare.

TASS Cites Reagan on INF Treaty Accomplishment

LD1701070089 Moscow TASS in English 0700 GMT 17 Jan 89

[Text] Washington January 17 TASS—President Reagan has stated that he is "so pleased" that the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the INF Treaty as a result of which a whole class of nuclear weapons is being eliminated.

"I don't believe a nuclear war can ever be won, and it should never be fought," the president said in an interview with the CNN Television network on Monday.

"And that's why I am so pleased that we got the first step, the INF Treaty, where for the first time we have negotiated out of existence a whole classification of those weapons," he said.

"But we are going to continue" the efforts in this field, Reagan emphasized. He pointed out that it was also essential to secure a ban on the use of poison gases and chemical weapons.

In answer to questions the U.S. President said he did not think that during the talks with the Soviet Union either of the negotiators "snookered" the other side.

"No, I don't think so at all," he said. "As a matter of fact, I think we've come out pretty well, first of all, with that one treaty. The fact is that we are negotiating another with regard to a different kind of nuclear weapons."

Americans Issue Nuclear Modernization Report

LD1301122589 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Washington January 13 TASS—by TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy:

The White House has advanced a plan to modernize the U.S. complex for the production of nuclear weapons and disposal of radioactive waste calculated for a period of twenty years. Its cost is estimated at 81 thousand million dollars, 52 of which will be spent on modernization and 29 thousand millions on waste disposal, it is noted in the report, which the Administration has submitted to the U.S. Congress.

The document was drawn up by the U.S. Department of energy with the participation of the Pentagon. This department supervises the enterprises involved in the manufacture of American nuclear weapons. The plan provides for the closing of three enterprises in the states of Colorado, Washington and Ohio, where the level of radioactive contamination is particuarly high.

Recent government investigations have shown that there is the danger of underground water contamination in the vicinities of these plants, which are known to produce components for nuclear weapons. Deactivation of this territory, as currently estimated, will take several decades. The Department of Energy moves to transfer their production to other plants. Consolidation of the nuclear compex, the report says, will yield an economy of funds and will ensure greater flexibility in dealing with a wide range of potential military, political and technological problems.

The question of whether or not the plan will be accepted by the Bush Administration, which is to assume power on January 20, remains open. This Thursday, when the non-secret part of the White House report to Congress was published, George Bush announced at a press-conference here his intention to apoint James Watkins as his new Secretary of Energy. When reporters queried him on the proposals contained in the report, the President-elect said he refused to assume committments on any reports, since it was dangerous to go ahead before the new Administration looked into the problems in hand.

Paper on Shultz Achievements as Secretary of State

PM1701093989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jan 89 Second Edition p 6

[A. Lyutyy article under the rubric "Portrait Against the Background of the News": "George Shultz"]

[Text] One of the members of the U.S. Administration who will be leaving Washington on January 20, the day that the new U.S. President is sworn in, is George Pratt Shultz, the 68-year-old Secretary of State, an economist by training but a diplomat by vocation.

When this unsophisticated and even slightly phlegmatic looking man replaced Alexander Haig in July 1982 few could have expected that he would remain in office 6 and ½ years. The post of head of the foreign policy department is not one of the most stable in the United States. Shultz's wife Helena inadvertently assured journalists as she left California in 1982: "See you in 2 and ½ years!" Meaning, by all accounts, until the next Presidential election.

Life decided differently. George Shultz not only was not ousted by factional infighting within the administration but also even managed to make a very perceptible mark on U.S. foreign policy. Doggedness, an exceptional capacity for work, and considerable experience of life and politics enabled him slowly but surely to achieve weighty results where his more impressive and eloquent predecessors had failed.

Foreign policy is made by real people. It is fair to say that Shultz was one of the architects of the change in relations between the USSR and the United States. "The Secretary of State," the U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT once wrote, "more than anyone else except Nancy Reagan helped to convert the President into a moderate on the question of policy toward the Soviet Union." Well, that was due to Shultz' realism and his sober realization of the fact that in the nuclear era the self-preservation of our two countries can only be guaranteed by means of dialogue. Shultz' ability to conduct talks patiently and to find solutions, and his experience of achieving compromise surely played a positive role during Soviet-U.S. high level contacts. In any event it is well known that working, constructive relations were formed between Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and the Secretary of State.

Not all the Secretary of State's demarches were marked by realism, it is true. Shultz, even more than Defense Secretary Weinberger, his constant opponent in disputes within the administration, defended the need to send troops to various corners of the world to protect U.S. "interests." It is well known what bloodshed resulted from the rapid and valiant dispatch of Marines to Grenada and Lebanon and the bombing of Libya. The U.S. Near East plan, woven together from proposals on separate deals, and which fell apart spectacularly, was the secretary's brainchild. Tribute must be paid to Shultz, however: Here, too, he has come a certain way toward realism. Near the end of the administration's term of office he personally recognized the need to begin a dialogue with the PLO.

Shultz is one of the few members of the Reagan administration whose name hardly figured at all among the financial, political, and moral scandals which have constantly rocked Washington in recent years.

What is he like out of his working environment? They say that he is an enthusiastic cook. Despite his nonsporting appearance Shultz is a great fan of golf and tennis. The Secretary of State has one more passion which is rarely mentioned—ballroom dancing. Although possessed of large fortune—before coming to Washington, Shultz was president of Bechtel, a multinational corporation—this father of five is quite unpretentious in his every-day life. He is not given to luxury, which, by American standards, should correspond to the status of such an important businessman. He does not lack a sense of humor and believes that it is never too late to learn. When his wife, watching her husband on television, exclaimed "George, what a boring speaker you are!" the Secretary of State took the criticism absolutely seriously. He didn't become a brilliant orator afterwards, but he drew the necessary conclusions and pepped up his speeches.

Jim Hoagland, a THE WASHINGTON POST commentator, who has taken a close and enthusiastic interest in the Secretary of State's career throughout these years, sums it up like this: When Shultz leaves office he will be leaving behind him a surprisingly long list of achievements in the sphere of East-West relations and arms control. At the same time, Hoagland believes, Shultz has had virtually no impact on international economics and trade, where, it was thought, he should have made an impression.

A paradox? Perhaps. But it does not bother Shultz. He has done quite a lot. "A new era in world affairs is beginning" now, as he said in his last public speech as Secretary of State.

Paper Attacks Kissinger's View of USSR, Gorbachev

PM1601103589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Jan 89 Second Edition p 6

[Feature under the rubric "From Different Positions" incorporating a reprint of a THE WASHINGTON POST article by Henry Kissinger and a retort by PRAVDA political observer Gennadiy Vasilev]

[Text]

The Views of a Former U.S. Secretary of State: The Idealists in the West

Since Mikhail Gorbachev's premature departure from New York, people are asking more and more frequently: Is Gorbachev serious? Is he sincere?

The answer is as clear as it is irrelevant. Gorbachev is totally sincere and entirely serious. The main question, however, is: What is he sincere about? What is the real aim of his frequently masterful diplomacy?

Most of the news media, and many leaders in America and Europe, have clearly come to the conclusion that Gorbachev is a new phenomenon, and that he has repudiated the entire preceding Soviet history. His speech has been compared to Wilson's 14 points and to the Atlantic Charter. Congressmen have started putting forward proposals as to what reductions in the U.S. defense budget his speech will make possible. European leaders and news media are vying with each other in demanding an answer. President Reagan has confirmed the sincerity of the Soviet leader. Mikhail Gorbachev made a dream of the West come true, a dream about some kind of panacea capable of automatically bringing about a relaxation of tension.

The question is not whether Gorbachev is serious, but rather whether the West is serious.

A serious attitude toward Gorbachev must be based on the premise that, like any other responsible leader, he is doing his utmost to safeguard the interests of the society with which he has been entrusted.

He is faced with a period of internal weakness. All around the Soviet Union—in Japan, Europe, and China—new centers of influence are appearing, giving rise to the prospect that the deterrence [sderzhivaniye] which has been the West's aim for 40 years may become reality. All this is to create a basis for all-embracing negotiations on the very essence of peaceful coexistence—respect for the vital interests of both sides.

However, this approach runs counter to the age-old unwillingness of the Americans to approach foreign policy from the viewpoint of balancing national interests rather than general reconciliation. Gorbachev has not shown any inclination to enter into such a dialogue, either. And in any case, from his point of view, it is expedient to weaken the unity of the centers of influence on or near the border of the Soviet Union and to undermine their resolve, so that the Soviet Union can make use of their economic assistance without the risk of strengthening their political influence.

However, even the most realistic statesman will be tempted to take the line of least resistance. He will try to seize control of the diplomatic agenda; he will try to broaden his options and to limit the options of his potential opponents.

Gorbachev brilliantly promoted these aims in his effective speech in New York. He was dealing with a president who had only 6 weeks of his term of office left, and who therefore could not place his successor, the President-elect, whose team in the sphere of national security had not yet been formed, under attack. Even after he has taken up his post, Bush will need several months to organize his administration, to analyze the options open to him, and to elaborate a strategy. And during all this time Gorbachev and his sympathizers in the West will be able to control the agenda to such an extent that in the final analysis the outcome may reflect the conditions which he stipulates.

However, this outcome will be inevitable only if the West, instead of engaging in a sober analysis, starts engaging in wishful thinking. How, in this case, is the current euphoria to be explained? It cannot be due to the propositions concerning Afghanistan or the illegal radar station in Krasnoyarsk. It has not been brought on by the passages in Gorbachev's speech in which he has written off hopeless foreign debts totaling $50 billion.

It was Gorbachev's arms control proposals that captured the imagination of the West. The significance of the proposed 10-percent cuts in the Soviet Armed Forces cannot be assessed or even checked out until the composition of the forces to be reduced is known. A reduction of a total of 5,000,000 men by 500,000 can be an effective way of consolidating supply functions, for instance. Similar proposals have been put forward by other Soviet leaders; the nature of the given proposals is as yet unclear.

The announced withdrawal of 6 tank divisions from Central Europe appears substantial, although it is not so new a proposal as might appear.

However that may be, the general impression that Gorbachev has offered unilateral concessions is absurd, or correct only in a purely theoretical sense.

Because his proposal will, unquestionably, give rise to demands for reciprocal concessions in all NATO countries, it must be assessed against the backdrop of the predictable responses that may be made.

For instance, the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons stationed in West Germany has become a highly controversial problem, partly because of fears that it might damage West German-Soviet relations. The West German Government tried to clarify this question by stating that it will carry out the modernization if no progress is achieved in the sphere of conventional arms control. Will the promised withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe be interpreted as such progress?

Gorbachev's speech has also rendered meaningless the argument that cuts in nuclear arms envisaged in connection with the agreement on the reduction of strategic arms should be in some way coupled with a reduction of conventional arms. However, if strategic arms are cut, if the modernization of battlefield weapons is called into question, and if the buildup of conventional forces is curbed, then NATO may find itself, in the end, without a military strategy altogether.

Ultimately, the importance of Gorbachev's speech will consist either in that it will mark a stage in the process of the West's disarmament, or that it will become the first step initiating complex negotiations. The interests of the West demand that it be transformed into a serious dialogue.

The Bush administration thus faces the need to make a decisive choice even before it takes power. It must not allow itself to be intimidated, but rather define its own agenda and a timetable for its actions. Ultimately, peaceful coexistence must be based on reciprocal respect for each other's vital interests rather than on propaganda spectacles. This will be the main test for Gorbachev and Bush.

The Russian empire has been expanding under tsars and commissars for 400 years. Since the times of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, Russia's sphere of influence in Europe has extended from the Dnepr to the Elbe, over some 1,500 miles, thanks partly to the fact that Russia sought absolute security, which meant absolute absence of security for all its neighbors.

Will it prove possible to induce Russia to support the concept of equilibrium for the first time in its history? Can we define what we ourselves understand under this concept?

The answer depends on many elusive factors and on changing age-old practices. The talks in question would have to be held on the basis of a cautious analytical approach, with an emphasis on both sides' long-term aims—on how they picture the world on the threshold of the 21st century, for instance.

If Gorbachev's speech leads to such a result, it may yet prove that it has marked a certain milestone. But that means that both sides would have to give up some of their favorite methods. Gorbachev would have to give up his predilection for beating the West at its own game, which he displayed in Reykjavik, for instance.... And the West would have to admit that one cannot form a judgment about long-term policy while pandering to an insatiable thirst for progress without any criteria. In order to truly build something, it is much more important to prove that one is right, rather than win cheap popularity. [Kissinger ends]

The Opinion of a PRAVDA Political Observer: Negativism Instead of Realism

I am sure that the reader has immediately noticed the ironical tone of the article by H. Kissinger, which we are publishing in slightly abridged form. From the height of his wisdom and experience as professor of political sciences, its author is mocking the "idealists" of the West. Look at the "simpletons"—they are in raptures over M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the UN General Assembly session—they even demand a positive response from NATO countries to the Soviet Union's peace-loving initiatives! Kissinger disagrees with such a "naive" approach. He tries to cool the enthusiasm of U.S. and West European leaders and journalists. He acts the part of a past master of politics, a rigorous realist, who understand better than others what's what in this complex world.

There is no denying that realism is a good quality. We all need it badly. Without realism, without the ability to get to the bottom of the intricacies of global problems—be they military, economic, or related to food, energy, or the ecology—you will get absolutely nowhere, as the saying goes. Incidentally, it seems to me that we lacked realism in particular during the period of detente in the seventies, when we had succumbed to illusions and were trying to convince ourselves and others of the irreversibility of the improvement in the international atmosphere that was under way then. However, realism clearly also presupposes the ability to see not only reality, in all its contradictoriness and interconnections, but also to understand the deep-seated processes characteristic of a given period.

If you apply this yardstick to H. Kissinger's article, it looks rather like an example of negativism, an attempt to apply the brakes to the positive tendencies which are gathering momentum in international affairs. Although it is not being done directly, point-blank, the main thrust of the author's destructive efforts is to call into question the motives and aims of the USSR's love of peace. According to Kissinger, all that the Soviet Union is doing, with a view to a demilitarization of relations and laying the foundations for a nonviolent and secure world, is declared to be a result of "internal weaknesses" in the USSR, and pursues the aim of "weakening the unity" and "undermining the determination of the centers of influence on or near the borders of the Soviet Union." (Let us note in passing that the author of the article describes not just West Europe, but also Japan and China as such centers).

The article contains quite a few compliments to the Soviet leader. However, even in making these compliments, the author is somehow unable to conceal his irritation. Nothing pleases him: neither the USSR's proposals aimed at achieving a speedy peace in Afghanistan, nor its readiness to transform the Krasnodar radar station into an international center of peaceful cooperation, nor the Soviet Union's willingness to introduce a moratorium on the repayment of debts by the least developed countries, and in a number of cases to write them off completely. Even the Soviet Union's unilateral reduction of its Armed Forces evokes above all his suspicions. But after all, half a million officers and men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft are not a needle in a haystack. They cannot be hidden. Especially in our time when, according to U.S. newspapers, the Pentagon's spy satellites can "read" car license plates on the earth.

The reasons for Kissinger's bad mood become obvious somewhere half-way through the article. The Soviet Union's arms reduction initiatives—as he puts it—"will undoubtedly give rise to demands for reciprocal concessions in all NATO countries" (allow me to add that they already have, and very vigorous demands at that). He is afraid that "obstacles to the modernization of conventional arms and the distribution of the defense burden (that is, attempts to foist even bigger military spending on the U.S. West European allies—G.V.) will arise even more quickly." "But what NATO country will build up its arms or agree to share the defense burden with America," Kissinger asks indignantly, "while Gorbachev is unilaterally reducing his forces?"

Trying to justify his stance, an extremely unpopular stance in our time, the author of the article has to resort to sophistry. "Ultimately," he writes, "the importance of Gorbachev's speech will consist either in that it will mark a stage in the process of the West's disarmament, or that it will become the first step which will initiate complex negotiations. The interests of the West demand that it be transformed into a serious dialogue." Yet, you may ask, why either-or? And why only the West's disarmament, and not the disarmament of the whole world? After all, a serious dialogue is already under way, and it is relatively successful. Let us recall Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow. Let us recall the Soviet-American treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, which is already being implemented, and the talks on the two countries' 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms, which are making headway despite all difficulties. The negotiation process on problems of nuclear weapons, conventional arms, and chemical weapons, and the quest for political approaches to ending regional conflicts, are developing successfully. Mutual understanding is emerging in Soviet-American relations, and elements of trust have appeared. Having read H. Kissinger's article you come to the conclusion, no matter how regrettable, that mankind's progress toward a demilitarized, safe world for some reason does not please the author.

As for the author's excursion into Russian history—it does him no honor at all. Presenting our country "under tsars and commissars" as some kind of primordially aggressive setup, he blatantly sins against the truth. The professor is forgetting that in the 13th century the Russian people bore the brunt of the onslaught of the Tatar and Mongol conquerors, thus providing favorable conditions for the economic and cultural development of West Europe. Quite recently, half a century ago, it was the Soviet people who bore the main burden of the clash with Fascism. May the author have this "forgetfulness" on his conscience.

"Gorbachev," Kissinger writes, "like any other responsible leader, is doing his utmost to safeguard the interests of the society with which he has been entrusted." It is possible to agree with this assessment. But we understand that it is impossible now to safeguard our interests while acting to the detriment of the interests of other members of the international community; we understand that there is a universal human interest. However, this maxim of new political thinking is clearly missing in the deliberations of the author of the article. He comes across as a geopolitician of the prenuclear era.

Reading this article I could not but feel a certain amount of embarrassment for its author. We knew the former presidential national security adviser and former U.S. secretary of state as a relatively sensible man, as a man who made a certain, I would even say, considerable, contribution to the improvement of Soviet-American relations in his time. Is it perhaps sour grapes which make him write in this vein, is it because the present Washington politicians refuse to act in accordance with his recipes? However that may be, H. Kissinger's advice is not conducive to the cause of progress which, as the Soviet leader said in New York, "is possible now only through a quest for mankind's universal consensus in the movement toward a new world order."

American, Global Relations With USSR Reviewed

PM1701092589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jan 89 Second Edition p 6

[Anatoliy Karpychev article under the "View From Moscow" rubric: "May We Not Be Misunderstood...."]

[Text] Perhaps it is only now that the world is realizing with complete clarity how important it is to understand one another correctly. There was a time when the West categorically refused to understand us because it dislikes Communists. We, in turn, blamed everything on the intrigues of the imperialist circles, and that was virtually our only explanation to the public. But now we see a different picture. The world is talking about our peace initiatives not only in the pages of Soviet newspapers but also in its own; the world is keenly discussing them, wants to understand our restructuring, and even wishes it success. Our new leadership has become popular, and when TIME magazine first declared M.S. Gorbachev "Man of the Year," the U.S. side noted with some jealousy: "It takes two to tango."

No one doubts that you cannot tango alone, but the magazine opted for our leader apparently because he made the invitation first. That was back in the statement of 15 January 1986. Much has been said about its significance in recent days, including in our newspaper, and I do not want to repeat it. It is a historic document. We were fond of using this word in the past but here, in my opinion, the occasion is completely different. Read the statement again, think about it again, and you will see that the whole series of measures we have taken to lead the world away from the abyss of nuclear catastrophe and away from fear for the future are nothing more than the specific embodiment of the ideas contained in the document.

It can be said boldly that the statement's ideas have been fused with our practical steps in foreign policy in the past 3 years. In the past, too, of course, we had our peace program, and even schoolchildren ignorant of it were in trouble as far as their examinations were concerned; the

West had its own programs, and meanwhile the world was groaning beneath mountains of nuclear weapons. The West justified those mountains with the "Red threat" and frighteningly immoral repetitions of the theme "the Russians are coming," even though we had no intention of going anywhere.

In Western eyes we were the enemy, the Russian bear which could not be trusted. And if you add to that the ideological determination of some of our leaders to bury capitalism, and you recall N.S. Khrushchev's desire to give the West a "bloody nose," then you can understand what effort it took in our time to break through the bastions of anti-Sovietism and begin dialogue on the fate of peace.

Today we can say with satisfaction that the disarmament process is gathering momentum. But it has still not become irreversible.

There is a great desire in the world to reject confrontation in favor of dialogue and cooperation. But it has by no means become established once and for all.

The legacy and inertia of the past still operate.

For example, at a White House press conference recently, journalists put a very typical question to Ronald Reagan:

"Mr President, this is your last press conference. At your first one you said that the Soviets will commit any crime, lie, deceive, and cheat to achieve their political aims. But today you are noting the progress which you and President Gorbachev have made together, and you rate highly the speech in which he, on behalf of the Soviet Union, renounced the use of force to achieve foreign policy tasks. Do you believe that it has really changed?"

In reply to the journalists' question, Ronald Reagan, who is nearing the end of his second term as President, answered that it was not he who coined that description of the Soviets, and in that respect he was right. But then inertia took over: He said that at his press conference he had repeated our own words and expressed our own philosophy, whose essence is to justify any crime "for the sake of advancing the cause of socialism." To the President's credit he did not forget to add: "The situation has changed now." And he announced to journalists that he had presented M.S. Gorbachev with a souvenir photograph showing them walking in Geneva in 1985 and he had inscribed on it: "We have come a long way together to clear the road to peace."

Three years is quite a short time. But the fact remains that people have begun to breathe more easily. It is no coincidence that NEWSWEEK, in its roundup of 1988, enthusiastically called it the year of miracles. What kind of miracles? Some missiles were destroyed. The superpowers spoke about one another in peaceable terms. Ronald Reagan delivered a speech under a bust of V.I. Lenin in a student auditorium at Moscow State University. In 1988 the grumblers and cynics had to stand aside to avoid being buried under an avalanche of glad tidings.

The cheerful tone soothes the readers, and the magazine ignores the fact that it is clearly easier to destroy missiles than to change images of the Soviet Union and remove the wall of suspicion and distrust.

It still invisibly divides us, even though we know far more about each other today than we did 3 years ago. I do not want to recall the past, but it makes its presence felt. It is there in the questions, such as: Can the Soviets be trusted? It cautions: Do not fall for Gorbachev's charm, he is a tough politician of the new type, you could fall into his trap. And it is no coincidence that the U.S. moderator of a children's television linkup under the slogan "Can We Be One Family?" still expresses surprise at how alike Soviet and U.S. children are.

"I did not expect Soviet children to like the same music and the same dances," she told a newspaper correspondent. "Perhaps if we see that we like the same music and that we have the same hopes and dreams, we will understand that the USSR is not an empire of evil inhabited by people with horns and tails."

It is easier to cast off the old fetters if you see the world as it really is. Yes, the "enemy image" has gone out of circulation, but another stereotype remains and is alive and kicking: You have to have muscle to talk with the Russians. Peace through strength is the official doctrine of the White House, they glorify it and predict that it will succeed in clearing the way to peace. But essentially this stereotype is nothing other than the obverse of the old stereotype. It is generally not customary to use force when talking with good people. First, it is vulgar, and, second, according to the Russian proverb, force belittles the role of wisdom and pushes it into the background. And it is wisdom which is needed more than ever now for the joint solution of general human tasks.

So, a little more wisdom, a little more trust and ability to understand one another.... It is time for force and the threat of force to be pensioned off.

Organization Opposed to Secret Operations Founded

LD1501131389 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] Washington January 15 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Igor Ignatyev

A group of former officers of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence services announced here an establishment of a new non-government organisation which is against using secret operations as an instrument of the U.S. foreign policy.

Explaining the reasons for setting up the association of national security alumni, retired Colonel Philip Rottinger, its present head, who had carried out the CIA's assignments in Guatemala, said that the notorious Iran-Contras deal turned out to be another U.S. foreign policy failure which was caused by secret operations. The association, he said, is for more open foreign policy and will seek to restrict possibilities of waging secret wars to prevent similar failures in the future. It plans to establish, said the retired colonel, direct contacts with the new congress and the new administration. The organisation, using the experience of its members, intends to influence the drafting of legislation in the sphere of national security.

According to Rottinger, the association informed the CIA director and heads of other U.S. intelligence services of its establishment and aims. He noted that the new organisation intends to observe strictly laws and rules defining the way of work with confidential and secret information, in part, to observe the ban on divulging identities of intelligence agents and the requirement on preliminary censorship of publications on these topics. However, Rottinger said that the association would support people who would make public the above information in public interests if it gets firm proof of misuse of these laws, aimed at hoodwinking Americans deliberately.

Northeast Asia

Japan To Participate in U.S. 'Pacex' Exercise

LD1601130989 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Tokyo January 16 TASS—The Japanese Navy, Air Force and Army will participate in the Pentagon's largest ever Pacific military exercise, codenamed Pacex, this Autumn, the Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN reported on Monday, referring to a Japanese Defence Agency decision.

The two-month-long muscle flexing will start on September 1, the newspaper reported.

The Pentagon will send four carrier groups of the U.S. Third and Seventh fleets, two to three Army divisions, a Marine division and more than 500 aircraft, including B-52 strategic bombers.

The war games involving Washington's allies in the region will be held in the waters near the Aleutian islands, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea.

The Japanese Defence Agency fears that "direct Japanese participation" in these large scale exercises and increased involvement in the U.S. strategies of collective defence will be criticised as contravening the Japanese constitution's peaceful provisions, the newspaper says.

In such conditions, the Japanese military propose to send its Navy, Army and Air Force to "joint Japanese-U.S. exercises" that will "accidentally" coincide with the Pacex manoeuvers.

'Complicated, Unstable' Far East Situation Noted

LD1601202089 Moscow TASS in English 1926 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 16 TASS—TASS political observer Askold Biryukov writes:

The year 1988 is gradually becoming part of history. It has passed on to the year 1989 the torch of the peace process, specifically, the beginning of the disarmament process, the settlement of regional conflicts and the restructuring of international relations on the basis of new political thinking. The year 1989 confidently took up the torch. It has witnessed already such remarkable events as the successful end of a conference on chemical weapons in Paris in which 149 countries took part and of the Vienna meeting of participants in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The improvement of international relations is gaining momentum in various parts of the world. However, there is a region which has not been affected by the peace process despite consistent peace-making efforts of the Soviet Union and a number of other countries. The region is the Far East or, more exactly, the north-western part of the Pacific basin where the situation continues to be complicated and unstable. The deployment of nuclear weapon systems and other weapons is going on there and the naval activity is increasing. Large-scale military demonstrations fraught with unpredictable consequences are staged close to the borders of other countries.

The Pacex military exercise which the U.S. is going to stage next Autumn will be one of them. The area of this major exercise will cover the sea around the Aleutian Islands, The Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. Four aircraft carrier groups from the 3rd and 7th U.S. Fleets, two or three Army divisions, a Marine division, over 500 warplanes, including B-52 strategic bombers, will take part in the Pacex military exercise from the U.S. side alone. Apart from U.S. servicemen deployed on U.S. mainland and the Hawaii Islands, as well as at the U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and the Mariana Islands, troops of U.S. allies, specifically, Japan, are to participate in it. According to reports coming from Tokyo, a decision to this effect has been taken already by Japan.

There is one more thing which is unusual about this military exercise: despite changes for the better taking place in the world, it is going to be of a confrontation nature. Its programme includes the "occupation" of the Kuril Islands, the "blockade" of the Kamchatka Peninsula, the "establishment of control" over the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, as well as over the Pacific communication routes, the "attack on coastal areas" and so on. In other words, it will be fully in line with the notorious "Lehman Doctrine" which envisages the dealing of blows, including nuclear ones, at Soviet military and civilian facilities both on the coast and deep on USSR territory.

The inertia of military thinking seems to be strong in Washington with regard to this region. It is at variance both with the modern trends in the world and with the call of reason, with basic common sense. Most probably, it is the obstacle which does not allow Washington to accept Soviet proposals aimed at bringing down the level of military confrontation and lessening military activity in the region. It is surprising that Japan which assures everyone of its good intentions and the desire to promote the bringing down of world tension is also going to make its contribution to these dangerous actions promoting confrontation.

DPRK Moves to Hold Preliminary Talks With ROK

LD1601111989 Moscow TASS in English 1102 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 16 (TASS)—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has again gone on record for military-political negotiations at government level between North and South Korea. A letter from the DPRK premier Yon Hyong-muk, addressed to the prime minister of South Korea Kang Yong-hun, was handed to the South Korean side at Panmunjom today. It is a reply to Seoul's official consent to hold negotiations on political and military aspects of bilateral relations, proposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Yon Hyong-muk noted the "agreement in principle", expressed by both sides on this matter, and went on record for holding bilateral negotiations at Pyongyang or Seoul with the participation of premiers and military leaders. They are to discuss problems of ending the military-political confrontation between the north and the south, as well as the question of putting an end to large-scale military exercises in the peninsula. In this connection he moved to hold a preliminary meeting at the level of deputy ministers at Panmunjom on February 8.

As to the question raised by the South Korean side concerning the resumption of economic negotiations between the north and the south, the message notes, it "may be settled automatically if high-level military-political negotiations are called." Yon Hyong-muk expressed the hope that the South Korean administration would renounce the holding of this year's American-South Korean "Team Spirit" exercises.

The letter calls on the other side to "study carefully" the DPRK proposal to call tripartite negotiations with the participation of U.S. representatives in order to achieve peace in Korea.

Timber Ministry Responds to Japanese Criticism

PM1301161889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 89 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "We Hear Mr Ivata"]

[Text] On 10 October 1988 PRAVDA published under the above headline a report from I. Latyshev in Tokyo about a number of shortcomings in the work of the first Soviet-Japanese wood processing enterprise, "Igirma-Tayriku," which was set up in the settlement of Igirma in Irkutsk Oblast. The reasons for these shortcomings, which are, to be frank, not as trivial as all that, are, according to Dzyugo Ivata [as transliterated], president of the Japanese firm Tayriku [as transliterated], entirely on the conscience of the Soviet side.

After the publication of this report the editorial office received an official reply from the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, signed by Deputy Minister I.N. Sankin.

It says that the ministry, together with organizations of the USSR Ministry of Railways and the USSR Ministry of Communications, has examined the issues raised in this article and deems its proposals for improving the activity of the joint Soviet-Japanese enterprise "Igirma-Tayriku" to be correct.

In this connection, the ministry's letter notes, agreed on decisions have been adopted to increase the efficiency of the joint enterprise's production and economic activity. These provide for supplying the enterprise with raw lumber of the required quality on the basis of the planned volume of production of 90,000 cubic meters of lumber per year. Measures are being adopted to complete the construction of a railroad siding and a cable telephone line to ensure a more stable telephone and fax link between the enterprise, Moscow, and Tokyo.

Also, measures have been adopted to improve the organization of the transportation of lumber for export, and prevent instances of damage to the cargo in transit; constant quality control has been set up for output dispatched to Japan.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Rumor of Soviets Fighting Karens in Burma Denied

BK1601144389 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] The Information Committee of the State Law and Order Restoration Council has rejected the propaganda spread by insurgents that Soviet military personnel had joined the side of the government troops in the recent battles with KNU [Karen National Union] insurgent units.

A Burmese Government spokesman termed as a blatant lie the claim by the Karen insurgents that two Russians were killed at the Methawaw battle site, an area where Burmese students are being trained in insurgent camps by West German instructors.

Vietnam's Nguyen Van Linh Receives Thai Minister

BK1401124489 Moscow in Thai to Thailand 1100 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] CPV Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh reportedly received Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila who was paying an official visit to the SRV. The Vietnamese leader attributed much importance to the visit and emphasized Vietnam's desire to further strengthen friendship between the two countries and further develop economic, trade, scientific, and technical relations, as well as to contribute together to normalizing the situation in Southeast Asia to turn the region into a zone of peace, good-neighborliness, and cooperation.

Nguyen Van Linh welcomed Thailand's actions aimed at improving and developing relationships with the Indochinese countries. Air Chief Marshal [ACM] Sitthi informed the Vietnamese leader that his visit was more successful than he had expected, saying that the visit advanced the political and economic relations between the two countries a step further. The Vietnamese announcement to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by September has received a positive response in Thailand as well in other ASEAN countries. The Thai foreign minister emphasized that Thailand and Vietnam have great potential for development of bilateral economic cooperation, and he urged Thai businessmen to begin earnest trade contacts with Vietnam. ACM Sitthi expressed hope that such cooperation will expand and diversify.

Vietnamese Official's Departure for PRC Noted

OW1501114989 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] According to foreign news agency reports, the first vice minister of Vietnam's Foreign Ministry left for Beijing on 14 January for talks with Chinese leaders. This marks the first visit by a high-ranking Vietnamese official to China in nearly 10 years.

The first vice minister of Vietnam's Foreign Ministry was accompanied by three leading officials of the ministry, including a China expert.

The reports indicated that the Sino-Vietnamese talks will focus on the settlement of the Cambodian issue. The China visit by the minister was realized after a series of diplomatic proposals to solve the Cambodian conflict were made. The first was the joint announcement by Vietnam and Cambodia that, on the premise of politically solving the Cambodian problem, Vietnam will withdraw all its voluntary troops from Cambodia no later than September of 1989.

Visa Accord Reached With PRC, DPRK, Laos

OW1501072589 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 11 Jan 89

[Text] The Soviet Union has signed agreements with the PRC, DPRK, Laos, Cambodia, and some other nations to allow people to enter each other's country without a visa. Commenting on this news report, (Halivanskiy), spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said: This is a result of improving state relations and ensuring human rights. Some time ago, the Soviet Union greatly relaxed its entry and exit regulations. Some 1 million people entered and left the Soviet Union in 1988.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits Philippines

Delegation Arrives in Manila

LD1401095989 Moscow TASS in English 0929 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Text] Manila January 14 TASS—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, led by Valentina Tereshkova, arrived on an official visit in Manila on Saturday at the invitation of the Philippine Congress. During the visit Soviet MPS will meet Philippine President Corazon Aquino, foreign minister Raul Manglapus, members of the Philippine Parliament and heads of various ministries.

Tereshkova, Delegation Meet Aquino

HK1601044289 Moscow International Service in Tagalog 1300 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] The head of the Soviet parliamentary delegation visiting the Philippines is the first ever female cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova. In a talk yesterday with journalists upon her delegation's arrival in Manila, Tereshkova expressed hope for a continuing dialogue between the Soviet Union and the Philippines on wider and more serious issues, including trade and economic cooperation. She said she was certain that relations between both countries will continue to flourish and thus promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the visit to Manila, the Soviet delegation met with Philippine President Corazon Aquino, members of Congress and other government officials.

Aquino Receives Soviet Delegation

LD1601200589 Moscow TASS in English 1506 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Manila January 16 TASS—Corazon Aquino, the president of the Philippines, received today the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by Valentina Tereshkova, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, currently on an official visit here. During their talks, attended by Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus, the sides discussed a wide range of international problems and the question of further developing bilateral relations.

The head of the Soviet delegation conveyed to the president and the people of the Philippines Mikhail Gorbachev's cordial greetings and good wishes. Corazon Aquino expressed gratitude for the greetings and reaffirmed her intention to pay a visit to the Soviet Union. Its date will be agreed upon additionally. She added that the Filipino minister for trade and industry and the country's foreign minister were planning to visit the USSR.

The president of the Philippines displayed interest in the expansion of Soviet-Filipino relations, particularly in commercial and economic contacts. The more personal contact we have, the better our relations will be, she stressed. In the light of this, the head of the Filipino state spoke highly of the visit recently paid to Manila by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU CC Politburo, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

The Soviet delegation had a meeting today with the Senate speaker Jovito Salonga and other members of the higher chamber of Congress. The sides discussed ways of further developing bilateral interparliamentary relations as an important part of the foreign policy dialogue between the two countries. The Filipino legislators evinced interest in different aspects of the perestroyka processes going on in the USSR. The Soviet MPs were invited as guests of honour to a meeting of the Filipino Senate.

The meetings, which proceeded in an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding, were attended by Oleg Sokolov, the Soviet ambassador to the republic of the Philippines.

Manila Peace, Disarmament Conference Convenes

HK1601044089 Moscow International Service in Tagalog 1300 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Text] In Manila, the major Philippine city, an International Conference for Peace and Progress in the Asia-Pacific Region is taking place. More than 200 activists from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and countries in South Asia and the Pacific region are attending the conference which is discussing the problem of disarmament. It is generally agreed that foreign military bases are the root causes of tension in the region.

Military Bases Seen as Threat

HK1401065789 Moscow International Service in Tagalog 1300 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Report by correspondent (Anatoly Alexandrov) on the Asia-Pacific Conference on Peace and Progress in Manila]

[Text] More than 200 activists from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and other South Pacific island states are taking part in the conference. What are the topics being discussed at the meeting? According to Ben Bartlett, the Australian conference organizer, the conference will discuss the negative consequences of foreign military bases in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is no coincidence that the conference is being held in the capital of the Philippines, for Manila is just a few hours away from the biggest U.S. military bases outside the United States. These are Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base, which allow the Pentagon to monitor strategic zones in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

These bases pose enormous threats. It is sufficient to know that the U.S. military bases in the Philippines were used during the U.S. war of aggression in Indochina. Moreover, there is evidence indicating the presence of nuclear weapons in the bases. For many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, this is regarded as a great threat to peace.

An anti-military bases movement has recently grown rapidly in the Philippines. Local newspapers also frequently focus on U.S.-Philippines relations, because the leases on the military bases will expire soon.

According to Filipino officials, the two sides will begin bilateral talks on the future of the military bases this year. As a result, Washington has started to activate its contacts in Manila, notably in the financial sector. The Philippines is direly in need of money to repay its foreign debts, which now stand at more than $28 million. Hence, the United States has begun to organize multilateral aid to the Philippines, known as the mini-Marshall plan.

Recently, U.S. Senator Lugar, the initiator of this project, visited Manila. His talks with President Corazon Aquino dealt precisely with the mini-Marshall plan. However, the objective of the American legislator is not to uphold the interests of the Philippines as a debtor country.

According to Pelaez, the Philippine ambassador to the United States, American and Japanese banks may take on part of the Philippines' debt obligations if Manila agrees to retain the U.S. military bases on Philippine territory. Hence, the debt-for-bases proposal may become a reality.

In response to Washington's initiatives, peace activists in the Philippines and in other Asia-Pacific countries have launched protests against the presence of U.S. military bases in the region.

Near East & South Asia

Shevardnadze Visits Afghanistan 13-15 January

Seen Off by Zaykov

LD1301132289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Today Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committe Politburo and USSR foreign minister, departed Moscow for Kabul on a working visit. At the airport he was seen off by Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and by other officials. Among those who saw him off was Golabzoy, ambassador of Afghanistan to the USSR.

Met by Wakil in Kabul

LD1301151789 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Kabul January 13 TASS—Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, arrived in Kabul on a working visit on Friday.

He was welcomed by 'Abdul Wakil, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and Afghan foreign minister, and other officials.

The welcoming party included Yuliy Vorontsov, a first deputy foreign minister of the USSR and Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan.

Vorontsov on Openness to Talks

LD1301203589 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] The Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has arrived in Kabul on a working visit.

His planned talks with the Afghan leadership are expected to center on ways of achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that such a settlement would be attainable if all parties concerned showed a sensible approach to the issue.

A short while ago this country's ambassador to Kabul, Yuliy Vorontsov, said the USSR and Afghanistan would always keep the door to talks open.

Confers With Najibullah

LD1401082689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0720 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Text] Kabul, 14 Jan (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, who is in Kabul on a working visit, has met Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan and general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee.

During the talks, which were held in a warm and friendly atmosphere, attention was focused on the state of and prospects for developing the situation in and around Afghanistan. It was noted by the two sides that there is every objective opportunity to finally direct the processes occurring in Afghanistan into a durable channel of a peaceful settlement, to halt the bloodshed, and to bring the long-awaited peace and tranquillity to Afghanistan. Stress was laid on the great importance of the detailed proposals on an Afghan settlement set out in M.S. Gorbachev's UN speech, which have given rise to widespread and positive response from the world's community. An important step, which was given total support by the Soviet side, was taken by the Afghan Government when it declared a unilateral cease-fire as of 1 January 1989. This initiative was not, however, accepted by the opposition, which persisted in inflicting an armed struggle on the Afghan people, thereby delaying the establishment of peace in Afghanistan.

The Soviet side confirmed its intention to continue to act as an intermediary in organizing an all-Afghan dialogue, during which the Afghans themselves would select the way to resolve their problems, proceeding from the interests of their people, and of ensuring Afghanistan's status as an independent, neutral, and demilitarized state.

In turn, President Najibullah noted that the Government of Afghanistan would sincerely like a straight path toward a rapid end to the protracted conflict to be laid in the very nearest time. At the same time it is prepared for a different, unfavorable development of events, and for continuing to resist the pressure imposed by violence and armed raids.

The Soviet side confirmed its total support for the political course being followed by the Afghan leadership and noted that the Soviet Union would continue to provide the Republic of Afghanistan with varied assistance in accordance with the treaties and agreements concluded between the two countries. At present, particular importance is attached to supplying the Afghan population with humanitarian aid in the form of food and fuel. The Soviet side intends to strictly discharge relevant obligations that it has agreed to vis-a-vis the Government of Afghanistan.

Meets With Sharq, Wakil

PM1501183089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Second Edition p 4

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, who is in Kabul on a working visit, on 14 January met M.H. Sharq, prime minister of the Republic of Afghanistan. In the course of the conversation there was a keen discussion of questions concerning the situation in Afghanistan and around that country, which has currently entered a particularly critical period. The parties noted that the constructive position of the president and Government of Afghanistan was creating the essential basis for a further quest for ways to reach a political settlement. The activity of the present Government of the Republic of Afghanistan, in which there is successful cooperation between representatives of various parties as well as nonparty members, shows that Afghans are also able to conduct a broad national dialogue on all questions concerning their country's future.

Questions of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation were discussed in specific terms. The Soviet side stressed its firm intention to observe the intergovernmental and other agreements concluded in this sphere and to fulfill the obligations it had taken upon itself, especially concerning the rendering of assistance to the Afghan population in the form of supplies of food, petroleum products, and other goods of primary necessity.

The Afghan side expressed thanks and gratitude to the Soviet side for its assistance in surmounting the difficulties the Afghan people are currently encountering.

E.A. Shevardnadze and M.K. Sharq exchanged views regarding the best use of the opportunities opening up in connection with the long-term program of economic, technical, and trade cooperation for the period up to the year 2000 which has been signed between our countries.

On the same day there was a meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and A. Wakil, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan.

It was noted that the initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev and Najibullah on peacefully unblocking the Afghan situation have attracted the attention of the international community. Implementation of these initiatives would make it possible to embark in the very near future upon the road leading to an end to bloodshed on Afghan soil.

A. Wakil expressed gratitude to the Soviet side for its efforts to provide assistance in organizing contacts with Afghans committed to various political views and convictions. It was stressed that in spite of everything, possibilities do exist for Afghans finally to come to an agreement among themselves.

The sides again emphasized that it was necessary to make the fullest use of the favorable opportunities that had arisen for an Afghan settlement as the result of the signing of the Geneva agreements and the 43d session of the UN General Assembly's unanimous adoption of its resolution on Afghanistan.

Individual, specific aspects of the situation in Afghanistan were discussed during a meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and S. Tanai, minister of defense of the Republic of Afghanistan; G.F. Ya'qubi, minister of state security; and M.A. Watanjar, minister of internal affairs.

There were also meetings with N. 'Ulwmi, governor general of Qandahar Province and commander of the II Army Corps; and F.H. Khaliqyar, governor of Herat Province, as well as other Afghan statesmen and political figures.

Concludes Talks With Najibullah

PM1601113589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jan 89 Second Edition pp 5-6

[TASS report: "Visit Over"]

[Text]—Talks between E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, and Najibullah, Afghan president and PDPA general secretary, ended in Kabul on 15 January.

The sides stated that during their talks they reconfirmed their common views on the ways to resolve the Afghan problem. The sides confirmed that a just and lasting settlement in Afghanistan can only be achieved through inter-Afghan dialogue and the formation of a broadly based government. The sides noted that the main obstacle to the achievement of such a settlement is the belligerent policy of the extremist part of the opposition, which has made of the war a means to try to implement its own selfish goals. These quarters of the opposition lean on the foreign forces that oppose the development of peace processes in Afghanistan.

At the same time, they noted the usefulness of the contacts the Soviet and Afghan sides have had with representatives of various opposition groups located both inside and outside Afghanistan.

They expressed the hope that at this crucial moment, when the destiny of the Afghan people is being decided, the whole international community, and first and foremost Afghanistan's neighboring countries, will direct their efforts toward promoting the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

They reached an accord on a wide circle of issues of Soviet-Afghan cooperation relating to the present day, to the outlook for the next few months, and to the more distant future.

E.A. Shevardnadze held talks with and S.A. Keshtmand, N.M. Muhmand, and N.A.K. Kawiani, secretaries of the PDPA Central Committee; and the leadership of the Revolutionary Organization of the Working People of Afghanistan (TROA).

Within the framework of his working visit to the Republic of Afghanistan, E.A. Shevardnadze met Muhammad Hakim, mayor of Kabul, and Daud Razmie, secretary of the PDPA Kabul City Committee.

In a friendly and frank conversation, the leaders of the Afghan capital spoke of the life and dealings of the people of Kabul and of the contribution Kabul is making to implementing the national reconciliation policy. They also noted that, despite certain successes on this path, the opponents of a political settlement among the opposition's extremist circles are trying in every way to hinder the Afghans' peaceful life and labor. The opposition is hatching particular plans against the Afghan capital, trying to organize an economic blocade of Kabul by preventing the entry of essential commodities. Even today, the food and fuel shortage is being felt in Kabul. The situation, moreover, is made worse by the winter cold. Actions like this by the opposition evoke the righteous indignation of the residents of the Afghan capital and strengthen their determination to fight for a future peaceful and flourishing Afghanistan.

The Soviet side expressed complete support for the efforts of the Afghan people to achieve a national consensus and stressed that Soviet people will in the future, too, provide vital aid to their friendly neighbor, and not leave it in trouble.

The sides noted with satisfaction the important role played in the development of cooperation between the two countries by direct links between Moscow and Kabul, and expressed their mutual intention to deepen and improve these ties.

Interviewed by BAKHTAR

PM1601105389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jan 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "E.A. Shevardnadze Interview With BAKHTAR Agency"]

[Text] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, who is in Afghanistan on a working visit, granted an interview to the BAKHTAR news agency. Answering a question about the aim of his current visit to Kabul, he indicated that what is probably the most crucial period in the development of the Afghan situation is now beginning, and that what is in essence the chief question is being resolved—Will the long awaited peace finally arrive on Afghanistan's long suffering soil? Naturally, it is necessary now more than ever to compare our evaluations of the situation and to determine joint actions for the near and distant future. I can say immediately that the talks have confirmed the unity of our views on all issues.

As before, the political line of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan remains oriented toward achieving a comprehensive Afghan settlement and resolving inter-Afghan disagreements through peaceful means at the negotiating table. A real, integrated base exists for such a settlement: the proposals by M.S. Gorbachev and Najibullah.

There can be no variant reading regarding the fact that the road to an internal Afghan settlement lies with the formation of a representative government on a broad basis with the participation of all Afghan opposition groups, and the Soviet Union fully supports the efforts of the Republic of Afghanistan in this direction. This fundamental idea is generally recognized, and the world community spoke in favor of this road at the 43d UN General Assembly session. But in exactly the same way it must be absolutely clear and obvious that a government that truly reflects the will and interests of all sectors of Afghan society can only be formed under the conditions of a cease-fire and if military operations on Afghan territory cease. To issue an ultimatum, threatening a new escalation of the war, that demands the exclusion of this or that real and influential political force from the state power structure is to undermine in advance all possibilities for the creation of a widely representative organ capable of ensuring a real end to the bloodshed and the genuinely free expression of the will of the Afghan people.

Commenting on the position of the Alliance of Seven, E.A. Shevardnadze noted that it cannot yet be called constructive. What but surprise can be evoked by the opposition's statement of its intention to break off talks with the Soviet side? The armed opposition in the form of the Alliance of Seven did not respond to the unilateral cease-fire by government and Soviet forces and continues to bank only on weapons. The opposition's thoughts do not go beyond war and continuing the killing. As a result, the bloodshed on Afghan soil continues. The opposition has not yet clearly defined its approach to the idea of a consultative council—a transitional body representing the various Afghan political, social, and religious views and outlooks and designed to set up a broadly based government. Incidentally, the idea of setting up a consultative council comes from Pakistan. It is supported by both the Soviet Union and Kabul and, it would seem, should be in accord with the alliance' proposals regarding a representative council (shura).

However, E.A. Shevardnadze said that we are still not losing hope that the voice of reason will be heard and heeded. Therefore, the door for contacts with our side and the Kabul side remains wide open for a constructive talk with the Alliance of Seven, the Alliance of Eight, Zahir Shah, and all other opposition and emigre groups.

But we make no claims to substitute for the Afghans and to settle internal Afghan affairs on their behalf. Our mission is restricted to providing the services of a mediator and is intended to help Afghans look at one another not through gunsights, but to conduct direct dialogue at the negotiating table of peace.

I reiterate: Our meetings and conversations in Kabul have provided convincing confirmation that the Afghan and Soviet leadership are unambiguously in favor of a peaceful settlement. But if war is nevertheless forced on the Afghan Government in spite of common sense and the logic of national interests, it will be compelled to react to this by force of arms, and it does possess such force.

However, I would like to emphasize in this connection that responsibility for the deaths of Afghans and for new tragedies and destruction will be borne solely by those who reject the olive branch held out by Kabul and Moscow, by those who are prepared to sacrifice the lives of their fellow countrymen to suit their own self-interests, their immoderate claims to monopoly power, and their personal ambitions.

The present regime possesses every capability of holding out, and Soviet military supplies will also be continued in the event of a continuation of the war. But of course it would be preferable for Moscow and Kabul for agreement to be reached, in conjunction with a cease-fire, on the cessation of arms supplies to the conflicting sides, which would be a prelude to the future demilitarization of Afghanistan. This is precisely the approach formulated by M.S. Gorbachev at the 43d session of the UN General Assembly.

Both we and the Afghan leadership, as has been confirmed by the talks we have had, are of a mind that the pledges adopted by the sides under the Geneva agreements should be strictly fulfilled, E.A. Shevardnadze went on to say. At the same time, some people in Pakistan continue to behave as if no provisions at all existed for ending interference from its territory in Afghan internal affairs.

Whether or not we will be able to say that the Geneva accords have been completely implemented will depend on the line the new Pakistani leadership follows.

We are aware of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar's readiness to become more decisively involved in the process of a settlement. At this decisive stage it is obviously necessary to enhance the role and importance of the monitoring mechanism that was set up in accordance with the Geneva agreements. This is particularly important when, in the present complex situation, difficult and acute issues arise requiring a quick reaction. The United Nations' peacemaking mission and its role in fulfilling the resolution on Afghanistan that was unanimously adopted at the 43d UN General Assembly session might be manifested here.

As far as the withdrawal of Soviet forces is concerned, I should like to draw attention to the seemingly paradoxical fact that it is precisely those people who are clamoring loudest about the need for the withdrawal of Soviet forces who are actually making every effort to see that the withdrawal does not take place and that the tension in Afghanistan does not lessen, but on the contrary increases. One gets the impression that the presence of Soviet forces is merely necessary to the forces opposing the Government of the Repubic of Afghanistan in order to justify their banking on a continuation of the war. They plainly fear that with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the very basis for their existence will disappear.

What is more, when they find themselves facing Kabul on their own, the ambitious claims of individual leaders and commanders will get the upper hand over the unity they declared, and the war will turn into chaotic, internecine clashes of the opposition groupings and parties. Once again I state with all responsibility that both we and President Najibullah want the Soviet troops not to be delayed. We are striving for their withdrawal to facilitate the reestablishment of peace and not to be the signal for new fighting, for new casualties.

When the decision concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was made, E.A. Shevardnadze went on to say, factors such as the actual arrangement of forces, the Afghan people's interests, and the potential of the national reconciliation policy were taken into account in our ardent desire to achieve peace on Afghan soil. We began the withdrawal of Soviet troops not only out of our desire to coordinate with real deeds our policy of unblocking regional conflicts by peaceful means, and not only in order to avoid further casualties. We were certain, and still are, that there are patriotic forces in Afghanistan capable by joint efforts of defending the people's achievements and the democratic institutions in different spheres of public life created in recent years.

Experience backs up our vision. Today there are already no Soviet troops in 26 of the 32 Afghan provinces, and the Kabul regime, despite all the prophecies of the maligners, continues to exist. What is more, its cooperation and contacts with the opposition are expanding, and coalition organs of power are being formed in the localities. Of course the armed clashes are not, unfortunately, dying down either. But taking a realistic look at things, this is natural, for apart from all else, there also exists the extremist section of the opposition which lives on war and on hand-outs from abroad, and which for that reason does not accept the policy of national reconciliation. But I would not want to dramatize all this. There is the Afghan Army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, and finally there is the highly effective special purpose guard. They have everything necessary, including the very latest weaponry, to sober up those who have taken the path of strong-arm pressure. The leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan and its Armed Forces are not making stakes on the path of war, but when necessary they will be able to stand up for the interests of the people. These interests consist in a truly coalition government finally being formed in Afghanistan on a broad basis, a government of peace with the participation of all political forces, parties, and groups.

In answer to the question regarding the problem of unity within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), E.A. Shevardnadze said: In our view, today more than ever everything, or almost everything, depends on how united those progressive forces of Afghan society will be which are in favor of peace and agreement among all Afghans. As of right, the PDPA is in the first ranks of these forces since the PDPA put forward the idea of national reconciliation and is consistently fighting to put it into practice. Such a policy being conducted by the PDPA and the president of the Republic of Afghanistan has created the necessary conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The PDPA has great experience in the matter of defending the people's gains. In this connection, it is precisely at a schism in the PDPA and at the exploitation of its individual errors and failures that all the attempts of the enemies of peace and national reconciliation in Afghanistan are aimed. Our conversations in Kabul have shown that there is understanding in the party of the importance of strengthening unity in the ranks. After all, to a large extent Afghanistan's peaceful and stable future depends on this. However, in speaking of the unity of the PDPA, I should not like to isolate this issue from the unity of all the national and patriotic forces of Afghanistan, from the PDPA's alliance with all genuine and honest patriots, regardless of their political, religious, or other convictions.

Touching on Pakistan's role, E.A. Shevardnadze pointed out that this country, which from the very outset has been directly involved in Afghan affairs, can do a great deal to restore a peaceful and nonaligned Afghanistan. We do not doubt, he said, that the Pakistani people are interested in this and for completely objective reasons. Following the elections in Pakistan and in view of the changes which have occurred in Pakistan's leadersip, more favorable conditions are being created for giving effect to this interest. The Pakistani people, we are convinced, support the cause of peace and democracy.

It is, of course, not easy to remove all the difficulties and contradictions that have accumulated over the years in our relations with Pakistan, but it can be done. It only needs a realistic view of things, and there are quite a few reserves for an improvement of our relations. We are deeply convinced that the unresolved state of the Afghan question accords with neither our own interests nor Pakistan's. For the sake of peace in Afghanistan and improving the situation in the region, it is necessary to put in the required work on Soviet-Pakistan relations, and we are prepared to do so. I should also like the Pakistani side to respond likewise. Therefore, we are viewing the new Pakistani leadership with hope.

The socialist countries and the Nonaligned Movement are making a big contribution to the settlement of the Afghan question, said E.A. Shevardnadze. We know about the great and genuine interest with which India regards the political settlement in Afghanistan and about India's efforts in this area. A number of Arab states and Italy are today already acting constructively. We are holding a useful dialogue with Iran and Turkey. Britain, France, the FRG, and other countries, the list of which could be continued, are in a position to do a good deal towards the speedy achievement of a comprehensive Afghan settlement. One must single out the role of the United States, which as a guarantor of the Geneva agreements took upon itself the corresponding obligations. I shall stress once again the role and responsibilities of the states neighboring Afghanistan. Overall responsibility for the development of the situation in that country and for the settlement of the conflict going on there is borne by the whole world community, which has in its hands such a powerful lever as the Geneva agreements and the recently adopted UN General Assembly resolution, which have provided an impetus for positive processes concerning Afghanistan and for the unblocking of other complicated regional problems in today's world. All that is needed is goodwill, realism, and the desire for a real and just solution of the Afghan problem, one which will take into account the interests of the Afghan people themselves and of its neighbors, and the interests of peace and security in the region.

Discussing prospects for Soviet-Afghan cooperation, E.A. Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet Union has a wide range of commitments to provide assistance to Afghanistan in the economic field and in the social and other spheres. All of these commitments have the force of law for us and will be carried out strictly. The basic guidelines of our aid and support for Afghanistan were agreed upon and amended during the meetings between M.S. Gorbachev and Najibullah regarding the requirements of achieving national accord and an all-embracing settlement in Afghanistan.

During the talks held in Kabul, the Soviet Union's readiness to continue giving all-around aid to the Afghan people in their desire for the peace and progress of their homeland, and in healing the wounds inflicted by war, was confirmed. We will give humanitarian aid in the form of deliveries of foodstuffs, petroleum products, and consumer goods both on a bilateral basis and via the United Nations. Our commitments relating to gratuitous aid to Afghanistan alone today come to several hundreds of millions of rubles. The commitments we have undertaken within the framework of the aid program for Afghanistan through the United Nations are also well-known. Aid in the training of qualified personnel for Afghanistan and through direct links between Soviet republics, oblasts, and towns and Afghan towns and provinces will be developed as before.

Individual leaders of the extremist groups are now talking of an economic blockade of towns and industrial centers in Afghanistan. It turns out that they are not satisfied with constantly shelling and killing the civilian population and engaging in overt terrorism. Now they need people to die of hunger and epidemics and freeze from a shortage of fuel and electricity in their homes. In other words, they want to doom their people to extinction. At the same time, many extremists are talking of some kind of retribution. What is all this for? One should look ahead and think of the future of one's country, prospects for which have been opened up with the singing of the Geneva agreements. Every right-minded person can now easily figure out who is who.

We cannot permit certain groups, whoever's self-interested and arrogant interests they may represent, to hamper the delivery of our aid, designed to satisfy the vital needs of the Afghan population. The Afghan people should know that in fulfilling our obligations under the Geneva agreements, despite all the obstacles, we shall also fully and rigorously fulfill all our obligations to the Afghan state under existing treaties and agreements.

The return of peace to Afghan soil will open up broad opportunities for the Soviet Union's further assistance in the construction of dozens of national economic projects in the country and for the implementation of the long-term program of Soviet-Afghan economic, technical, and trade cooperation for the period up to the year 2000, which was signed in Moscow. In a word, our cooperation with nonaligned, neutral Afghanistan will not only be continued in the future but will increase, E.A. Shevardnadze said in conclusion.

Seen Off by Wakil

LD1501164489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1629 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] Kabul, 15 Jan (TASS)—After completing his working visit to the Republic of Afghanistan, E.A. Shevardnadze left Kabul for Moscow today. He was seen off by A. Wakil, member of the PDPA Central Committee Politburo and Afghan foreign minister, and other officials. Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister and USSR ambassador to Afghanistan, was among the party seeing him off.

Returns to Moscow

LD1501205189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2035 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow, 15 Jan (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, returned from Kabul to Moscow today. He had been in the Republic of Afghanistan on a working visit.

E.A. Shevardnadze was met at the airport by L.N. Zaykov, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; other officials; and also S.M. Gulabzoy, Afghanistan's ambassador to the USSR.

Lieutenant General Gromov on Troop Withdrawal

OW1601064789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2230 GMT 14 Jan 89

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program; interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov by correspondent Boris Smirnov; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Gromov] Now, what can I say about the withdrawal of troops? This is, of course, a delicate issue that is of concern not only to everyone in the Soviet Union but also to us, and probably more so. The withdrawal of troops will be completed by 15 February. When it will begin depends on the situation that takes shape in the center of the country, particularly in the region of the capital, as well as in other areas of the republic, both in the east and in the west; in other words, in those places where Soviet troops can be found. But the plan and the schedule have been prepared and defined. All the tasks have been determined, and the withdrawal of troops will be completed entirely by 15 February.

[Smirnov] How can losses of these troops be prevented?

[Gromov] Well, I have already said that we have a plan. It has been drawn up, and the task has been set. In this regard, we have experience, I mean the experience of the withdrawal in 1986 and the particularly extensive experience gained during the first stage, between 15 May and 15 August. But we have taken into consideration, and of course understand, that during the final phases everything may be different from the way it was during the first phase. The pressures will be significantly greater and the weather conditions will be completely different. It was summer then, whereas now we have winter. We are taking all of this into consideration.

Why am I talking about this? Well, your question was quite correct. For us, naturally, prevention of losses is the main question. It is the key issue around which all other questions revolve and are solved. In other words, everything is directed precisely at solving this task, which is paramount.

In connection with this, I would once again like to take the opportunity to stress a fact that concerns our soldiers, ensigns, and officers. Bearing in mind that I have been in Afghanistan for an extended period of time, I can say that our servicemen, and servicemen of the Soviet Army in general, have shown themselves to be magnificent over a period of almost 9 years. Upon reading our press, listening to conversations, and visiting the Soviet Union, it has been very painful to hear of various instances—and there have been many of them unfortunately—of a callous attitude, to put it mildly, toward our servicemen and the servicemen of the Soviet Army who have returned home. Unfortunately, there have been many cases like this, and for some reason that I cannot understand the number of such instances is increasing.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to appeal to our local Soviet and party organs to somehow do everything—we must do everything—so that the people who come back from the war, from Afghanistan, and who have earned a good and kind attitude, actually enjoy it.

[Smirnov] I have spoken with many officers and soldiers, and they say that even in war there is still evidence of various bureaucratic obstacles, even here in Afghanistan.

[Gromov] I can say that we really do; we also have our many problems here. These problems did not develop primarily because someone did not want to solve them. They also arose because of the situation. Now, you spoke about uniforms. If, for example, the wear and tear of uniforms in the Soviet Union, or more precisely in the Armed Forces, is expected to follow a certain time frame, here it is quite different. Even the time specified for troops in Afghanistan is insufficient; it is not enough. So we have these problems, and, as you have said, we also have problems with coordination of all kinds. Unfortunately, restructuring has not been completed. We would like things to be much quicker, but unfortunately we still have cases such as these. This not only concerns uniforms, but other issues as well. However, I think that experience and everything that we have acquired here, on both major and minor issues, will be useful to us in the future. The main thing is to draw a really good lesson from this experience.

Afghan Intervention Characterized as 'Mistake'

LD1601192889 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1505 GMT on 16 January 1989 carries the scheduled 30-minute discussion program entitled "Afghanistan: Paths of a Settlement," with the participation of IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin and Vladimir Vladimirovich Basov, head of a department at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The discussion is hosted by political observer Viktor Lyubovtsev.

Asked what the basis for the Soviet Union's "fresh approaches" to a settlement of the Afghan problem is, Bovin replies: "What is taking place there now, and we must speak about this quite frankly, is the result of the mistake which we committed at the end of 1979, when we agreed to introduce troops into Afghanistan—what was called the limited contingent of Soviet troops—and we are now reaping the fruits of that."

Turning to the historical background of the Soviet intervention, Bovin continues: "This is how it was: We went there really to shield the country from external counterrevolution. Incidentally, this is a delicate matter, too. We are trying to explain to our people what is happening there without, essentially, having any real information-...what full documentation is there? There's scarcely any. By the way, it's not we who should be sitting here, but the politicians responsible. The marshals and generals should be sitting here; they could use that documentation to explain to us what really was there in Afghanistan—what were the motives for that decision? What information did we have that prompted us to make that decision? You see, we can only guess about this so far. Of course, there was the idea—and our military people spoke to me about it quite seriously—that if we didn't go in there then the Americans would." He goes on: "We went there to help them deflect an external counterrevolution, but a tragic thing happened: we started by shooting at the counterrevolution but then we began hitting the Afghan peasants. Objectively, we were drawn into that civil war."

Bovin notes that there were positive effects resulting from the Soviet intervention. He cites an Afghan scientist who told him that in the past 10 years Afghanistan has been "brought into a new historical orbit." Bovin goes on: "Whatever the situation now in Kabul, Afghanistan can no longer be pushed back into that medievalism which it has left behind during these very difficult and dramatic years...it has become a focus of world politics. So, all the same, the process which took place there during those 10 years is nothing to be sneezed at. They weren't wasted years in the history of Afghanistan. And some time, when the present pain of the injuries and losses has died away a little, perhaps it will be possible to look at these 10 years with slightly different eyes, from the point of view of the fate of Afghanistan itself, of Afghan society and the Afghan people."

Basov adds that, although it was a mistaken decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the circumstances should also be taken into account: "When a neighbor's house is on fire and a person—a good neighbor—rushes for help, in such situations you usually don't weight up the pluses and minuses which will ensue."

Bovin interjects: "As far as houses are concerned, that's fine. But haven't we become firemen too often? Do you remember Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968? Haven't we offered too many fire services?"

Asked how they envisage Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Bovin says that in 2 or 3 years there will be normal relations between the USSR and Afghanistan. Basov, however, sees a different picture: "I think that during the next year, in the short-term future, that is, there will nonetheless be an increase in the internal struggle in Afghanistan. I think that too many weapons have been accumulated. There's a paradox here. The paradox of the situation, so far as I can understand it, is this: everything has been said and done for national reconciliation, but it has taken place against the background of the growing mountains of weapons which have accumulated in Afghanistan. The social, national, clan, tribal, and ideological contradictions which existed previously now have a material basis in the form of weapons, and confrontations between groupings are now taking place in a very acute form. I believe that it will scarcely be possible to resolve this aspect of the question in the next year, and I think that we must be prepared for the fact that there could be an aggravation here. But, in the final analysis, I nevertheless think that there will be a normalization after some time."

Chemical Weapons Use in Afghanistan Denied

LD1601124589 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 2, 14-20 Jan 89 (Signed to Press 12 Jan 89) p 8

[Untitled report by USSR Armed Forces General Staff; first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "Reports have recently reappeared in the West that Soviet troops in Afghanistan have used chemical weapons. Is this so?" (K. Yegorov, Orel)

A reply was obtained from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that it has never used chemical weapons anywhere or transferred them to other countries. The USSR rigorously observes its international pledges under the 1925 Geneva protocol and is making every possible effort to complete as quickly as possible the talks on a global ban on chemical weapons and to destroy all stockpiles.

The Soviet Union was also the initiator of setting up a special verifying organ within the UN framework for the urgent—within 48 hours—impartial investigation of all instances of the use of chemical, bacteriological, and toxic weapons in order to curb the intentions of certain countries to violate the 1925 Geneva protocol and to strengthen intolerance among the world's states toward the use of these kinds of weapons in armed conflicts.

During 1980-1982 counterrevolutionary gangs in Afghanistan used chemical weapons against the peaceful population more than 10 times, claiming several thousand children and women victims.

During the Afghan Government's investigation of the aforesaid cases, material evidence was presented to the international community—specimens of chemical grenades and shells, gas generators, and other means manufactured in the United States, Britain, Pakistan, and the FRG and crammed with toxic substances. All this was displayed at the time to foreign journalists in Kabul. It was also established that these weapons had been used by dushmans trained in Pakistani camps by special U.S. and West German instructors who taught the bandits how to kill women, children, and old people "competently," how to poison wells, destroy food, and exterminate livestock.

In subsequent years the dushmans also made extensive use (more than 10 times) of chemical weapons against the peaceful population. Afghan Government troops captured a large quantity of chemical warfare means during fighting and when eliminating the bases of counterrevolutionary groupings. They include U.S. M7P and 517 grenades and British L-1A3 grenades loaded with toxic chemical agent CS, No 119 West German and U.S. grenades loaded with "chloroacetophenone," chemical shells, and special capsules, bullets, and tablets designed to contaminate the air in premises of limited volume and water sources. All these means were shown to foreign observers and journalists at specially held press conferences, the last of which took place at the end of November 1988.

Afghan Army Seizes Arms Near Qandahar

LD1501120089 Moscow TASS in English 1148 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] Kabul January 15 TASS—The Afghan Army has seized a large army and ammunition cache, including 160 missiles, more than 200 mines and thousands of cartridges, near Qandahar. Dozens of terrorists were killed or wounded during the operation. According to the military command's communique, scores of rebels have been killed or wounded in Nangarhar, Kabul, Herat and Laghman Provinces in the past 24 hours.

Foreign advisers continue to be infiltrated in Afghanistan. According to the BAKHTAR news agency, a group of Pakistani and Arab military advisers have recently crossed into Zabol Province to provide material aid to the Afghan opposition. The advisers demanded from the opposition leaders to increase hostilities against the Afghan Government.

Another 100 families returned to Qandahar Province on January 13. The repatriates were heartily welcomed by the local authorities and give all the necessary aid.

Afghanistan is marking the second anniversary of national reconciliation today. The situation in the country has markedly improved over that short span of time: Presidential elections and elections to the National Council have been held and a coalition government and a multi-party system have been formed, more than 16,000 former insurgents have been given an amnesty, 180,000 refugees have returned home and 55,000 rebels have given up armed struggle against their own people.

Abdul Waheb Safi, chairman of the Constitutional Council, said in an interview with the BAKHTAR news agency that the past years had convincingly proved the need of national reconciliation as the only way to end the war and settle the Afghan issue. He emphasised that national reconciliation had reflected the will of the Afghan people.

Rebels 'Constant Threat' to Kabul Supplies

LD1301131489 Moscow TASS in English 1303 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Kabul January 13 TASS—Convoys with food, fuel and other prime necessities keep arriving in the Afghan capital. However, groups of extremists attack convoys virtually every day and are a constant threat to Kabul's supplies.

A report by security forces circulated here says that government troops are forced to take counter measures to stop subversive activities by insurgents who, as a rule, set up ambushes or hid in villages situated along the Kabul- Salang Pass-Hayraton road. These villages also suffer when retaliatory strikes are inflicted on extremists. All responsibility for destruction and loss of life is borne in such cases by the opposition, since the Afghan Army is duty-bound to ensure uninterrupted supplies for Kabul residents, says the report.

Especially fierce fighting raged on Thursday between Afghan troops and opposition terrorists in the province of Nangarhar and Qandahar. According to the command, some 100 insurgents were killed or wounded there as a result of successful operations of government troops. They destroyed several missile launchers and great quantities of other weapons. Clashes between warring opposition groups were registered in the provinces of Parwan, Paktia, Faryab and near Kabul. It is estimated that at least 170 extremists were killed or wounded during these clashes.

The BAKHTAR news agency reports that in Shakar Darreh District of Kabul Province officers of the Afghan Interior Ministry uncovered a cache with 54 long-range missiles to be used against the capital.

IZVESTIYA Rounds Up Afghan Developments

PM1401181189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 4

["IZVESTIYA Press Service" report: "Afghan Opposition Rejects Compromise"]

[Text] Pakistan is committed to a political, not a military solution of the conflict in neighboring Afghanistan. This was stated at a press conference in Islamabad following a 3-day trip to Saudi Arabia by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. According to her, only the Afghan people themselves can make the final decision on what form the settlement takes.

As REUTER reports from Islamabad, Afghan rebels based on Pakistani territory have announced that, regardless of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, they intend to continue the armed struggle. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, who has assumed leadership of the "Alliance of Seven," said in a speech at the Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies that the armed opposition is capable of capturing the city of Kabul and other big cities, including Jalalabad and Qandahar, but has not attacked them in order to avoid civilian casualties.

AFP reports from the Afghan capital that the local authorities are continuing to strengthen Kabul's defenses in order to turn the city into a fortress. Citing Western diplomats, the agency reports that reinforcements have been sent there—5,000 commandos from Laghman Province, trained by Vietnamese instructors. The 10,000 soldiers of the presidential guard have received a very substantial pay increase. A petition demanding that Najibullah be ready to fight is circulating among Afghan Army officers above the rank of major. According to AFP, the petition has been signed by more than 700 officers.

A TASS correspondent reports from Kabul that traffic has resumed on the highway linking the Afghan capital with the border point of Hayraton in the north.

For many days the highway, which is vitally important to Afghanistan, was closed due to heavy snow and sabotage activity by opposition detachments. As a result the situation as regards food supplies for the people of Kabul is extremely difficult. Long lines have started to develop outside bread stores in the city. In order to prevent bread prices from rising spontaneously and to prevent speculation and theft, the government has decreed that action will be taken against people who deliberately hoard surplus foodstuffs and fail to surrender them by a set time. In order to improve bread supplies to the population, the state is allocating flour to private entrepreneurs daily to ensure regular baking.

More than 200 trucks have arrived in Kabul carrying food and petroleum products. The convoy was guarded by subunits of the Republic's Armed Forces. According to a BAKHTAR report, extremists tried to stop the convoy in the vicinity of the Salang pass, but the attack was repulsed by the Afghan troops.

Admiral Meets Afghan Army Political Chief

PM1601100189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jan 89 Second Edition p 5

[Unnamed correspondent dispatch: "Meeting in Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul, 13 Jan—A meeting has been held here between Admiral of the Fleet A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and Lieutenant General Z. Ziarmal, chief of the Afghan Army Main Political Directorate. Admiral of the Fleet Sorokin described how the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference are being implemented and the processes taking place in this connection in the USSR Armed Forces. He dwelt in detail on the international mission of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

In turn Lieutenant General Ziarmal dwelt in detail on the policy of national conciliation which the Afghan Government and the country's president, Najibullah, are implementing. He expressed great gratitude to the Soviet Union and the troops of the limited contingent for their great aid in support of the policy of national conciliation and for the free and real assistance which the Soviet people have rendered and are continuing to render to the war-torn Afghan economy. It was stressed that the people of Afghanistan will forever preserve in their memory the courageous character of the Soviet soldier, who came to their assistance at a moment of difficulty for the country, and he gave an assurance that the servicemen of the Afghan Army would make every effort to defend the gains of the Republic.

The meeting passed in a cordial, friendly atmosphere. Soviet and Afghan political workers took part in it.

Gerasimov on Reopening of Israeli Embassy Wing

TA1601203889 Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Report on interview with Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov by correspondent Yo'av Tocker in Moscow; date not given; passages within quotation marks in English]

[Text] With the mediation of a Netherlands diplomat, the USSR and Israel are currently negotiating on the reopening of the Israeli Embassy building in Moscow.

This was hinted by Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov in a special interview, the first of its kind, to Israeli television. Following is a report by our correspondent in Moscow, Yo'av Tocker:

[Begin recording] [Tocker] A 72-hour ping-pong game by telephone took place between various officials in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and myself in this very Stalinistic building in the center of Moscow. Finally, the approval to grant me an interview was received, and I was invited to enter, through a creaking side door, and go up to Mr Gerasimov's office. The talk with him, as will transpire immediately, was conducted in the style of a very Moscow-like diplomatic maneuvering, with the most sensitive issue being the possible opening of the building that formerly housed the Israeli Embassy in the Soviet capital.

[Gerasimov] "Well, this is your embassy, but we... [changes thought] It's the building, I mean, yes? It's yours, but we do not have diplomatic relations, just as we have a building over there, I guess, somewhere in your country, yes?"

[Tocker] "Would you let the consular mission operate from this building?"

[Gerasimov] "Well, I guess we can solve this problem on practical grounds. Your consular mission is now with the Embassy of Netherlands, yes? So, it's something to be worked out with this embassy, the Embassy of Netherlands, because we don't have diplomatic relations."

[Tocker] "Namely, you see no objections of principle to the reopening of such an embassy on working conditions by Israel?"

[Gerasimov] "It's, it's not going to be reopening of the embassy, if it's going to reopen just to use the facilities."

[Tocker, interrupting] The reopening of the building sometime.

[Gerasimov] "...just to use the facilities. Here, I think it's, it may be negotiated."

[Tocker] The practical interpretation of all these hints which were made to sound innocent revolves around the idea of reopening, for the time being, a single wing of the embassy building that we see here, under the diplomatic auspices of the Netherlands Embassy, without having an Israeli flag fly on top of this wing, and without calling it a consulate. [end recording] [video shows Moscow street scenes, Soviet Foreign Ministry, interview with Gerasimov, and Israeli Embassy building]

Gorbachev Congratulates Indian Communist Leader

PM1601154189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jan 89 Second Edition p 1

[M.S. Gorbachev message "To Comrade E.M.S. Namboodiripad, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, Marxist Central Committee"]

[Text] Dear Comrade E.M.S. Namboodiripad!

I cordially congratulate you on your reelection as general secretary of the Communist Party of India, Marxist [CPI-M] Central Committee.

I wish you and all members of the CPI-M success in the struggle for the vital interests of the working people, and in strengthening Soviet-Indian friendship, and peoples' peace and security.

I wish you good health and fruitful work in this lofty and responsible post.

With communist greetings,

M. Gorbachev

East Europe

Demonstrations in Prague Mark Student's Death

'Loudmouths' Gather 15 Jan

LD1601143289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0931 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Prague, 16 Jan (TASS)—According to the CTK agency, several groups of antisocialist elements gathered on Sunday afternoon in Wenceslas Square, Prague. They attempted to use the 20th anniversary of the tragic suicide of Prague student Jan Palach to inflame antisocialist emotions and violate public order in the city. The demonstration was held in defiance of a ban by the state organs.

Staff of the public security organs and representatives of the people's militia from works in Prague stopped the provocateurs' actions. More than 90 active particpants were arrested.

Spokesmen for the public security organs told a TASS correspondent that this blatant provocation was intended to provide fodder to the opponents of socialist Czechoslovakia for their latest insinuations regarding human rights in the CSSR. The loudmouths demanding "freedoms" here were pursuing one goal—that of violating public order and drawing the attention of the Western mass information media.

Disturbances Repeated 16 Jan

LD1601184989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1833 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Prague, 16 Jan (TASS)—Wenceslas Square in Prague was an arena of mass disturbances again this evening. Incited by antisocialist groups, extreme elements tried to repeat the provocative demonstration that failed yesterday. Special units for maintaining public order are taking measures to eliminate the hotbed of tension. Water cannons and tear gas have been used. The city center has been cordoned off by militia and army details. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1942 GMT on 16 January transmits a "new version" of the preceding report which renders the concluding sentence as follows: "The city center has been cordoned off by units for maintaining public order."]

Western Media 'Urging' Demonstrations

LD1601200489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Report by Andrey Ptashnikov]

[Text] [Ptashnikov] In continuing the story about events abroad, I would like to dwell on a telegram of the CTK agency from Prague. It says that yesterday a number of groups of antisocialist elements gathered in one of the central squares of the city. They tried to take advantage of the anniversary of the suicide of Jan Palach, a Prague student, to whip up antisocialist emotions and violate public order in Prague. It must be pointed out that the demonstration was staged in spite of the ban by state bodies.

Now I would like to turn to our correspondent in Czechoslovakia, Vladimir Taranov, who will report in more detail about what occurred.

[Begin Taranov recording] Over the course of the last few days the Western mass media that broadcasts in Czech, especially the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, have been urging the population of the CSSR to widely mark the 20th anniversary of the self-immolation of Jan Palach, who took this action allegedly in defense of democracy.

To whip up the interest of the Czech population, the organizers of the anti-Czechoslovak campaign in the West, citing authentic information in their possession, promised an impressive spectacle—the self-immolation of another young man in the center of Prague.

The Western radio stations broadcast detailed instructions as to where and when the participants in the provocative demonstration in Wenceslas Square in Prague should assemble, how they should react in the event of a clash with the police, what slogans they should chant, and so on. These instructions were addressed, first and foremost, to representatives of illegal structures in the CSSR who were defeated as a result of the attempt at an antirevolutionary coup in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and who are now trying to use the processes of restructuring and the deepening of democratization in the country for their own ends.

On 15 January, in the center of Prague, an attempt was made to stage a prohibited demonstration. Several hundred young people tried to enter Wenceslas Square but were kept out by units of the people's militia and the police. No acts of self-immolation, of course, took place.

Clearly some people in the West were counting, with the aid of representatives of illegal structures in the CSSR who were inspired by the demonstration, on hindering the improvement in mutual understanding and trust in Europe. They failed, however. The majority of the Czech population condemns the practice of provocative demonstrations being carried out by individual antisocialist elements in the center of Prague. [end recording]

[Ptashnikov] I believe this applies not only to the center of the Czechoslovak capital but to other cities in the country as well. I would like to add to what our correspondent said that, in cutting short the activities of those who took part in the gathering, the members of the state security bodies and representatives of the people's militia of works in Prague were compelled to detain about 90 of the more ardent provocateurs.

Kondrashev Comments on Anniversary

LD1301234389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow, 13 Jan (TASS)—TASS political observer Aleksandr Kondrashev writes:

It is now 2 weeks since the melodic chimes of the Old Town Hall carried the year 1988 into history. The year of the "two eights," the year of a series of anniversaries in Czechoslovak history, and finally the leap year, did not justify the predictions of emigre circles and local skeptics, who had been forecasting dramatic events and upheavals for the country.

No, the past year went down in history as one in which Czechoslovak restructuring began, important decisions on opening up the potential of the socialist economy were adopted, and a broadening of democratization in the life of society occurred. However, it seems that the stock of unrealized hopes on the part of those fond of drama and upheavals was too great. They were not embarrassed in the least by the failure of their plans to disrupt the normal life of the country during last year's anniversaries. They have thought up a new anniversary—the 20th anniversary of the self-immolation of the Prague student Jan Palach, which they wish to mark by a repeat of that tragedy. It is difficult to say how real and serious are the plans for self-immolation in Wencelas

Square on 15 January as a mark of political protest—which stem from a letter by an anonymous author that has been disseminated in Prague.

The main thing is something else, the unworthy attempts to make political capital on the part of the by-no-means anonymous inspirers of this sinister act. Regardless of how much representatives of the Charter 77 antisocialist group deny their involvement in the plans for self-immolation, their connection is more than obvious.

In the text of the anonymous letter, its author says directly that by his self-immolation he wants "to resolutely support" the activities of "Charter." His letter is being distributed to the editorial offices of Prague newspapers and the offices of Western correspondents by representatives of "Charter." Finally, "Charter" and other opposition groups want, despite a ban by the authorities, to hold a demonstration on 15 January at the site of Jan Palach's tragic death, inviting all "patriots." This has been reported not only by Prague newspapers but also by Western agencies.

The suicide attempt being prepared may of course be only a false alarm and a cunning maneuver for the purpose yet again of gaining the attention of the public and the Western press. Whatever the case, however, manipulating one's life and arousing people's alarm and confusion for the sake of one's political ambitions and goals is, at the very least, immoral.

It might also be recalled that Palach's tragic suicide was by no means his own choice. It is well known that Palach was promised that he would burn with a "cold flame" similar to that demonstrated in performances by oriental fakirs. The adventurists who pushed him by deception to suicide were only counting on an outburst of passions and emotions in the country. It seems that the present handful of organizers of antisocialist actions in the CSSR are ready to strive to achieve similar goals at any price. In this respect they are not embarrassed in the least by the fact that this barbarous act is at variance with the very essence of human rights and liberties, about which they are fond of speaking so much.

Anniversary 'Adventure' Fails

PM1701105189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by TASS correspondent V. Rzhevskiy "especially for IZVESTIYA": "The Torch Did Not Light"]

[Text] Prague—People waited anxiously and uneasily last Sunday in Prague and, perhaps, throughout Czechoslovakia. Several days earlier the newspaper VECERNI PRAHA had published an anonymous letter. Written on behalf of the so-called "organizational committee of mass suicides," it threatened self-immolation on Wenceslas Square in the center of the capital. The pretext for this was the marking of a particular "black jubilee"—20 years ago a student, Jan Palach, set fire to himself in that very place. On that occasion a young life was snuffed out by political adventurists trying to fuel tension in the country after August 1968.

The present anonymous letter from "torch number one" was addressed to V. Havel, one of the leaders of the antisocialist grouping Charter 77, who conveyed its contents to the Radio Free Europe. Thus the "Palach jubilee" was widely publicized and provided the pretext for a handful of oppositionists to violate the republic's normal life on the eve of the signing of the Vienna meeting's final document.

In its appeal, quoted several times a day on the radio stations, Charter 77 urged "patriots" to demonstrate at the site of Jan Palach's death and bear witness to a new act of self-immolation as political protest (for which read support for the opposition grouping).

...From early Sunday morning, activity on Wenceslas Square was moderated by a regime of strict security. Interior Ministry organs had taken every measure to prevent incidents and acts of provocation. Detachments of people's militia, consisting of workers from Prague plants, provided help when the alarm was raised. Toward 1400 groups of "patriots" responding to Charter 77's appeal began to approach the Wenceslas monument. When their actions threatened to get out of control, special militia subunits began clearing the square. Their operations were efficient and coordinated, and they accomplished their set task of protecting public order. The political speculators' adventure had failed.

Candidates Recommended To Head SFRY Government

LD1201173989 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Belgrade January 12 TASS—The Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the country's collective Presidency—has recommended six candidates out of 23 nominated to the post of chairman of the Federal Executive Council (government) in place of Prime-Minister Branko Mikulic, who handed in his resignation at the end of December 1988. This was stated today by Raif Dizdarevic, president of the Presidium of the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia—the largest socio-political organisation of the country.

The Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recommends to elect a candidate to the post of head of government at a meeting of the Federal Assembly (parliament), to which he must present his program for the implementation of the country's economic reform, his plans to curb inflation, boost production and stabilize the national economy.

Political & Social

Council of Ministers on Socioeconomic Questions

PM1701154189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] At its 14 January session, the USSR Council of Ministers examined the following questions:

on the country's socioeconomic development in 1988 and during the first 3 years of the 12th 5-Year Plan period;

on measures to ensure fruit and vegetable supplies for the population.

The discussion of the first question evolved into a profound and objective analysis of the processes which actually occurred within the economy in 1988 and during the first 3 years of the 5-year plan period. It was emphasized that the development of the country's national economy was positively influenced by the ongoing transition to predominantly economic methods of management and the transfer of associations, enterprises, and organizations to the principles of full economic accountability and self-financing. Produced national income increased by 4.4 percent in 1988 against an average annual increase of 3.6 percent in 1986-1988. The entire growth of national income was secured through higher labor productivity with a net reduction of the number of persons employed in material production in 1987-1988.

The fundamental basis of this objective discussion was provided by the question that the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development must be aimed as much as possible at solving the most important task—to satisfy Soviet people's steadily growing needs. In this context, it was noted that the consumer's direct interests, man's interests, are becoming the practical guideline for the work by most links in the national economy.

It was emphasized that the stable trend toward intensification of the social orientation of economic development is becoming increasingly noticeable. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that the proportion of national income channeled into consumption and nonproduction construction work stood at 83 percent in 1988 against the 79 percent envisaged in the 5-year plan. The proportion of the total volume of capital investment in the nonproduction sphere increased from 21.8 percent in 1985 to 24.4 percent in 1988. Real per capita incomes increased by an average of 2.7 percent during the first 3 years of the current 5-year plan period, and the increase in 1988 was 3.5 percent against 2.1 percent during the 11th 5-Year Plan period. The average annual figure for commissioned housing reached 127 million square meters of housing area, this being 16.5 percent more than during the corresponding period in the previous 5-year plan period. Compared with 1987, the volume of consumer goods sales in 1988 increased by R25 billion. Paid services to the population increased at an average annual rate of 11 percent.

At the same time, members of the USSR Government who spoke at the session pointed out the complexity, contradictions, and sharp contrasts in the processes involving the economy's social reorientation. Despite the considerable increase in commissioned housing area, the acuteness of the housing problems remains unabated. In many cases, the quality of housing remains unsatisfactory. Despite the growth in commodity turnover, the problems of satisfying effective demand remain unsolved and the volume of services for the population is clearly inadequate.

In order to substantially improve the state of affairs in the social sphere it is necessary to meet the targets set by the 5-year plan for the efficiency of economic development. But there has been no success in achieving this. Scientific and technical progress is being implemented only slowly. Targets for the introduction of advanced base technologies and the retooling of sectors are not being met. The saving of resources has yet to become the decisive factor in satisfying the national economy's additional needs for material resources. The radical economic reform has yet to exercise the due influence on the intensification of production. Consequently, the national income produced during the first 3 years of the 5-year plan period fell short of plan figures by R24.5 billion, which includes the sum of R13.3 billion for 1988.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the population's income and expenditure remain unbalanced in virtually all regions in the country, and there are insufficient goods and services to balance the total amount of money in circulation.

It was noted at the session that anomalies in money circulation resulted primarily from practical distortions of one of the fundamental principles of the radical economic reform—the intensification of the incentive role played by working people's money incomes in boosting production efficiency and their close interlinkage with higher labor productivity and increased manufacture of output. The result is the widespread effect of negative phenomena whereby wages rise faster than labor productivity, this being in many sectors and regions directly linked with the flawed practice of paying out unearned money.

In these circumstances, the efforts made by union and autonomous republic councils of ministers, ministries and departments, and soviet and economic organs to fully provide the consumer market with goods and services were clearly inadequate. A significant number of enterprises and organizations fail to ensure the fulfillment of state orders for their production and unjustifiably cut back the manufacture of cheaper goods. A number of regions in the country make insufficient use of the cooperative and individual forms of labor activity.

In this context, sharp criticism was leveled against ministry heads N.A. Pugin of the USSR Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building; N.P. Panichev of the USSR Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry; V.M. Lukyanenko of the USSR Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building; Ye.A. Varnachev of the USSR Ministry of Construction, Road, and Municipal Machine Building; and the chairmen of the RSFSR, Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Georgian SSR, Latvian SSR, Tajik SSR, and Moldavian SSR Councils of Ministers who allowed the 1988 targets for the production of consumer goods and their delivery to the trade network to be thwarted. Emphasis was placed on the need to radically change attitudes toward boosting the output and improving the quality of goods for the people as a most important statewide task.

The session conducted a detailed investigation of the state of affairs in the country's agro-industrial complex. It showed that stability has yet to be achieved in the development of agricultural production and the work of processing sectors. The population's needs for many foodstuffs remain unsatisfied and they have to be purchased on a large scale abroad. The total value of these purchases exceeded R30 billion during the 3 years.

The USSR Government made it incumbent upon the permanent organs of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Gosagroprom, USSR ministers and departmental leaders, and leaders of union republic councils of ministers to take immediate steps to satisfy the consumer market, to overcome the imbalance between the growth of the population's money incomes and the goods and services on offer, and to consolidate money circulation in every region.

Taking into account the major difficulties in securing financial backing for state expenditure and the growing budget deficit, which result in unbalancing the country's economy, the USSR Government demanded of the leaders of national economic complexes and sectors and the union republic councils of ministers that they take extraordinary measures aimed at saving state funds, reducing centralized capital investments, and bringing supernormative and surplus stocks of commodity and material assets in circulation, and also that they implement a package of measures to ensure steady growth of incomes on the basis of increased production efficiency. Nonproductive expenditure and losses at many enterprises and loss-making operations by them are especially impermissible in the prevailing circumstances.

Those who spoke at the USSR Council of Ministers session noted that, during the first 3 years of the 5-year plan period, there has been no substantial improvement in capital construction, the number of projects simultaneously under construction at any one time is inordinately high, and the time taken to construct them is more than twice as long as the normative schedule. The commissioning of many projects in the social and cultural spheres was thwarted last year. For example, the number of kindergartens and day nurseries was 64 percent, and the number of clubs and houses of culture was 59 percent of the set targets. The fulfillment of the plan for boosting production capacities was not ensured, and this is sure to have an effect on the national economy's future development. The above-norm volume of incomplete construction work increased by more than R5 billion during the year, and the total now stands at more than R13 billion. All this intensifies imbalances in the economy and holds back the implementation of planned programs to re-equip the material production sectors and consolidate the social and cultural spheres.

It was pointed out at the session that the USSR Gosstroy, the union republic Councils of Ministers, and the construction ministries must draw the most serious conclusions from this critical examination of the state of affairs in capital construction, must ensure the unconditional fulfillment of the 1989 plan, and must meet the set targets for reducing the above-norm volume of incomplete construction work.

Leaders of agro-industrial combines, associations, and farms, of scientific institutions, and of procurement, transportation, processing, machine building, and trade enterprises and organizations were invited to attend the discussion of the second item on the session's agenda.

It was unanimously agreed that the country has real potential to fully satisfy the population's needs for potatoes and vegetables in the next few years, to substantially improve the supplies of fruit and berries, and to organize everywhere a stable trade in a wide range of these products.

But the solution of this task will necessitate a fundamental change in the attitude of union and autonomous republic Councils of Ministers, local ispolkoms, the USSR Gosagroprom, the USSR Ministry of Trade, and the Tsentrosoyuz toward this important work. Serious shortcomings in the activity of agro-industrial committees and associations have resulted in the consumption of vegetables, fruit and potatoes actually declining rather than increasing in many of the country's regions.

Over the last few years, for example, the consumption of vegetables and cucurbits has fallen from 107 to 93 kg in the Uzbek SSR, from 98 to 80 kg in Vladimir Oblast, from 92 to 81 kg in Tula Oblast, and from 89 to 67 kg in the Mari ASSR.

The situation prevailing in fruit production is absolutely intolerable. Over the last 15 years the total area of orchards in the country has been reduced by 830,000 hectares or 30 percent. This area has declined from

89,000 to 53,000 hectares in Rostov Oblast, from 55,000 to 34,000 hectares in the Dagestan ASSR, from 31,000 to 16,000 hectares in Tambov Oblast, from 13,000 to 5,000 hectares in Ternopol Oblast, and from 22,000 to 12,000 hectares in Kherson Oblast. Orcharding has virtually come to an end on Moscow Oblast farms, with only 4,300 hectares of orchards remaining out of 19,600 hectares.

One of the main shortcomings preventing the improvement of supplies of potatoes, vegetables, and fruit to the population is the fact that many organizational questions, meant to ensure in fruit and vegetable production close links throughout the entire course of the progression from field to store, via processing and transportation, remain unsolved.

The obsolete system of economic and organizational links, established decades ago, still remains in operation. Consequently, even the existing potential is not properly utilized and products grown on kolkhozes and sovkhozes fail to reach people.

The USSR Council of Ministers emphasized with special concern the fact that, for many years on end, the necessary changes have not been introduced in the scientific backup for the country's fruit and vegetable economy. The V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the sector scientific complexes for the production of potatoes, vegetables, and fruit—even though they have major scientific potential and the appropriate base at their disposal—fail to ensure the development of high-yield varieties and hybrids of potatoes and of vegetable and fruit crops which would be more resistant to diseases and pests.

Inadequate use is made of cooperative forms for organizing the procurement of fruit and vegetable produce when utilizing opportunities to improve food supplies for the population.

On the whole, the speeches by participants in the session offered a positive appraisal of the measures planned by the government to improve the supplies of potatoes, vegetables, and fruit for the population. Active local work on their implementation will make it possible to use domestically grown produce, without any import purchases, to substantially raise per capita consumption of vegetables and cucurbits from 95 kg in 1988 to 130 kg in 1990, and the consumption of fruit and berries from 47 to 61 kg. For this purpose, it is envisaged that the conditions necessary for further development of diverse agro-industrial formations like agrocombines, agrofirms, agro-trade sovkhozes, and others be created.

The participants in the session made a series of specific suggestions aimed at eliminating obstacles in the way of the development of trade brokerage cooperatives, which are an effective form for boosting the efficiency of fruit and vegetable procurements. The USSR Government has taken steps toward satisfying the desire for growing numbers of such cooperatives to be set up within the framework of consumer cooperatives and under agrocombines and major industrial enterprises, and a decision was adopted to offer utmost assistance in this work.

A number of measures must be implemented within the next 2 years to fundamentally change the state of affairs in supplying the population and farms with high quality seeds and planting stock for potatoes and for vegetable, fruit, and berry crops. The union republic councils of ministers and local soviets have been set the task of satisfying the urban population's needs for their garden plots.

V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gosagroprom, was instructed to carefully examine all suggestions received in connection with the supply of fruit and vegetable produce to the population and, together with interested organizations, to finalize work on the draft resolutions examined at the USSR Council of Ministers session.

Taking part in the USSR Council of Ministers session were N.N. Slyunkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, Yu.D. Maslyukov, and N.V. Talyzin, candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; and O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The session was chaired by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Ryzhkov Speaks Meeting

LD1401194189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Excerpt from speech by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov summing up discussion on the economy's performance in 1987 at an expanded session of the USSR Council of Ministers held in Moscow 14 January—recorded]

[Text] These 3 years of the 12th 5-year period have, of course, been special years. They constitute a continuation of the April 1985 plenum and of the changes taking place in our country, and this is also the only way in which the development of the national economy should be viewed. The first 18 months of this 5-year period was a time of theoretical interpretation of the processes that had been allowed to occur in the national economy, and the paths along which our economy is to be develop were charted out—that is, some very serious preparatory and theoretical work on the development of the economy was being done. And since the June 1987 plenum we have actually begun implementing radical economic reform. In 1988 50 percent of the national economy was operating under the new conditions, and in 1989 100 percent of the country's entire economy should be operating under those conditions. As far as our development over these years is concerned, it can be said, on the whole, that a certain amount of dynamism has been imparted to the economy. It cannot be said that we have been marking time, because even last year produced the highest growth rate in the national economy, and if we look at a general indicator like national income, this was, of course, higher than the previous years of 5-year period and the average for the 11th 5-year period. In numbers, growth was 4.4 percent, compared to a 3.2 percent average during the first 2 years of the 5- year plan and an 3.6 percent annual average for the 11th 5-year period. At the same time, however, we suffered a shortfall of over R13 billion in national income. This kind of loss could not, of course, fail to have an overall effect on the the national economy, its equilibrium, and the tackling of various issues. We are very concerned about the agricultural sector. In 1987 it grew, according to a gross estimate, by only 0.7 percent.

The rates for the assimilation of capital assets have slowed down. In 1986 we had 6.3 percent, in 1987 6.9 percent, and in 1988 it was down to 1 percent. In general along with the fact that we do have positive aspects in the work of the economy of the country, there are at the same time very many shortcomings. If one were to give a specific formulation to summarize economic development, it would be that we do not have stability. That is the main thing. We don't have a situation where we have gathered a certain pace and that everything is developing at that pace. We have upswings and downturns, then an upswing again, and then a downturn. There is no steadiness in which economy keeps to a solid basis. This is a very great shortcoming, and it is a consequence of the fact that we have created neither the economic prerequisites, nor have we created the relevant economic basis to prevent all the possible deviations that occur in the national economy—be it poor harvest, natural disaster, or unfavorable weather and so on—from being reflected in the development of the economy as a whole. Unfortunately as soon as something happens anywhere, it immediately affects the work of the economy as a whole. I could develop this theme for a long time and very forcibly: it is obvious that we have insufficient reserves to smooth over these peaks, and there are many other factors which prevent us from having stability. I should like to touch upon another question connected with evaluating the dynamics of economic development. You have felt, and we do not hide the fact, that we are very worried by inflationary processes. Unfortunately these processes—they existed before in our economy, but now that we have gone over to new methods of management, stressing profit and so on, it gives rise, to such processes whether we like it or not. [sentence as heard] These proceses are familiar on a theoretical level, well grounded as they say, but there are instruments with which we must and can fight these processes.

True, the estimation of them is by no means unanimous. If you read the literature, especially the periodicals, some writers describe the rate of inflation as 6 percent, others 4 percent, others again 1.5 percent, and some actually use foreign statistics: I've been informed that AUGUMENTY I FAKTY has resorted to the estimate of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. It states that since 1980 goods prices have risen by 14 percent and in the United States by 38 percent, that is to say two percent in the Soviet Union [annually]. I think that as far as this is concerned we must not, Comrade Korolev must not, keep quiet about it. We should give an objective picture. If there is 2 percent inflation in the country, we should say so. If there isn't, we should also report it to the government, and at the same time, obviously, today, when all materials are published, should evidently report it to the public.

This is a situation that is too serious. The assessment of inflation—either we are making headway, or, on the contrary, we are spending everything in our country on consumption. And so, everyone but Comrade Korolev is talking. He is keeping silent. I think that this is impermissible, and clearly, Comrade Korolev has to draw the appropriate conclusions, and, as they say, report, and at the same time bring this into the public domain.

Much has been said today about the social thrust of our economy. We consider that certain breakthroughs are beginning in it. Of course this is a very difficult road, and it would be naive to think that since we said today that we have to change the economy sharply in the social field that everything will happen immediately. Of course, years are needed in order to bring about such a major turnabout. Look at the rate of growth of the output of group A and group B [producer goods and consumer goods] from 1986 to 1988. Count it up, from 1985—I'm counting from there—nearly 2 years were needed from the time we proclaimed this to the time when a clear breakthrough began to get under way. So only in 1987 did a definite breakthrough take shape, and in 1988 group B outstrips group A. So 2 years passed for such a manoeuvre to occur in the national economy. And so, in making certain decisions, we must always know and feel that with such a large economy as ours, with its scale, with its enormous burdens of inertia, that is, a command is given, and a year or 2 pass in order to make it a reality.

I have already said that we have gone over to new methods of running the economy this year. If we are to make an assessment, without going into the details which have been spoken of at great length today, it can be said that, on the one hand, we have built up a certain experience, and we see those positive factors which exist in our activities, but on the whole, reform is proceeding very painfully, extremely painfully.

There are many factors here. There is the psychological factor: Many people are not prepared to work in new conditions. This applies both to managers and to the labor collectives, very great burdens of inertia, and clearly, very many failings on the part of the central economic bodies, and failings on the part of the government, when we didn't regulate one or another situation. So, on the whole, of course, reform is proceeding, but it is proceeding with great difficulty, and we have to work, as they say, day and night, on this matter. And any reform which is underway needs daily attention. You can't say that we've made a certain decision, that everything is underway, and that there's nothing else that needs doing. You have to keep track of these processes the whole time. Everything that's good has to be encouraged to the maximum, and everything that we can see is working badly has to be stopped, these processes have to be regulated, and only in this way can we really adjust the economic reform. But if we contemplate how all of this is progressing, we won't manage to get anything out of this.

In my introductory address today I said that we are worried, at the large-scale level, by several problems, including the balancing of the national economy is the balancing of the budget, and the consumer market. If we are to speak of the consumer market, what is happening in the country? We have to know this. Look: last year we sold R25 billion more goods than in 1987. That's a record. In the 30-odd years we have been keeping track of this, there's been nothing like this—we sold more to the extent of R25 billion. Usually it is plus R9 billion, or plus 10, or 8 billion, or 12. One year we had R16 billion, I think that was in 1981 when prices rose very high, you remember, for crystal and carpets and so on. That was the only year such a thing occurred, there were no more years like that. We have achieved an increase of R25 billion. And at the same time we see that we can't balance the consumer market. So what's happening? If we are to speak of consumer goods, they grew about 9 percent last year, non-food goods, that is.

It is worse regarding food products. I will talk about this later on. Given a nine percent increase in consumer goods, the goods should exist. The point is that we have not balanced monetary income and expenditure. I am not talking about the so-called postponed demand, that is that money has, as it is said, accumulated over past years. We are not talking about all the money that is in savings banks and belongs to the public. This is for the most part money that people put away for a rainy day, for their old age, to buy big items and so forth. This happens in all countries and there is nothing alarming about it. It is simply for a society where people have a certain amount of money at their disposal.

However, a proportion of that money - and this is put at about R70 billion—is what they call hot money [goryachiye dengi], money that a person would put into circulation immediately if the goods or services were there. But they are not. This R70 billion, according to estimates from Goskomstat, is precisely what is putting pressure on the market. It is applying pressure, creating lines, and creating all the negative phenomena that occur in our country: speculation, hoarding etc. Precisely this money.

So, comrades, you and I added last year to the R70 billion, which was estimated at the start of last year, another R20 billion. According to Gosplan estimates, the population's incomes should have grown by aproximately R19 billion in 1988. In fact, they have grown by about R40 billion...[Ryzhkov corrects himself] 39 billion. That is an additional R20 billion in the form of money. Part of this has gone into the savings banks and part again has gone to people who would like to put it into circulation but do not have an opportunity. If we are talking about the 3 years as a whole, to give you an idea of these large-scale processes underway on the consumer market, look at what is going on: In calculation the 5-Year plan, the calculation was as follows—over the 3 years 1986-1988 purchase of goods and, accordingly, services, was due to rise by 14 percent and financial incomes were due to rise by 12 percent.

That is, everything was properly and correctly done to give some sort of backing, backing in the form of goods and services, and to create a normal situation on the consumer market. But what in fact happened over the 3 years? Consumer spending rose only 13 percent, while incomes rose 17 percent, 1.3 times, that is. Such are the discrepancies, and hence all these shortages. This is the main issue, and we, as people entrusted with governing the state, must evidently understand just these very processes: we can talk as much as we like about the details, but until we understand exactly what is going on, what the processes are, it will be very hard for us to come to definite conclusions.

We, comrades, have made a certain mistake; this must be said in self-criticism. When the 1988 plan was being drawn up a very large number of ministers—who are, incidentally, sitting here—said: Comrades, abolish the correlation between the increase in wages and the growth in labor productivity. As you know, we have always had this sort of ratio; it was introduced in 1983, and we should point out that it has not worked badly. So we say: Earn whatever you like. Our theory today, our approach is that we do not limit anyone's pay at all; earn whatever money you like, comrades. Anyone at all can earn whatever he can, but every ruble must be accompanied by an increase in labor productivity and an increase in output. This is an indispensable condition. Any disruption of that leads to an imbalance in the national economy. This, comrades, is the crux of the matter, as the saying goes. Therefore, I think that we made a great mistake in abolishing this correlation in 1988. We have now corrected this mistake and this year have introduced the correlation. We have warned the banks that as soon as there is any violation in any labor collective, in any enterprise, if there is any violation, the mechanism will immediately start to operate. We must take very strict measures. Let people earn whatever money they can, but there must be output. Without output, we can no longer hand over money.

TV Reports Proceeding

LD1401234489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Jan 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by correspondent Tikhomirov—recorded]

[Text] A session of the USSR Council of Ministers took place today. [video shows Ryzhkov addressing session at head of table, Chazov, Slyunkov, and Biryukova are seen among those present]

[Ryzhkov] I would like to invite you to examine carefully four problems which in our view are the main ones today, and which are hindering our normal development. The first problem is the profound imbalance in the consumer market. The second problem is the absence of any noticeable improvement in the supply of food for the population.

The third problem is the deterioration in state finances and the rising budget deficit. In our view this is an extremely serious problem, and it does not allow us to conduct the country's economy in a normal manner.

And the fourth problem is the increased difficulties in the foreign economic activity of our state. Our debt is increasing, our foreign currency expenditure exceeds our foreign currency income; and consequently we are, as they say, obliged to make loans for which, as your yourselves understand, we must pay very high interest.

[Tijhomirov, over video of the session in progress] Yes, only too often, evidently, in the dim and distant past and also in the not-so-distant past the Hall of the Council of Ministers has resounded with victorious reports glowing with self-praise instead of serious analysis of the situation and tendencies in the development of the economy—so often, that the quota has been exhausted, let's put it like that. And how much effort must still be exerted by those who come here today, in order to get all our lumbering and cumbersome economy moving in the right direction. As before, inertia continues to match the scale of the economy well. Just look at this graph. [video shows graph in Council of Ministers hall depicting movement of "group A" and "group B" type goods in 1986-88] It is one of the ones hung up in the hall. The red line shows the rate of growth of group B consumer goods: you see how reluctantly it rose. It took 2 years from the time the party and government decision was adopted to get things moving. This graph could, I think, depict the development of our whole economy today—there is movement, but jerky movement, skidding at spots and as yet low in efficiency.

The following fact emerged from the report by Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov, chairman of Gosplan [video shows Maslyukov addressing session]:

[Maslyukov] The national economy is maintaining the rate of development for material production envisaged in the 5-year plan. However, resources are being processed in greater quantities than envisaged. Consequently, the fuel and raw material sectors are compelled to work more intensively than was envisaged in the 5-year plan. I shall cite the following figures: in 1986-88 approximately 51.6 million tonnes of coal, more than 400,000 million cubic metres of gas and 10.6 million tonnes of oil and gas condensate above the 5-year plan were extracted. This violation of a major ratio in the 5-year plan burdens the economy, since the ratio of capital investments in the fuel and power complex, for instance, is constantly growing. In 1986 this was R15.1 for every tonne of standard fuel, while in 1988 it was R16.4. The more fuel and raw material we produce, the greater the loss to the national income.

[Tikhomirov, over video of proceedings] So that is what happens when it is final results rather than intermediate results that are the issue. That is how our triumphant above-plan proclamations look under the X-ray of harsh economic analysis. Imbalance—this was the most frequent word heard here today, and applied not only to our old processes but also to new processes just now emerging. For instance, imperfections in the distribution of profits even lead to a situation today where for some enterprises, the lower the plan, the more profitable it is.

[Maslyukov] This issue has revealed the imperfections existing in the economic mechanism; and we must correct them.

[Ryzhkov, seated at head of table] (?That means) we should get together in the near future and examine this issue more deeply.

[Maslyukov, standing at the rostrum] This is a very dangerous tendency. What happens, you understand, is that the lower the volume of output, the more above-plan profit one can now obtain. As a result, this encourages a fall in production, in physical production of output.

[Ryzhkov] This will be a very dangerous tendency when we are formulating all the targets of the next 5-year period. Everyone will try to have the lowest targets possible so as to subsequently overfulfill them and, as they say, to obtain above-plan profits. Therefore we must go into this matter deeply and make certain decisions. I would not anticipate today when we should abolish this whole matter, but obviously we must straighten it out.

[Maslyukov] Appropriate proposals have been drawn up, Nikolay Ivanovich, so we shall be examining them.

[Tikhomirov, over video of Gostev addressing session] Boris Ivanovich Gostev, minister of finance, spoke once again about the budget deficit and the process of inflation which is taking shape and about the fact that recently it has become particularly noticeable that the incomes of the population are growing disproportionately compared to the quantity of goods produced. The rate at which wages are growing has suddenly started to outstrip labor productivity. It was said quite bluntly at the Council of Ministers session today that the government was in too great a hurry when it removed the restrictive limits on the budgets of enterprises. Some enterprises rapidly lost all sense of proportion when they started to pump into wages money which had not in effect been earned. This will be stopped.

[Video shows Biryukova addressing session] How many most difficult problems! And most of them have to be tackled, shall we say, by groping about, tentatively feeling one's way as scientists say. Yes, the current leadership is sometimes reproached, as I know from conversations and from television viewers' letters, for failing to get things done, for the fact that frequently there are no profound economic developments being worked through. But just tell me where these could have come from during the Brezhnev times, when any divergent view on economics was immediately driven out, if it was not illegally put on trial. It is difficult, but one must move on. Even if one makes a mistake, one must advance. This was not discussed today, but it was what was meant in every address made, most of which I cannot even briefly describe in a short report. One must move ahead, and learn along the way.

[Studio announcer] The editorial office is preparing a special "Spotlight on Restructuring" program on the second point examined at this session, namely the provision of fruit and vegetables for the population.

Taking part in the USSR Council of Ministers session were Comrades Slyunkov, Biryukova, Vlasov, Maslyukov, Talyzin, Baklanovh.

KGB Seeks Intelligence Cooperation on Hijackings

TA1401202789 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Text] The KGB chief says that in its war against international terrorism, the Soviet secret police desires to coordinate positions with the Mossad, the CIA, and the British intelligence service. Our monitor Mikha'el Gurdus reports that Vitaliy Ponomarev, the head of the KGB [name, title as heard], said in a Radio Moscow broadcast that secret services must make use of all technological developments in the war against terrorism, especially against plane hijackings. Ponomarev denied reports in the West that the KGB is involved in international terrorism.

Registration of Election Candidates Ends

LD1401184289 Moscow TASS in English 1821 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—The Commission on Election of USSR People's Deputies completed the registration of CPSU candidates, nominated at the January plenary meeting of the party Central Committee, at its meeting on Saturday. Initially party organizations nominated more than 30,000 contenders to run for deputy seats. Proposals also came from work collectives and individuals. Their number has been shortlisted to 100 people.

Mikhail Gorbachev and other party leaders are among those registered.

Under the election law, members of the government, except for the chairman of the Council of Ministers, are not included in the list of candidates for USSR people's deputies from the CPSU.

Members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, who do not work in Moscow, as well as secretaries of the party Central Committees of union republics, territorial and regional committees, who were nominated in territorial and national districts, can run in one of these districts.

Representatives of science, technology, culture, who earned nationwide acclaim, were included into the list of candidates.

The party gave priority to the most authoritative representatives of the working class and peasantry. This reflects the real make-up of the party ranks, in which workers and peasants have an advantage.

Despite differences in profession, age and character, all candidates are united by the trust of working people and the active position in the perestroyka reform programme.

The candidates are facing a responsible period of meetings at party organisations, at which they will make public the election platform and listen to the voters' proposals.

Another round of the election campaign has been completed, but the Commission on Election of People's Deputies from the CPSU continues its work. It is now registering persons representing candidates and considers requests and proposals.

More on Central Electoral Commission 12 Jan Session

PM1301160789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the Central Electoral Commission on the Election of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] On 12 January the regular session of the Central Electoral Commission on the Election of USSR People's Deputies took place in Moscow in the October Hall of the House of the Unions. It examined a series of questions connected with preparation for the coming elections.

A report was heard by Yu.I. Ryzhov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission, on the composition of the okrug electoral commissions and of the electoral commissions on the election of USSR people's deputies from public organizations. It has been decided to publish in the press consolidated data on the composition of electoral commissions.

The Central Electoral Commission approved the text of a letter to the sectional electoral commissions with recommendations on the preparation for, and conducting of, elections of USSR people's deputies. Their attention was drawn to the procedure for compiling lists of electors, the familiarizing of citizens with them, the organization of the the voting and counting of votes, assistance to candidate deputies and their agents, and ensuring glasnost in work. G.V. Barabashev, a commission member, gave the report on this question.

The commission examined the question of attaching electoral sectors which are located outside the borders of the USSR to electoral okrugs within the country's territory. V.S. Nechayev, a commission member, gave the report on this question.

V.P. Orlov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, provided information on the Central Electoral Commission's work in the period between sessions, on the participation of its members in the local election measures, and on the examination of citizens' appeals.

Some other questions connected with preparation for the elections were also discussed at the session. In particular, the attention of soviets and okrug electoral commissions was drawn to the fact that in certain places the opportunity presented by the law to put forward candidates for USSR people's deputy at meetings of electors at their place of residence is poorly utilized. A recommendation was made that the electoral campaign process should be more actively covered in the mass media, with particular attention being paid to explaining the provisions of the Law on Elections and the practice of its application.

A.I. Lukyanov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, took part in the commission's work.

IZVESTIYA Reports 12 Jan Session

PM1601112189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondent M. Kushtapin: "What They Discussed at the Central Electoral Commission"]

[Text] Whenever the official agenda of a routine session of the Central Electoral Commission on the election of USSR people's deputies is exhausted the commission members start discussing issues they have encountered in the okrugs, at plenums of public organizations, and in labor collectives. Many issues of this kind were raised at the Central Electoral Commission session that was held in Moscow on 12 January.

For example, can a first deputy minister or deputy chairman of a state committee who frequently has to stand in for the top man during his absence be elected as a USSR people's deputy? He can, because only the minister or state committee chairman is appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet and is accountable to it. Another question in the same vein: But what if a USSR people's deputy subsequently becomes a minister? He will have to resign his deputyship or decline the ministerial portfolio in order to remain a deputy.

There were simpler questions: A voter deposits his voting-paper without having crossed out any of the candidates—the document is deemed invalid. But what if he takes the voting paper and crosses out all the names? The paper is deemed valid and the voter's vote is placed in the "against" column.

Many "irregular" issues are discussed at the Central Electoral Commission's table. There are not always ready answers: The current election campaign is something new not only for the electorate, but also for the organizers. But, in any event, the commission members, together with the consultants, scholars, and lawyers, have two basis principles in mind—the solution of the question must not contradict the law and it must in no way infringe voters' rights.

But let us return to the session agenda. It listened to a report on the makeup of okrug electoral commissions and of the public organizations' electoral commissions. Some 1,496 okrug electoral commissions have been formed and approved on time. In one territorial okrug and in three national territorial okrugs of the Armenian SSR, in connection with the earthquake, nomination of representatives for membership of commissions will take place starting on 15 January. The electoral commission based on the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences will also be formed later than scheduled. This is due to the reorganization of the Academy and reelection of members.

Some figures were cited at the session. Some 22,570 representatives of labor collectives, of public organizations, of meetings of voters at their places of residence, and of servicemen are currently working in 1,496 okrug electoral commissions. Some 58.8 percent of the members of these commissions are full or candidate members of the CPSU, 15.8 percent are Komsomol members, 46.7 percent are wonmen, 45.1 percent are workers or kolkhoz members. Some 437 people are working in 38 electoral commissions based on public organizations. Seven of these commissions are common to several organizations.

The Central Electoral Commission approved a methodological letter to ward [uchastkovyy] electoral commissions containing recommendations on preparing for and conducting the election of USSR people's deputies. There was a consideration of the question of attaching electoral wards outside the USSR to electoral okrugs on the country's territory. Moreover, it was pointed out that in many okrugs there have been very few meetings enabling voters in residential areas to nominate candidate deputies. It is clear from citizens' communications to the Central Electoral Commission (our paper receives similar letters) that this is due to the reluctance of okrug commissions to organize and hold such meetings and the inadequate assistance for local soviets in this matter. It is a worrying fact that contradicts the spirit and letter of the Law on Elections.

A.I. Lukyanov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, participated in the commission's work.

Znaniye Society Considers Candidate Deputies

PM1301163189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Dolganov report under rubric "Elections of USSR People's Deputies": "Different Lists"]

[Text] The All-Union "Znaniye" Society has been given 10 deputy mandates for 2.5 million lecturers and people in virtually every profession.

The battle for "one's own" candidates at local levels has been a serious business. The final list contained 62 candidates. And this figure prompted disputes at the session of the board presidium, which preceded the plenum. N. Golovko, first deputy chairman of the board, tried to persuade people that they should select about 15 of the "most worthy candidates" from the list and propose them to the plenum, thereby ensuring maximum representation of the union board. Members of the presidium felt this proposal was undemocratic and unlawful. After a long discussion, it was agreed that the plenum should consider two lists: The full list and another one that would reflect the opinion of the presidium. This contained 20 names.

The next day, conducting a conference of chairmen and deputy chairmen of the union republic "Znaniye" society boards and republic (ASSR), kray, and oblast organizations, N. Golovko read out a list of 11 candidates which had mysteriously appeared from nowhere.

Neither the conference nor the plenum supported the attempt to conduct everything in the time-honored way by "shaping opinion" in advance.

The plenum began with a surprise—only 159 of the 263 members of the board were present, and a further 8 people turned up by the time the voting started. The law says that a competitor from a public organization who secures more than half of the votes of members of the board may become a candidate for USSR people's deputy. The discussion was quite sharp. Here are some of the rejoinders, aired through microphones set up in the auditorium:

"On the basis of what criteria has the presidium selected 20 people, and just how democratic is this?"

"No one objects to an outstanding scientist, but is there any point in nominating someone more than 80 years old?"

"Why is there not one representative of Siberia and the Far East on the list?"

And so on and so forth. Two candidates were struck off the list proposed by the presidium and three new ones added. N. Golovko said he refused to accept his nomination. Admiral V. Grishanov, deputy chairman of the board, failed to collect the number of votes needed to be included on the list of candidates. The plenum participants decided in favor of a secret ballot—but not without some argument. Many objected to the voting list being "circumscribed."

The commission responsible for counting the votes announced the results. Of the 19 names on the lists, only 12 secured the number of votes needed to be nominated as candidates for USSR people's deputies. What is more, in the voting process, the plenum made its attitude to the leadership of the All-Union "Znaniye" Society board perfectly clear. Neither Academician N. Basov, the chairman of the board, nor his deputy, L. Feoktistov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, nor Professor V. Semenov, member of the presidium, secured the necessary number of votes.

IZVESTIYA Editorializes on CPSU Address

PM1601143189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Party Platform Is Restructuring"]

[Text] A CPSU Central Committee plenum unparalleled in our history has come to an end. In what sense was it unparalleled? Well, in the sense that at this plenum party representatives were nominated candidates for people's deputies for the first time. Moreover, the plenum, adopted the "CPSU Central Committee Address to the Party and the Soviet People"—a document that in effect embodied the party's election platform.

This document answers virtually all the fundamentally important questions worrying society today. Let's not close our eyes to the fact that there are people among us—and quite a few of them—who, when faced with new tasks and sensing their inability to resolve these tasks, experience nostalgia for olden days and a desire to go back in time and retrieve their lost comfort. These sentiments are meeting with a resolute protest in society. Yet they give rise to doubts in some people: Will the party be strong enough to stubbornly and consistently continue to restructure society while overcoming resistance from some and inertia from others, won't we grow tired, won't we put the brakes on, or even stop?

The address says clearly and directly with a degree of certainty that leaves no room for doubt: "...The party assures Soviet people that it will continue to proceed steadily along the path of restructuring, applying all its efforts and collective thought and collective will to the revolutionary renewal of our society."

There is also the next line containing not only the logical continuation of this idea but also reflecting the essence of the process and containing the condition for success: "The party hopes that each one of you will take an active part in implementing the plans that have been outlined."

The party is going to the polls with a clear, all-embracing, and comprehensively analyzed program for the renewal of society.

It is supremely aware of its responsibility to the people. It realizes its role as the acknowledged vanguard of society. And recognizes its responsibility for past mistakes and miscalculations.

Democratization is the main link and the essence of this great renewal. The political reform that the party initiated, starting with itself having defined its functions as a political vanguard capable of expressing public interests, uniting the entire diverse range of opinions and needs of the various strata of society, and imparting a purposeful character to them, is geared to this above all.

The address expounds the main avenues for party policy at the opening phase of restructuring and the means of achieving them.

Increasing people's prosperity and improving their life is the main avenue, the core, and the aim of all socioeconomic policy. The most acute problem today is the food problem and the address says that the solution of the problem is linked above all with ensuring that the rural worker becomes master on the land and with the establishment of progressive economic methods of economic management, the restoration of equilibrium between town and country, and the social restructuring of the countryside. The upcoming party Central Committee plenum will elaborate agrarian policy in detail at the contemporary phase.

Industry will produce considerably more goods for the people. All its sectors, including the defense sector, will work toward this. Considerable funds are being earmarked for modernizing the light and food industries: Foreign and mixed firms and enterprises are being enlisted for these purposes.

Deeming the housing problem one of the most urgent and worrying for Soviet people, the party's election address confirms the program made public previously: Every Soviet family must have an individual apartment or home by the year 2000; by the end of the next 5-year plan the commissioning of new apartments will have risen to 3 million.

The following are important areas in the party's socioeconomic policy: Boosting concern for pensioners and the preparation of a new law on pensions; shifting attention to the family and to the family's social and moral prestige; radically improving Soviet people's medical service.

The address stresses that the economy is the foundation of active social policy. A great deal is also changing here and a great deal still has to be changed in accordance with the well-defined program for radical economic reform elaborated by the party. The main thing is to establish the direct dependence of income on the effectiveness and quality of work and ensure that every ruble is earned honestly. The party considers that attempts to use economic instruments—profit and prices—for narrow group interests and for selfish interests to the detriment of the people are incompatible with social justice.

The election platform contains the basic principles of a nationalties policy. The scheduled CPSU Central Committee plenum will elaborate a more concrete action program in this area. But it is clear even now that our multiethnic state's stability is based on its strong center and strong republics. Economic accountability [khozraschet] is to become the basis of the union republic's independence [samostoyatelnost] and of their responsibilty to one another and will help do away with departmental diktat. Every republic and every people will have more opportunities for developing the economy, the social sphere, language, and culture, and more opportunities to reveal more fully and clearly ethnic originality, which will, as a result, strengthen and enrich the family of the Soviet peoples and their union.

A considerable part of the address is devoted to the spiritual and moral atmosphere that must be created in society. This atmosphere is characterized by the exposure of individual capabilities, intellect, and talents rather than leveling, diversity of opinions, views, and approaches with complete respect for one another rather than ostentatious unanimity, the affirmation of good feelings, truth, justice, charity, and fraternity and at the same time the nonacceptance of social and moral vices—that is our social ideal.

"The party considers it its duty," the address says, "to build up the intellectual potential of restructuring and create the requisite conditions for the formation of a comprehensively developed and socially active individual. The CPSU favors the consistent affirmation in the life of our society of openness, glasnost, and the lofty humanistic ideals and values of socialism."

CPSU foreign policy is also notable for its realism and innovative nature. The new thinking has helped us to find approaches to a whole series of problems of international life and ensure that the world as a a whole is more secure and the stereotypes of the "cold war" are overcome. Seeing this over and over, we can be sure that our foreign policy aimed and will aim to ensure peaceful living conditions for the current generation of Soviet people.

The party's election address is not simply Words that the people expected, it is also Deeds—a precisely gauged program for our common purposeful actions, a program for restructuring linking the people and the party through a single common destiny. This party election document rightly says that no one will solve our problems for us. Only we ourselves, together, by concerted efforts can overcome the difficulties and achieve our plans.

Festive Rally Marks Latvian Anniversary

LD1301200589 Moscow TASS in English 1950 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Riga January 13 TASS—A festive rally marking the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Baltic Republic of Latvia was held in the Riga opera and ballet theater where the first Congress of Soviets (or councils) of United Latvia took place on January 13, 1919.

The congress delegates—workers, peasants and soldiers—adopted a constitution which enshrined the Lettish people's national state system in legislation for the first time.

"We were brought together here not only by a desire to pay a tribute of respect to that generation of revolutionaries but also by the need to think of the continuity of revolutionary traditions and of the embodiment of Lenin's ideals of socialism in our activities today," Anatoliy Gorbunov, president of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, said in his speech at the anniversary rally on Friday.

He described the congress of 70 years ago as the first forum in Latvia's history that had the right to take decisions on behalf of the people.

Its delegates proclaimed Latvia a sovereign Soviet Socialist Republic whose independence was first recognized by the Government of Soviet Russia led by Vladimir Lenin.

The congress passed a special resolution expressing the keen desire of Lettish people to form a fraternal union with revolutionary Russia.

"The destinies of our peoples have come to be bound by history and our desire to strengthen Latvia's economic and political sovereignty within the USSR is directed primarily at overcoming deformities of the past," Gorbunov said.

"Latvia's well-being depends first of all on the consolidation of forces, on our joint labor. It is essential that everyone, regardless of his nationality, realize his responsibility for his republic and for the future of Soviet Latvia which was proclaimed 70 years ago," he added.

Reporters on Trial for Distorting Estonia Reports

LD1701143389 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1130 GMT 17 Jan 89

[Text] In the Estonian capital, Tallinn, a very unusual trial was due to begin today. Two journalists from the official news agency TASS are accused of distorting the truth in their reporting from Estonia, but the two TASS reporters never turned up for their trial today.

[Correspondent Anders Eriksson] The two TASS reporters were dispatched from Moscow to monitor events in Estonia during September and October, when the People's Front held its constituent congress. But according to the leaders of the People's Front, they gave a completely misleading and distorted picture of what happened in Estonia. Their reports were based solely on contacts with representatives of the Russian-speaking population; they had no contact at all with the People's Front. According to TASS reports, one of the People's Front meetings ended with the plundering of shops in Tallinn. Three of the leaders of the People's Front have now instigated legal proceedings against the two TASS journalists. Lembit Koik is one of the three leaders; he is a lawyer himself and gives the following example of how the two TASS journalists described the leadership of the People's Front:

[Begin Koik recording in Estonian, fading into report in Swedish] Well, among other things, they described how the leadership of the People's Front, which consists of seven persons, allegedly went around factories in Tallinn destroying machines, and how, in connection with the session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, they tried to influence the delegates inside the hall where the session was taking place. This is completely wrong, and in our view this is a case of pure slander, says Lembit Koik. The TASS reporters' articles have not been published in Estonia. Lembit Koik does not know whether they were published anywhere else the Soviet Union either; but the mere fact that the reports were written is enough, he believes. Besides, says Lembit Koik, it is common for incorrect descriptions to appear in the Moscow press concerning events in Estonia. [end recording]

The trial of the two journalists was due to begin in December, but the two never turned up at the court here in Tallinn. Nor did they do so today. One of them announced that he was on vacation, and that his lawyer was ill as well. Lembit Koik says it is obvious that the two do not want to appear in court.

[Begin Koik recording in Estonia, fading into report in Swedish] One can see their motives for not coming here. It is transparent that they don't want to, says Lembit

Koik. The trial will now continue in February—if the TASS journalists and their lawyers come to the court then. Obviously the three People's Front representatives are prepared to wait for the pleasure of bringing the state news agency TASS to account in court. Anders Eriksson in Tallinn. [end recording]

Decree on NKAO 'Special Form of Administration'

PM1401160989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 1

["USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on Introducing a Special Form of Administration in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] In connection with the continuing tension in interethnic relations in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], in order to prevent a further deterioration of them and to stabilize the situation in the region, in view of the proposals by party and state organs of the Azerbaijan SSR and Armenian SSR and of the Soviet of Nationalities commission, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, having considered this matter with the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in accordance with clause 14 of Article 119 of the USSR Constitution, decrees that:

1. A special form of administration [osobaya forma upravleniya] is to be introduced temporarily in the NKAO while retaining Nagorno-Karabakh's status as an autonomous oblast in the Azerbaijan SSR.

An NKAO Special Administration Committee is to be formed under the chairmanship of Comrade A.I. Volskiy.

The powers of the NKAO soviet of people's deputies, 20th convocation, and its ispolkom are to be suspended until a new soviet is elected.

2. It is laid down that the NKAO Special Administration Committee is directly subordinate to the supreme organs of power and administration of the USSR and has the full powers of the autonomous oblast's soviet and its ispolkom, and the chairman of the commission has the rights and duties of the oblispolkom chairman.

The aforementioned committee is to be entrusted with the leadership of local organs of state power and administration of the NKAO and the oblispolkom apparatus is to be transferred to it as a working organ.

3. It is laid down that as long as this decree is in effect enterprises, institutions, and organizations under union and republican jurisdiction situated in the NKAO and their branches, shops, and other structural subdivisions are subordinate to the committee in terms of a range of questions determined by the USSR Council of Ministers, taking into account the opinion of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers.

Organs of the press, radio, and television and other news media, publishing houses, printing enterprises, internal affairs organs, and institutions of culture, public education, public health, and other organizations in the nonproduction sphere, irrespective of their subordination or departmental affiliation, will perform their activities under the direct leadership of the committee or individuals authorized by it.

The activities of the prosecutor's office and courts in the NKAO will take place in accordance with existing legislation and the procedure laid down by the USSR General Prosecutor, USSR Ministry of Justice, and USSR Supreme Court.

4. The NKAO Special Administration Committee is to be given the right:

to suspend the powers of NKAO rayon, city, rural, and settlement soviets of people's deputies and their executive and administrative organs and set a date for and organize elections to the aforementioned local soviets;

to suspend activity of public organizations and unofficial [samodeyatelnyy] associations which contravenes the USSR Constitution and USSR legislation and, if necessary, disband them. The registration and disbandment of the aforementioned organizations and associations which have republic or union organs is to be coordinated with these organs;

if necessary to go direct to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR ministries, state committees, and departments with proposals on questions of state, economic, and sociocultural building.

5. The action of clauses 2 and 3 and paragraph 3 of clause 5 of Article 6 and Article 7 of the USSR Law "On the State Enterprise (Association)" is to be suspended on the territory of the NKAO.

6. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is to adopt the relevant decisions arising out of this decree.

7. This decree comes into effect 20 January 1989.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

T. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

The Kremlin, Moscow, 12 January 1989.

NKAO Committee Head Interviewed

LD1501205589 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1841 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Interview by Moscow Television commentator Aleksandr Krutov with Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy, chairman of the Committee for the Special Administration of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and head of a department of the CPSU Central Committee; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Aleksandr Krutov] Arkadiy Ivanovich, a decree has been adopted on the temoprary introduction in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of a special form of administration. What does "a special form" mean? What has caused it and what is the point of it?

[Volskiy] Well, I hope that all the viewers read the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in today's papers. I must say that it was not simple for us to arrive at this decision. Various points of view were weighed and various options were considered as well as their effect on the situation. All the comrades know that a commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet worked directly in Nagorno-Karabakh. They submitted the very proposals which have now been adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The commission included 10 deputies from Azerbaijan and 10 from Armenia, who also arrived at precisely this compromise solution; and it seems to me that this is the only way out of the situation which has come about. We cannot hide the fact that tension remains despite the energetic measures which are being taken to stabilize the situation. It cannot yet be said that it has stabilized, that it has finally stabilized. You cannot say today that the peoples have arrived at friendship and mutual understanding.

[Krutov] So the situation remains complex?

[Volskiy] It is complex. The reasons for this were disclosed by Mikhail Sergeyevich when he gave an interview to central television and Armenian television. In making this decision, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium considers this to be a temporary and enforced measure, but one that has to be.

[Krutov] Does the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an oblast change?

[Volskiy] No. Not only does the status of the autonomous oblast not change, it has risen a little, so to speak, on account of its economic independence; but, as before, it will be part of of the Azerbaijani SSR.

[Krutov] Except that it will now be administered by your committee?

[Volskiy] Yes.

[Krutov] Arkadiy Ivanovich, the situation now is that everything concerning people's lives in the autonomous oblast, socially and economically, now comes under your jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of your committee. That's how I understand it.

[Volskiy] Yes the special administration is under the committee's jurisdiction.

[Krutov] Can you say how many people it consists of?

[Volskiy] Well, there will be something like 80 people on the committee. These are experienced people. Some of them are still engaged in party, political, or economic work. We shall take with us members of the party Central Committee and deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We shall also include both Armenian and Azerbaijani comrades in the committee. I must say that our main aim is harmonious joint work.

[Krutov] Isn't this decision in contradiction of the party's course towards democratization, glasnost?

[Volskiy] Not at all. You must understand clearly here that the very situation which is coming about is already violating restructuring; it is not offering the opportunity for this very democratization and glasnost which you are speaking of to develop. But to be frank, when you are there and are observing the development of relations all the time, you can draw the unambiguous conclusion that it's as if you were in some other prerestructuring era. And the local leaders—those who were responsible for social matters, for the solution of all matters related to the oblast's economy and so on—they all lost their heads at that time. Many were carried away with holding endless meetings—they got carried away with chatter, to be blunt. And as a result—well, I have had occasion to travel throughout the Soviet Union a great deal and to visit many places in our country and I cannot name a more neglected region than Nagorno- Karabakh.

The blame here lies also with the former leadership of Azerbaijan which conducted a policy—precisely that very same administrative-command policy. It cut off all kinds of links with Armenia. The blame for this lies also with the leadership in the oblast, which, as is known, has been removed and replaced. But in any case, there were no positive changes in the oblast after the April plenum.

Therefore, if you are talking about restructuring, essentially it has not started here. For this reason, it can be said unambiguously that the measures which are being taken do not in any way contradict the party's course. Moreover, I would say that they make it possible to arrive at that course through new forms and methods of work, through an improvement in the mutual relations among people.

[Krutov] How will the committee's relations with the local organs of authority be built?

[Volskiy] I would say this: If you are talking about the Presidium's decree, all the comrades have read that the activities and powers of the Soviet of People's Deputies and its Executive Committee are prorogued until new elections are held. So all political and administrative power and economic management is being transferred to the jurisdiction of the special administration committee; and I think that we shall rely, of course, on Communists. We shall rely on the healthy forces amongst the Karabakh people, we shall rely on our good relations with the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee and the governments of the republics, both of Armenia and Azerbaijan. But, be that as it may, the special administration committee is subordinate to the central organs of power and this also sets the particular responsibility, so to speak, for the state of affairs in the region.

[Krutov] A lot has been written about the role, the negative role, that has been played by the mafia, by corrupt elements. Will this decree provide greater opportunities for combatting the mafia?

[Volskiy] I will allow myself to say this, that the significance and the role of the shadow economy—the mafia and the corrupt elements—have not yet been fully exposed, although just one thing is clear—the fact that it is frantic in its resistance to restructuring. It tries at any price to block the party bodies and our administrative bodies from making any checks, and so on—transferring the struggle, so to speak, to the level of relations between the nationalities. And voices have even been talking about civil war, about war between nationalities, this is convenient—to divert attention.

I'll tell you, according to the assessment of scientists and bank workers and specialists, Azerbaijan's shadow economy is currently put at R10 billion. This means underground business, people running workshops of all kinds; it means all the rest of the mafia that is associated with this. One can talk about this subject, but one thing can be said unambiguously: The fact that today it is visible, it is showing through. And unfortunately this is not just at the low levels but at the level of the leadership of the republics, too. I have said that Azerbaijan's shadow economy is estimated at R10 billion. That figure needs to be considered.

[Krutov] Ten billion is an enormous figure.

[Volskiy] It is an enormous sum. But if one is to speak about Armenia, then according to the same calculations that have been made by the relevant groups of specialists, the figure there is no lower—in the region of...it is even greater than R10 billion. The task now, of course, is to expose this to the processes of improvement which—and when we speak about improvement we have in mind, first and foremost, of course, doing away with this shadow economy, the mafia, the criminal world, the fusion with the state apparatus which indeed exists, one cannot fail to see this.

[Krutov] As I understand it, things have gone so far that there was no alternative to the introduction of a special form of government?

[Volskiy] I would put it like this: Other methods of working had simply run out at this particular stage. In accordance with the instructions of the party Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet we mainly had a mediatory role. The functions that had been given us were carried out, and it is now moving into a new phase. Elections have to be organized, so that the party bodies, and the local soviet bodies, and the trade union and Komsomol bodies are joined by worthy people—and what is most important, by people who are honest and decent, true fighters for restructuring, true representatives of their people.

You mention the mafia. Once again, unfortunately, I am obliged in some way to stress its role here. I recall one of many facts of recent times: There is currently a trial in the town of Stepanakert of people who have been plundering state property at a small shop in the town of Mardakert. Over a short period of time R1.3 million were stolen at this shop by criminal elements; but the main thing is that it was with the involvement of the leadership of the oblast, and not just of the oblast—of the republic. Furthermore, the investigations led to a situation in which, as it was said, there were no culprits.

[Krutov] Was the investigation carried out by local bodies?

[Volskiy] The investigation was carried out by the procuracy of the republic, but clearly such important people were involved in this—influential rather than important, perhaps—they don't deserve a good word, they are criminals.

[Krutov] But has your committee now been given authority?

[Volskiy] So influential were they that the investigation ended with the people involved in a small way having been found, but then they said that those who stole R1.2 million had not been discovered.

[Krutov] The small man always ends up bearing the blame!

[Volskiy] Yes, yes, of course. Under these conditions you are right, our task and the committee's task now, together with the all-union procuracy—and we now have a large group that has been set up by the union procuracy, it is conducting investigations into other cases which are also related to mafia affairs and the shadow economy, the shadow business—and together with the investigations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs I think that we have to assure the people of Karabakh and the whole Soviet people, because everyone has an interest in our society being free of scum of any kind.

[Krutov] You made a speech at the December session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in which you noted the serious socioeconomic situation in the autonomous oblast. A large amount of funds has been allocated to it by the center. Tell me, is the situation changing?

[Volskiy] I would say this: The Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision on assisting the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. There are also other sources for the oblast's development—the local budget, etc. I think that these funds are sufficient; but this decision must be fulfilled, we must struggle so that it is fulfilled, we must exert all our force. We see this as one of the committee's main tasks—to improve the oblast's socioeconomic development, to improve the situation of people living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

[Krutov] How do you see the special administration committee's action program in the near future?

[Volskiy] The main task now is to calm people down. We cannot permit those confrontations which took place in November and December. It was for this reason that the special situation was introduced in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as in Baku, Yerevan, and 28 rayons where there is mixed population. It allowed us to avert an interethnic war. But the peoples' distrust of each other continues. Offenses against each other are being scrupulously counted. A register is being established, as it were, of the insults which have been inflicted, and so on. Our task now is to get people to live in peace—ordinary people. Is it really permissible for such a problem—there has never been such a thing in our country's history—as the problem of migrants, refugees, to arise?

More than 200,000 people have left their places of residence, the places where they cultivated the land, where Armenians and Azerbaijanis had lived together harmoniously. But they were driven out, they were driven out by the very elements which we were speaking about earlier.

[Krutov] In our way of life, there has never before been such a form of administration, a special form.

[Volskiy] Yes it is unusual in our country's history and in the practice of recent years, but it has been used elsewhere in the world. I have one thing to say—that we shall devote, we shall spare no effort or opportunity to restore peace and calm in that territory, in that region, so that people can live once more as before, in friendship and comradeship.

[Krutov] I wish you success in your work.

[Volskiy] Thank you very much.

Volskiy Writes on Committee's Tasks

PM1501151589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by A.I. Volskiy, chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Special Administration Committee and chief of a CPSU Central Committee Department: "Peace to the Land of Karabakh. From Confrontation to the Struggle for Restructuring"—first three paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] A USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree on introducing a special form of administration in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of the Azerbaijan SSR is published today.

Local authorities' powers to tackle all political and socioeconomic issues are transferred to an NKAO Special Administration Committee.

At PRAVDA's request, Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy, chairman of the NKAO Special Administration Committee and chief of a CPSU Central Committee department, recounts what prompted the decision and what tasks face the Special Administration Committee.

The decision is unusual. There is nothing like it in the history of our state. To be frank, until recently there was still the hope that good sense would prevail in Azerbaijan and Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and that healthy forces would be able to achieve reconciliation. Unfortunately, this did not happen. For a whole year interethnic strife continued to intensify in the region and in the last months of the year it took on the character of open clashes. More than 200,000 people—both from Armenia and from Azerbaijan—were forced to leave their homes, work, areas of settlement, and cultivated lands. Intelligent, capable people, good neighbors were driven out simply because they were of a different nationality. Injustice and even cruelty broke free from the custody of reason and invaded the masses. It took harsh measures and the introduction of a special situation in a number of areas in order to halt the orgy of violence. And now, on the basis of a mutually acceptable, sensible compromise, an NKAO Special Administration Committee has been set up, as an enforced measure.

Of course, it will not be easy to restore friendship and trust between the two peoples. The catalogue of mutual grudges is too great and the bitter feeling of humiliation and outrage is too recent; they have not been forgotten, of course. But continuing internecine strife is the path not to truth and justice, but to the abyss. The campaign of reproaches and accusations has not helped to solve a single problem, and more feuding will only result in further suffering and hardship for both peoples.

Whom did the organizers and inspirers of the strikes and mass disturbances hope to punish? The state, the government, or the people? Nagorno-Karabakh even within the framework of Azerbaijan accounts for only 2-3 percent of gross production. Who was punished then? Primarily the families of workers who did not receive pay for many months. The labor collectives of enterprises which lost profits amounting to millions of rubles, got into debt, held up reconstruction, and lost the confidence of partners in economic ties. The oblast as a whole, which blew all its plans for socioeconomic development.

Sometimes one hears it said: We are struggling to implement our own national demands and socioeconomic solutions are of no importance. Well, let us consider this: What is a national movement anyway? What does it spring from and who nourishes it?

A person considers that his nationality has been offended and abused not when he is surrounded by people of a different color, different language, and different religion. If that were so it would be impossible for multinational collectives and cities to coexist; everyone would disperse to their own national quarters. But we do not have that. So it is not a question of ethnic or historical roots. A national movement appears primarily when and in places where social justice has been violated— when representatives of one nationality receive preferential conditions and privileges, while representatives of another nationality face all manner of obstacles to the development of their language and traditions, to education and professional advancement.

Remember how the Karabakh movement emerged and developed. Why did people raise the question of joining Armenia? Because they could see that the former leadership of Azerbaijan was leading the oblast further and further up a blind alley and was seeking to sever the Armenian population's natural links with Armenia in the sphere of culture and language and was placing certain obstacles in the way of the Armenian-speaking intelligentsia. All this actually happened! All this is true! In my trips round the country I have never encountered the kind of neglect and disregard for people's future I saw in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This is the socioeconomic soil in which the tree of national demands grew. But the solution was obvious too: For the tree to start feeding on different sap it was necessary to change the soil itself—conditions of labor, everyday life, and leisure and the atmosphere of life itself. Hence the persistent and consistent stance of the CPSU Central Committee: eliminate the socioeconomic distortions which were preventing the people of Nagorno-Karabakh from feeling full-fledged respected citizens.

The real tragedy of both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani peoples is that the pure cause of the struggle for social justice began to be polluted by the filthy tide of nationalism. Instead of calling untalented, bureaucratic personnel strictly to account, as demanded by restructuring and by the party, instead of identifying and bringing to book the sloppy workers in their midst—instead of this, the only correct path, they started to look for an external enemy and blame him for all the insults and mistakes, see him as the root of all evil. History can show many examples of a deceived people venting their irritation in pogroms and orgies, in accusations against "foreigners." But this path has never led to a happy conclusion. And those who have used evil for their own purposes have themselves become its victim.

The events of last November and December show what frantic resistance dark forces in Azerbaijan and Armenia—the black economy, corrupt strata, and the mafia—mounted to restructuring, renewal, and purification. They plundered their own peoples mercilessly, so how can one expect them to show concern for and interest in people's needs?

But there is something else that restructuring has produced. Can one not see how the new leaders of the republics are making a vigorous effort to accelerate and deepen the restructuring processes? And if the people and Communists do not support these efforts, restructuring will grind to a halt there and its opponents might gain the upper hand.

The most important and most difficult thing was that corrupt elements and the mafia found the bulk of their support not only in informal associations. First and foremost they had forged a bond with the state, soviet, and, in some cases, party apparatus. These dark forces had planted cadres at all levels and were running the show in both republics. It was they who for a number of years conducted chauvinist propaganda, duped the public, and fanned every smoldering coal into a conflagration. It was they who tried to create a situation where they could encourage national and religious feelings and stifle glasnost and democracy. They consistently generated an atmosphere precluding any compromise settlement of the problem. These smart operators needed to divert the party's and the country's efforts away from restructuring, from the establishment of order, and from exposing swindlers and thieves. Unfortunately, in many respects they succeeded.

We are sure that healthy forces in Armenia and in Azerbaijan are capable of rectifying the situation. Today all honest people must unite beneath the banner of restructuring. For my part I can give assurances that we will be sympathetic toward and respect the initiatives of the people's movement and are prepared to cooperate with unofficial [samodeyatelnyy] public associations and organizations wherever it is a matter of renewing life, cleaning up our society, and protecting socialist ideals.

This will be one of the principles of the NKAO Special Administration Committee's work. With its creation the oblast essentially acquires self-management in the sphere of planning, material and technical provision, and solution of cadre and special matters. Moreover, the creation of the committee does not infringe the oblast's autonomy and does not mean any change in its territorial affiliation to the Azerbaijan SSR.

In making this decision, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was aware that the urgent questions there had become so great and acute that neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia was capable of solving them alone. As you know, Armenia's potential will be severely limited for the next few years after the terrible earthquake of 7 December.

Before describing the committee's tasks, I want to say why the party has again come out resolutely and unequivocally against a territorial alteration.

All historical allusions to the land having belonged to this or that people for centuries are completely groundless. For many centuries the peoples were nomads, they exchanged territories, and lived together. One cultural stratum grew on top of another. Today the reality is that the territorial claims of some peoples cannot be resolved without encroaching on the vital interests and infringing the rights of others. To follow this path is to cause a new outbreak of strife and bloodshed.

Furthermore, what does "border" mean anyway, in our socialist state? It is a conventional line, a boundary on a map... We do not have and we will not have any boundary markers and closed roads in the country. And when people start grumbling about "sacred integrity" and the "need to preserve every bush, stone, tree, and mountain," we will ask—preserve them against what? From attacks by the hordes of Tamerlane, the Turks, or fascist forces? Is it not Soviet land everywhere beneath us?

Finally, a legitimate question in that vein: Shouldn't a border characterize the extent to which national problems have been resolved in the single, multinational socialist state? Certainly, the established territorial community of a particular nation or ethnic group, its constitution, its cultural traditions and ways, and even the dominant religion there—they are all realities of national life that no one should encroach upon. But it is equally certain that today all our republics and okrugs without exception are multinational. One in five inhabitants of the country—more than 60 million people—lives in republics and oblasts with a different indigenous nationality.

The people retired within their own ethnic shell are unhappy. This is indicated by historical experience and by the contemporary situation. Artificial isolation, cutting oneself off from another culture—they are the first step to the people's spiritual impoverishment. Aleksandr Shirvanzade wrote about his fate: "I do not know of which of the Transcaucasian peoples Solomon would regard me as a member. I was born and spent my youth in Azerbaijan; my adult life was spent and my creative activity took place in Georgia; in my dotage I live in Armenia and I will probably die and be buried here; but my heart cannot tear itself away from any of these lands."

The thousands and thousands of Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Kurds, Lezgins, Ossetians, Ukrainians, and Russians living in this land can subscribe to those words. Historically, Nagorno-Karabakh too was the cradle of many mixed families. And if for centuries the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples lived here together, cooperating rather than killing each other, how absurd the polarization [razmezhevaniye] nowadays must be and what a perpetual tragedy for both peoples might result from it.

V.I. Lenin, who was extremely punctilious about national relations, especially when it came to small peoples, always objected harshly to the artificial demarcation of nations and national self-isolation. For instance, he categorically rejected the plan for autonomy in terms of cultural enlightenment and for separate schooling according to nationality, calling these steps the most subtle and therefore most dangerous forms of nationalism.

No, there will be no national reservations in our country. In Nagorno-Karabakh too Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Russians must live together, work together, and together raise children and display concern for their happiness. There is no alternative! Peace will not come to the land of Karabakh until the settling of scores is stopped.

I will turn again to V.I. Lenin. He has some superb advice in this connection. He emphasized that it is impermissible to seek formal equality—an eye for an eye, a grievance for a grievance—in interethnic disputes. On the contrary, even inequality is justified here so that the trust of the aggrieved parties is restored: "It is better to go too far in the direction of pliancy and mildness toward national minorities than not far enough."

I think that this behest should be addressed above all to teachers, the intelligentsia, and the mass media. Stop fanning the flames of enmity and mistrust toward the other people! Stop boundlessly and thoughtlessly praising your own people, for that is also the road to chauvinism and interethnic strife. If your words bode no good for the other people, they will also harm your own.

Increasingly often of late the banners of national patriotism have been beginning to be hoisted in our life. There's no question—love for your own people and motherland is a sacred and superb feeling. But love—not unthinking deification. Love—not unthinking fanaticism whereby your own nation begins to be portrayed as the cleverest and most talented, as God's chosen people.

If one people regards itself as better and higher than others, that is not patriotism but national arrogance and haughtiness. There have been many cases in recent days where people have demanded that a thief, rapist, or robber be acquitted merely because he is "one of us" and has camouflaged his crimes with a "patriotic" screen.

Nationality cannot exist so far as justice is concerned. The important point is whether or not someone has committed an offense. That is the norm in any rule-of-law state.

I have deemed it necessary to dwell on this point in order to call on everyone yet again: Let us cleanse the people's movement, the restructuring movement of all the scum and of everything that impedes the main aim—the renewal of all aspects of our life. It is impermissible to stage a political boycott of restructuring even in a small region of the country. What is happening here is precisely a boycott! A boycott of the fundamental tasks of restructuring—people's power, democratization, self-management, economic accountability, and the priority development of the social sphere.

The responsibility for the prevailing state of affairs is borne primarily by the oblast's leaders. They assessed the situation incorrectly, were unable to establish positive dialogue with the various movements, left it to self-styled leaders, and were unable to channel national feelings in the right direction.

This is why the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium made the decision to suspend the powers of local organs of power pending the holding of new elections. Their functions are temporarily transferred to the Special Administration Committee. It is taking charge of all reins of administration on the oblast's territory and of all cadre questions.

A few words about the committee's main tasks.

In the economic sphere the task is to enlist the aid of union ministries and departments for the faster development of the oblast's productive forces and the radical reconstruction of enterprises, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes. It is planned to implement measures to transfer enterprises to conditions of self-financing and economic accountability and to widely introduce leasing relations and the family and collective contracts. Of course, the oblast will have to be helped with both centralized capital investments and credits, but in the long term it will live on its own profits.

In the social sphere it is necessary to sharply increase the scale of housing construction and [construction of] public health, education, and cultural projects. In particular, we are planning to sharply increase the capacities of the local construction trust and to create our own construction industry base. Within a short time it is necessary to repair a number of highways and to construct new ones and to regulate electricity and gas supplies.

In resolving economic and social questions we will rely chiefly on centralized aid. Indeed, the USSR Gosplan is introducing a special line in the national economic plan—regarding the NKAO—for this purpose. But, of course, the traditional economic links with Azerbaijan will also be retained. It would be suicidal for the oblast to break them today. Such a boycott would be a blow not against Azerbaijan but against the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Only irresponsible blabbermouths with no grasp of economics can call for such steps.

It is quite another matter that all Karabakh's links with the outside world—both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and so forth—must be placed on a firm foundation of equal economic cooperation. Not administrative pressure but cooperative interest—that is the firm foundation of such relations.

A considerable place is assigned to the cultural sphere in implementing the vast program for the NKAO's development. Here it is necessary to carry out a profound reorganization of the activity of many organizations and institutions—both directly in culture and in education, training, and amenities in everyday life and activities. Links with Armenia will be expanded in every possible way—especially in culture, education, art, and the training of cadres.

This approach must be equally characteristic of the Azerbaijani section of the population. It is unfair, unreasonable, and simply ridiculous to think that the residents of Shusha should not have broad and multifaceted national links with Azerbaijan. To do this would simply be to reverse the sands of time—previously the Armenian community felt aggrieved and nursed its anger, but now the Azerbaijani community would become a source of similar feelings.

So we will both encourage and develop the population's contacts with both republics. But fundamental questions of Karabakh's life can be resolved only through the efforts of the oblast's population itself. Here, being united in this work by common interests and actions, we must advance restructuring. So the oblast will autonomously decide everything that it alone can decide—from cadre questions to self-financing.

That is the general outline of the committee's activity. There is no experience of anything like this. Never mind, we will acquire that experience together and learn together. One thing is clear: Colossal work must be done. The oblast, and above all its party organization, must arrive at the 28th CPSU Congress renewed, strengthened, and firmly embarked on the road of restructuring. This goal can be achieved if we act together, harmoniously, pooling all our efforts.

Academic Explains Decree on NKAO

PM1401161589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Doctor of Juridical Sciences M. Piskotin, staffer of the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute, by M. Kushtapin: "Special Form of Administration in Nagorno-Karabakh"—date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Today IZVESTIYA is publishing the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On Introducing a Special Form of Administration in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of the Azerbaijan

SSR." Doctor of Juridical Sciences M. Piskotin, staffer of the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute, comments on the decree.

[Piskotin] According to Article 78 of the USSR Constitution, the territory of a union republic cannot be changed without its consent. The borders between union republics can be changed by mutual agreement between the relevant republics, the agreement being subject to ratification by the USSR. Such an agreement was not reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia. A conflict arose which has been creating turmoil in the two republics for about a year now. Shortcomings were also revealed in existing constitutional legislation, which does not provide for the necessary mechanisms for resolving such conflicts. Presumably these shortcomings will be eliminated during the reform of the political system that has now begun and will be appropriately reflected in the USSR Constitution. It is important to enshrine in the constitution consistently democratic procedures for resolving all disputed issues in interethnic relations.

[Kushtapin] Doesn't the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree run counter to the constitution and the process of democratization? That question is more topical than ever today, you will agree.

[Piskotin] The last USSR Supreme Soviet session, as is well known, adopted the USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution. It clarified the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. In particular, it enshrines the right of the Presidium to introduce a state of emergency in particular localities in the interests of protecting the USSR and its citizens' safety on the compulsory condition that this question is examined with the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the relevant union republic, and also to introduce in the aforementioned instances special forms of administration implemented by the state organs of the USSR and the union republics. This constitutes the juridical basis for the decree.

As for democracy, the decree is designed precisely to defend it and to protect the NKAO's population from the intrigues of those who benefit from interethnic strife. The special form of administration introduced in Nagorno- Karabakh is an emergency, forced measure. It is prompted by the complex and explosive situation that has arisen both within the NKAO itself and around it. It is no secret that this situation is being deliberately and purposefully fueled by those who dislike restructuring.

It has to be said that the introduction of such a form of government suspending the operation of certain general constitutional and other legislative norms is nothing unusual in world practice. The institution of temporary presidential rule has long been used and is still used in certain other countries.

In view of the situation prevailing in Nagorno-Karabakh, which the local organs of power can no longer control, the introduction of the special form of administration is the only possibility of stabilizing the situation, extricating it from the grip of blind emotion, and, most importantly, protecting citizens' interests and preventing rampant anarchy and arbitrariness. But, of course, it does not remove the general task of seeking effective ways of finally overcoming the conflict that has arisen.

IZVESTIYA Views Committee Tasks

PM1701124789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by Vyacheslav Dolganov under the "Week's Events" rubric: "Only Together, Only Jointly"]

[Text] The Committee for the Special Administration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which is empowered by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree to resolve all the most important political and socioeconomic problems there, is beginning its work in a complex and contradictory situation.

We all hoped in these recent long months that on the Nagorno-Karabakh question, common sense and prudence would triumph in the two neighboring republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, linked from time immemorial by many economic and cultural threads. That the interethnic feuds—which caused casualties and the loss for very many people of their homes, work places, and normal environment—would cease. That people would understand that strikes, mass disorders, clashes, and mutual recriminations are a blow not only to restructuring but also to the interests of workers in this region and the whole country. However, the situation continued to heat up, the national economy suffered losses running into many millions, and corrupt people hoped to escape responsibility as passions continued to be inflamed.

Then came the necessary decision, produced on the basis of mutual compromise between the two peoples—a decision designed to restore a normal situation in the region and normal relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The decree envisages it as a temporary measure. However, it would be naive to think that the problems which have accumulated, the distortions in interethnic ties, and the many instances of violation of social justice can be eliminated at a stroke. Long, strenuous work lies ahead.

Now, first of all, it is very important to understand the significance of the decree and the two peoples' role in normalizing the situation. The very fact of the creation of the Committee for the Special Administration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast demonstrates the growth of restructuring tendencies in our life. The central organs of power did not limit themselves to previous decisions but embarked on the path of further developing them, democratically taking into account all the opinions formed and showing concern for the interests not only of Azerbaijanis and Armenians but also of the other peoples living in the two republics, particularly those on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. But first the party and the government strove consistently to eliminate the socioeconomic distortions which had infringed civil rights and the national feelings of the Nagorno-Karabakh people.

Until new elections are held, local organs of power in the autonomous oblast will relinquish their powers and transfer them until the situation improves to the Special Administration Committee headed by A.I. Volskiy, chief of a CPSU Central Committee Department. With the help of union ministries and departments and local labor collectives the committee must bring all industrial enterprises and farms in the NKAO up to a modern standard of equipment and organization and introduce a complex package of measures for the transfer to self-financing, economic accountability, and the development of the lease contract.

Paramount attention will be paid to raising the pace of housing construction and providing municipal services in every dwelling. New hospitals and schools, clubs and movie houses, kindergartens and libraries will be built. The country's national economic plan will include a new entry—on Nagorno-Karabakh. And this means that the entire country is going to show concern for Karabakh and its inhabitants.

The two peoples must live and work together and show equal concern for their homes, the whole state, and a faster pace of restructuring. Thus it is only as a result of their joint efforts that the accumulated problems can be resolved. They themselves must decide who should be given the key posts in the management of the national economy and who is worthy of a place in the renewed soviets of people's deputies and their ispolkoms, departments, and administrations, and the social organizations required to restructure life in the new way.

How such people and all Karabakh need the assistance of the intelligentsia and all the healthy, restructuring forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia, first and foremost the intelligentsia in both republics whose social duty calls them not to divide the peoples but to bring them together.

The road ahead is difficult. But the whole country and each one of us believe that the two peoples' friendship and mutual trust will be restored by joint efforts, together. There simply is no other way.

Azerbaijan Presidium Supports Decision on NKAO

NC1501070989 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 15 Jan 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has examined the issue of putting a halt to the further worsening of interethnic relations and of stabilizing the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh [NKAO]. The presidium has decided to approve and support the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree for suspending the powers of the NKAO Oblispolkom. You can read the information provided on the two matters on the front pages of the republic's newspapers.

Azerbaijan Aktivs Approve Decree

NC1501071789 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 15 Jan 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] It has been reported that the Azerbaijan party aktivs held a meeting in Baku on 13 January. The participants discussed the tasks of the Azerbaijan party organization derived from the CPSU Central Committee recommendations for normalizing the situation in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and the CPSU Central Committee's appeal to the party and the Soviet people.

The aktivs meeting approved the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree for the temporary implementation of a special administrative system in NKAO on the basis of preserving NKAO's status as an autonomous oblast within the framework of the Azerbaijan SSR. The report read at the meeting and the addresses delivered described the decision as the most logical and appropriate move under the present circumstances.

The workers in Azerbaijan wholeheartedly support the CPSU Central Committee's principled policy of eliminating tension and restoring the traditional and fraternal relations between the two peoples.

Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the meeting. His address will be broadcast in the first program of the republic's radio at 1100 today.

Baku Commandant Says Decree Welcome

NC1501183789 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Notice by Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of Baku City Special District]

[Text] Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of Baku City Special District, announces that peace prevailed in the city during the day. The work collectives of the establishments and administrations and the special committee of the military units of the special district have welcomed the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree for the implementation of a special administrative system in the Azerbaijan SSR Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and approved the measures aimed at removing the tension in the region and restoring the traditional friendship and brotherhood between the two peoples.

The workers of the city are using the rest of the day to do whatever they please. No violations of law have been recorded.

[Signed] Leutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of Baku City Special District.

'Special Situation' in Baku Reported

Baku Commander Interviewed

LD1601214489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] In Baku today, our special correspondents, Leonid Lazarevich and Islam Kuliyev, interviewed (Vitaliy Viktorovich Bosov), military commander of the first sector of the town's special region.

[Lazarevich] (Vitaliy Viktorovich), we are, of course, all interested in what the situation in the town is now. The attention of many people is now attracted to the Transcaucasus. A special situation has been introduced in both republics. Of course, this cannot fail to worry people.

[(Bosov)] The situation in the town of Baku is on the whole stable and calm. Investigations are being conducted against instigators and organizers of the mass disturbances which took place in November and December. The main task falling to the operational group of troops boils down to ensuring the maintenance of public order, upholding the rules during the hours of curfew, taking an active part in suppressing incitement-type activities, and ensuring the constitutional rights of our Soviet citizens.

[Kuliyev] So there still are declarations of an instigatory nature? And are they just as frequent as they were at the time of the introduction of the special situation?

[(Bosov)] You know, there are far fewer of them but at the same time, most unfortunately, we do indeed have to take measures to suppress the activities of persons calling for the violation of public order. For example, very recently, Citizen (Kuliyev) was detained. That was on 6 January 1850. When being arrested, this citizen resisted the military patrol, and a bundle of leaflets and a large sum of money was taken off him. As you see, there is a need for active work and energetic actions to be carried out to uphold public order.

[Lazerevich] You know, we have on occasion seen representatives of the command headquarters in trade enterprises too. Please tell us what military personnel are doing there?

[(Bosov)] Yes, indeed. This step has been forced on us. We understand this, and the administration of trade institutions and enterprises and of all industrial enterprises have correctly understood this initiative. The basic task of the military commander's office is to check and make sure that the rules of trade are being observed. At the same time, military commanders monitor the delivery and marketing of goods. They study demand and the marketing of stocks. Daily figures are drawn up.

[Kuliyev] That is to say that in practice the goods that used to be in storage and now simply getting to the consumer?

[(Bosov)] Yes, indeed. Because the system of work of the commander's headquarters amounts to monitoring the movement of goods, beginning with requests from the trade base to the shop warehouse and thus to the shop counter.

[Lazarevich] I know that people have come to be received now at the command headquarters. In the time that you have been working here 1,200 people have come. Tell us please, what are they coming for?

[(Bosov)] The main bulk of questions being asked by the inhabitants of Baku boil down partly to their getting housing, partly to solving social problems that for a long time were not being solved—the provision and creation of conditions for work—all the more so that one of the basic questions now is the question of immigrants. Many of the people who, because of the worsening of the situation were forced to leave their villages and leave their homes, are of course in need of care and attention. I must say that within the bounds of what is permissible, taking into account the active work of the executive committees, the raykoms, these questions are being successfully answered.

6 Detained for Inciting Hostilities

NC1301182589 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku City Special District]

[Text] Peace prevails in the city. No significant disorder has occurred. In accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree dated 23 November 1988, the internal affairs organs have instituted administrative charges against six individuals, including Pashayev Oktay Mamed Oglu and Shemiyev Vagif Tarif Oglu, who are residents of Sumgait and were tried in the past. They were detained in Baku while trying to incite interethnic hostilities.

Aliyev Ali Salman Oglu, a worker employed by the [name indistinct] factory No 1 in Baku, tried to disrupt public law and order in the yard of the factory, carry out anti-social activities, and call for the expulsion of Armenians from work.

Talaberdiyev Adalet Gayib Oglu, [name indistinct], and Faradzhov Fuzuli Enver Oglu were brought to account by the militia units in [words indistinct].

[Signed] Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of Baku City Special District.

No Violations Cited 16 Jan

NC1701095189 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Notice by Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of the Baku City Special District]

[Text] The process of normalizing the situation in the city is continuing. No violations of law were recorded during the past day.

Industrial, transportation, and educational establishments and trade and social services departments performed regular work.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of the Baku City Special District.

Transportation Authorization Needed

NC1301183389 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku City Special District]

[Text] Normal work rhythm was maintained yesterday. Industrial establishments, educational and training centers, trade administrations, and livelihood services departments worked smoothly.

Regarding the question of the change of authorization certificates for the movement of citizens and transportation vehicles, the leading officials of establishments, administrations, and organizations must draw up lists of workers and employees who work at night. The lists must be submitted to the rayispolkoms so that authorization certificates may be issued. The chairman of the rayispolkoms must submit the general lists to the headquarters of the military administration of the Baku City Special District by 15 January 1989.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of Baku City Special District.

Azerbaijan Cultural Center To Open in Moscow

NC1301091889 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 5 Jan 89

[Excerpt] The Moscow Gorispolkom has examined an appeal by the leaders of Azerbaijan SSR to open a cultural center in Moscow with a view to better acquainting the residents and guests of our homeland's capital with the life and achievements of Azerbaijan SSR. The Moscow Gorispolkom has allocated a building comprising 3,635 square meters in (?Mayakovskiy) Square, in the central sector of the city, for this purpose. A relevant decision has been adopted by the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. [passage omitted]

Leninakan Story of Miracle Rescue 'Invented'

PM1401190589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondents S. Bablumyan and S. Taranov: "The Legend of the Six Rescued Men"]

[Text] Yerevan—It has been reported in the press that six people were pulled out alive from the ruins of a house in Leninakan on the 35th day after the earthquake. IZVESTIYA (No 14) published a commentary on this in which it attemmpted to investigate the event. We promised to give readers the details of the sensation: To find, identify, and provide the names of all the people who had been rescued. We had hoped to meet with the rescuers as well. Alas, we have not been able to do so. Apparently, the "rescue" story was invented by the sister of A. Akopyan—one of the "captives."

On 13 January, as we were sending our piece to the editorial office, a resident of Leninakan whom they had been meaning to discharge for some days from the hospital where A. Akopyan is a patient went with TASS correspondents to the scene of the event. He said that he knew A. Akopyan's sister and had volunteered to help investigate the story, but he asked them not to give his name. According to his account, the house in which Aykaz lives is not on Bulvarnaya Street. But he could have been there on the day of the earthquake, so our interlocutor went to Bulvarnaya Street with a group of journalists. All acquaintances and strangers there were questioned—no one had seen anything, and no one knew about survivors being found there. But it transpired that at the beginning of January, when Aykaz was supposedly beneath the ruins, he had been to a hospital and obtained some medicine there.

Our interlocutor also succeeded in meeting with Aykaz' sister—Dzhulyetta. The conversation took place in the presence of correspondents from the local branch of TASS and of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Yes indeed, Dzhulyetta had taken her brother to the hospital, but not after he had been freed from a stone prison. He had been taken ill and urgently needed treatment, and it was on the way to Yerevan that the legend was born. Why did it have to be concocted? She had wanted to get her brother into a good hospital...

We also obtained information from A. Atabekyan, chief of the Armenian SSR Health Ministry Medical Administration, who had gone to Leninakan specially. A tour of the hospitals, numerous meetings with potential witnesses, and an unsuccessful search for the five others who had been "rescued" made it clear to him that there had been a misunderstanding.

"Our patient is definitely suffering from chronic lung disease," G. Badalyan, corresponding member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences and chief of the Yerevan Medical Institute Internal Diseases Diagnosis Department, said. "We have established that he has between second and third degree pulmonary and vascular insufficiency. Everything possible is being done to get him back on his feet as soon as possible."

Leninakan Story Questioned

PM1401185589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 89 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondents S. Bablumyan and S. Taranov: "Beneath the Rubble for 35 Days? Following Up the Sensational Report About the 6 People Rescued in Leninakan"]

[Text] Certainly, the news reported by TASS correspondents in Yerevan on 12 January was sensational. Six live (!) people had been freed from the ruins in Leninakan on the 35th day after the earthquake...

One of them, Aykaz Akopyan, a 50-year-old electrician at the No 1 construction administration, was brought to Yerevan's No 3 clinical hospital at midday. They say he was brought by his sister in a car. Where the other rescued people are is not known. Aykaz Akopyan said that on the day of the disaster he went down with his neighbors, Rafik Simonyan, Karlen Sarkisyan, Vanik Khachatryan, and two young men whose names he could not remember, into the cellar of his house at 8, Bulvarnaya Street. They were about to move two heavy barrels when the ground suddenly began to shake, the house collapsed, and they were all six buried beneath the ruins. Karlen Sarkisyan had a broken arm, the rest sustained slight injuries. Fortunately, the cellar contained food that had been put away for the winter—stewed fruit, which took the place of water, and even smoked ham. They ate the food and Akopyan's folk medicine skills allegedly helped ease the pain from the injuries. The victims had no idea what had happened, however, and they lost track of time. According to A. Akopyan, he did everything he could to prevent the young guys from going crazy—he entertained them, reassured them, and told them stories about his life. He felt sure they would be rescued, in fact, fate had smiled on Aykaz before. Back in 1985, during the construction of a club in Tyumen Oblast, he had fallen from the second floor and escaped with just a mild fright. Luck was on his side again. But...

We journalists find ourselves in a difficult situation. From the experience of past days we know there is a great, very great desire for a miracle. After all, a person who has lost relatives keeps on hoping and sometimes believes the most incredible things—until he sees for himself the fate of a father, brother, or sister, whether they are alive or not.

Do you remember the recent "Vremya" report about 17 people released alive from the ruins of the Spitak elevator, having been there for more than 25 days? Alas, the joyous sensation never occurred; it turned out to be nothing more than a rumor. So when we heard the TASS correspondents' report we did not believe it. How could we not doubt it, having actually been in Leninakan on 12 January, actually on Bulvarnaya Street, in the company, what is more, of Gorispolkom Chairman E. Kirakosyan, who categorically stated: It was on 26 December that the last living survivor was found in the city. It was 1400 hours, and the six had been found in the morning. Where had they got to? Could they have gone unnoticed? Who rescued them in the end?

This is what S. Sarkisyan, duty officer at the central headquarters in Leninakan, had to say:

"I have just been to Bulvarnaya Street and talked with the occupants of the neighboring houses, with the Kroyanov family, who live alongside the ruins from which the people were apparently extracted. The people I spoke with had neither heard nor seen anything about it. I cannot believe the event could have gone unnoticed. Earlier, immediately after the television broadcast, the scene had been visited by a group of workers from our civil defense headquarters. They questioned any likely witnesses and went to hospitals and other facilities where the rescued people might have been, but they found nothing to confirm the news."

Armenian SSR First Deputy Health Minister G. Arutyunyan:

"I learned about what had happned from 'Vremya.' I immediately called the hospital. They confirmed that Aykaz Akopyan had been brought in. Where were the other five? I rang round all the rayon hospitals on the route between Leninakan and Yerevan and contacted the Yerevan Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics. They all said the same thing: We have not received a single rescued person in the last 24 hours. But we decided to continue the search."

Here is what Yu. Tunyan, chief of the republican Council of Ministers health and social security department, said:

"On 12 January, as I was passing the hospital, I saw a group of excited people. I stopped to find out what was going on. I was told that a person had just been brought in who had been found in the ruins 35 days after the tragedy. Frankly, I did not believe that it was possible. When I got to work I met with journalists and told them what I had heard. That evening, first on local television and then on 'Vremya,' I saw A. Akopyan. I have no information on the other five rescued people. I believe the information needs to be carefully checked..."

The victim was in a serious condition. Pneumonia, pulmonary insufficiency, extreme exhaustion; he gets tired answering questions and he is sleepy all the time.

You can tell by looking at him that Akopyan has not shaved or washed for a long time. Why, one wonders, can he not recall his rescuers? He says that they bound his eyes immediately—so he did not see anyone. But we did not have the time to question the patient in detail. He was given immediate assistance by the doctors. Deputy chief physician Ashot Grigoryevich Adamyan:

"One thing surprised me—his sister left. Relatives have generally been in constant attendance on victims, visiting them sometimes several times a day. Then we have this strange disappearance. But we are expecting her any moment..."

Together with the hospital's chief physician, A. Sirunyan, we went into the ward where Akopyan lay. Aykaz did not look well, that is for sure. It is hard to imagine that someone in such a serious condition could be pulling the wool over our eyes. A psychiatrist sat by the patient's bed. She said:

"I came of my own accord when I heard about it on television. I have talked for a long time with the patient. He has severe nervous exhaustion and is very frightened. Can you see the towel on his head—he is still frightened of falling rubble and wants to protect his head. But his memory is sound. He remembers being in the cellar, he talks about his family (he does not know yet that his wife and children are dead), about his work. He even recognized his neighbor in the ward, who is also from Leninakan. I do not doubt the authenticity of what he says. Clearly, everything happened that way. Of course, it will be a long and difficult path to recovery. He will have to start a new life and come to terms with the loss of his immediate family..."

But not all of the doctors we talked with in the hospital shared this view. The fate of the five people who were rescued and are missing is a puzzle. A great deal, a very great deal is unclear, unknown...

But one thing can confidently be said: Aykaz Akopyan's state of health has improved somewhat over the past 24 hours. As for the search, we will certainly inform readers of its outcome.

TASS Cannot Confirm or Deny Story

LD1301153289 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 13 TASS—By a TASS staff writer:

One would very much like to believe that six people have been pulled out from under the debris in Leninakan 34 days after the devastating quake. When the news came to TASS on Thursday from the Yerevan news agency ARMENPRESS, it was immediately circulated around the world on the TASS wire, picked up by radio and television, with more details added by correspondents of several Soviet newspapers.

The authenticity of the sensational piece of information seemed to be beyond doubt. It came from quite a reliable source and was corroborated by eye-witness accounts.

Journalists, including television crews, even managed to meet and talk with the rescued electrician, Aikaz Akopyan, 50. The interview was seen by millions of Soviet TV viewers.

What happened in Armenia could not leave anyone indifferent, for the point at issue was human life, resurrection in the true sense of the word. Everybody wanted to believe in the "Leninakan miracle."

Journalistic duty demanded that the correspondents now working in Armenia continue their investigation, find new details. So they did that tirelessly, mindful of their responsibiity for every piece of information.

In the process of work, as is often the case with critical journalism, the first doubts emerged, which compelled us to read and re-read the original version, analyse it and weigh every word on the gold scales of verity.

Why, for instance, a day after the miraculous salvation was it possible to locate only Aikaz Akopyan in a Yerevan hospital? What about the other five? So far, the attempts to locate them in Yerevan hospitals, or in Leninakan or any other places have failed.

Where is the survivor's sister who failed to appear in the hospital on Friday, though she promised to do so?

There are many rumours in the quake-hit areas now, as on previous days. It was reported on December 31, for instance, about the rescuing of 17 quake victims. The information was never confirmed.

A host of other news items, truthful and invented, from Armenia sell on the world news market. It is understandable: one wants so much to believe in the miracle about the saving of six people on the 35th day after the quake.

Regrettably, we are unable so far to confirm with full certainty the authenticity of the reports made by our Armanian colleagues about the "Leninakan miracle", nor can we categorically deny them.

TASS Apologizes for Rescue Story

LD1501121289 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 15 Jan 89

[Text] Yerevan January 15 TASS—By TASS correspondents Eduard Shakhnazaryan and Akop Shakhbazyan

Doctors of a Yerevan hospital continue their efforts to save the life of Aykaz Akopyan and believe that his life soon would be out of danger. Regrettably, the 50-year-old Leninakan resident was the reason for a mistaken report published by many newspapers about a "miraculous" rescue of six residents who had spent allegedly 35 days in the basement of a ruined nine-story building.

We were the first to report this and today we want to offer our apologies to the readers. A painstaking search conducted all these days did not confirm the story which we would like to believe so much. What was the reason for the delusion? Akopyan's sick imagination whose story was heard not only by us but also by millions of TV viewers during a report from the hosptial? Or a selfish intent? Now it is difficult to give a straightforward answer.

One thing is unquestionable: Now there is no need for using such extreme methods for any patient in Armenia to get a skilled medical aid. This is how Emil Gabrielyan, Armenian public health minister, commented on this event.

Earthquake Commission Tours Armenian Sites

PM1701123389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Jan 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission. Life Resuming"]

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov, head of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission to deal with the aftermath of the earthquake, and commission members N.N. Slyunkov, D.T. Yazov, and L.A. Voronin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, arrived in Armenia 16 January in the zone affected by the recent disaster. They were met at Leninakan airport by S.G. Arutyunyan, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission; and Yu.P. Batalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

More than 40 days have passed since the tragedy. The rescue and reconstruction work has not stopped for a single day. Nor has the stream of aid from the entire country to the disaster zone broken for a single day. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission has been in operation throughout this period. Now it is paying another visit to the epicenter of the calamity.

The cold is complicating the already difficult life and work of thousands of people—both the old inhabitants and people who have come there from literally all the union republics. But every day there are more and more signs of revival. A plaque announcing the laying of the foundations for the first apartment block, the announcement of the first movie show in a movie theater-cum-shed, and the first consignment of baby carriages in the stores. Life is resuming...

The first stop was near Leninakan children's hospital. The local inhabitants regard it as miraculous that this block remained intact among the ruins. N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, and D.T. Yazov visited a hospital ward and talked with the medics. The chief medic delighted them with the news that 78 babies have been born in the maternity ward in the days since the catastrophe. Their voices can be heard clearly from the rooms. Five clinics have been opened in permanent buildings and two in warm tents. Construction workers are hurrying to lengthen the railroad sidings for three medical trains named "Rossiya," "Kazakhstan," and "Armeniya." USSR Health Minister Ye.I. Chazov announced that this would be sufficient to begin with.

Some 8 million tonnes of wrecked building structures must be removed from the city—to specially allocated sites rather than to dumps, where they will be put into service and turned into construction materials. The commission members were familiarized with the first of these gigantic shops located on the outskirts of the city. The operators in charge of the machine complex can crush huge ferroconcrete girders, sorting the metal cages and the gravel into two conveyor belts.

There are almost as many inhabitants in Leninakan today as there were before the earthquake. The volunteers' 12-hour working day is 2 hours longer than daylight. But the construction sites and the entire city are not plunged into the gloom that the disaster inflicted on them; they are illuminated.

The commission members visited the "Tartu" Food and Industrial Goods Store. There are approximately 100 trading points in the city. All the stores have enough meat, vegetables, bread, and other foodstuffs. There is still free food at factory canteens.

Some 60 percent of industrial enterprises were destroyed in Leninakan. Construction teams have been formed at all plants and factories from among their former workers. Some plants have begun to produce their first output. But the main thing for Leninakan today is to create a firm construction base. Pasteboard screens bear the following inscriptions: Vologda, Cherepovets, Gorkiy, Syktyvkar, Kostroma... Detachments of construction workers are living temporarily in portacabins at the stadium, but in a month or so they will gather up all their equipment and go to an area they have been allocated under the general plan for the reconstruction of the city. One detachment—of specialists from Chuvashstroy—has already begun construction. Not far from the Sevzapstroy base a monolithic "cushion" of reinforced concrete has been placed on the ground for the first new building in Leninakan. The commission members wished success to construction workers from Cheboksary in constructing an entire city block of 3-story quakeproof apartment houses on one of the central highways.

The first bell was heard at a school under canvas in Leninakan's Moskovskiy Rayon. Some 500 children from various rayons, down to 6-year olds, have returned to their desks. Leningrad construction workers, who have pledged to reconstruct the school by the next academic year, congratulated the children together with N.I. Ryzhkov and the other commission members on their first day back at school.

Workers at the "Elektrobytpribor" Plant needed 4 weeks to organize one of the three destroyed production lines. The commission members also visited this workshop's fitters. The plant's first output—electric irons—will be sent to Yerevan and other cities tomorrow.

A conversation took place at the RSFSR Gosstroy headquarters with the leaders of ministries and departments involved in the reconstruction of the city. The work of many services to normalize urban life was noted. It was stressed that women with children should be provided with housing first of all. Deliveries of prefabricated homes and portacabins must be speeded up. The attention of a number of leaders was drawn to the unsatisfactory organization of subsidies and distribution of thermal goods. Justice must indisputably be done. Aid must reach everyone who needs it. Severe punishment awaits anyone who attempts to feather his nest from this aid.

In the afternoon the commission members drove to Spitak. This city, which lay at the junction of two faults, is to be moved. It will be rebuilt elsewhere. At present Spitak inhabitants are living in tents. More and more people are forming labor collectives. Early in the morning a new "note" joined the rumble of construction equipment in the city. The local sewn goods association workshop had begun to function. The commission members talked to the workers. There are 50 of them at present. They are making bed linen. The other 600 workers from what used to be the republic's largest association are engaged in reconstructing the main production units. Seamstress Lena Gevorkyan talked emotionally about how the whole country's concern fills the hearts of the grief-stricken people with warmth and hope.

The commission members visited other facilities in Spitak, were familiarized with work on straightening out the bakery combine's workshops, and held working meetings with city staff leaders. On the same day meetings and conversations were held with the inhabitants of Kirovakan. N.I. Ryzhkov and the commission members took part in laying concrete for the foundations of the first apartment block constructed by Ukrainian construction workers. A capsule was placed in the foundations carrying an address to posterity. The text of the document in Russian, Ukrainian, and Armenian is imbued with the idea of strengthening the fraternal alliance of the USSR peoples.

Late in the evening, following their arrival in Yerevan, the members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission visited the House of Architects, where they were familiarized with the blueprints for the reconstruction of the cities and villages struck by the earthquake.

There will be a meeting of the republic party-economic aktiv in Yerevan 17 January to discuss the progress of work on dealing with the aftermath of the earthquake and the immediate tasks linked with this.

Armenia's Arutyunyan Interview on Public Order

LD1401202489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Interview with (?Usik Surelevich) Arutyunyan, Armenian SSR internal affairs minister, by correspondent Koryun Khumaryan, date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Khumaryan] (?Usik Surelevich), for 2 weeks now we've been in the New Year 1989, which we all hope will be a better and calmer year than the previous one. How has it begun with you, the Militia? How is the situation in the republic in general and in the disaster zone in particular?

[Arutyunyan] I'd say the situation in the New Year is on the whole favorable. If for example one were to analyze the state of affairs in the earthquake area, where there's a population of about 800,000, in round figures, then there have been days for example when throughout that zone there has not only been no crime, but also no breaches of the public peace of any kind. That was the case on 5 January, 7 January and 11 January, when there were practically no violations of public order.

[Khumaryan] What about clashes, or interethnic tension?

[Arutyunyan] As far as anything on an interethnic basis is concerned, you can say that there have been practically no clashes since about 3 December.

*Earthquake Damage to Leninakan Industry Noted

WA18200133 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 24 Dec 88 p 4

[Article by L. Leontyeva and N. Ordinyan: "The City Is Reviving"]

[Text] ...There are crowds of workers in the yard of the country's largest hosiery production association. Everyone left alive has come here today—they have heard that the enterprise is just about to start up. They are waiting for the commission examining the rooms inside that remained intact to at any moment issue the decision that they are safe. The production operation is ready to start up, but people who are ready are the most important thing. They are conquering their fear courageously, they are overcoming the shock—after all, three large shops fell down on their heads. Hundreds died, almost one out of every six workers.

This was the most advanced enterprise in the industry. Not a single complaint, not a ruble in fines for product quality. By the beginning of December, the collective had fulfilled almost all delivery obligations, earning 12 million rubles in profit. Firms from Hungary, Canada, Egypt, Japan...had competed in offering cooperation.

"We are reviving our enterprise at a pace determined only by the limit of our strength; we will work even beyond that limit, clenching our teeth," says Sh. Grigoryan, deputy director for economic affairs. He lost his entire family—wife, daughter, and son—in the hell of the natural disaster. The enterprise's revival might at this point be the only thread keeping him from despair.

People surrounded us on the grounds of the plant: "How soon will we go to work? It is time!" They seemed to have taken us for the commission.

"There were 97 enterprises in the sector that were in the earthquake zone," says R. Mkrtchyan, the republic's minister of light industry. "The 6 of them that were least damaged are already in production, and 10 will go into operation on Saturday. We will be putting another 30 enterprises back into operation in the first quarter of next year."

The collectives of the enterprises not operating now have not been sitting idle either. They have organized hundreds of brigades to clean up the rubble in the city. After all, about 3 million tons of twisted structural fabrications, fragments, and trash have to be carried away. A titanic job. They are still pulling people from the ruins, alas, dead people. This painful process will continue, in the opinion of V. Artsruni, deputy chairman of the republic commission to repair the earthquake damage and deputy chairman of the republic's council of ministers, until 28-29 December. At many enterprises, they are working day and night to restore shops and equipment which can be started up.

The role of party committees, their secretaries, and rank-and-file party members in mobilizing these efforts is simply immense, especially since the managers at many enterprises were killed. In the party gorkom, they told us about Laura Akopyan, secretary of the party committee of the refrigerator compressor plant, who has become legendary here. The disaster razed it to the foundations. The entire office force was killed. But from the first minute after the earthquake the party leader began to gather the survivors around her and organized the rescue operation. Now she does not leave the plant. The workers have come to the party gorkom asking for a tent city to be set up alongside the ruins of the enterprise; the collective headed by Laura Akopyan wants to work around the clock in a crash effort to rebuild the plant.

Nothing is left of the furniture factory, but there are little spots among the ruins where the workers had begun to make collapsible cots which are now so necessary.

The city was destroyed, the city has been pushed to exhaustion, but yet one immediately notices that it is unusually clean, there is no household trash, hundreds of trucks clean it at night, the public health situation is under the strictest control. Not a single case of infectious disease. Hot food service has been organized for everyone, gratis. Part of the water supply system has been restored.

A second city bath has been opened, so that it is possible to wash without improvising.

All efforts have been committed to the heat supply—this is the most urgent problem in this cold city. Boiler plants are being rebuilt, the burners are being converted from gas to coal and mazut: gas is extremely dangerous in a city that has been destroyed. Package boilers are arriving from Tyumen, they can be set up in a matter of hours.

They were able to restore power to the meat combine so quickly that they rescued 6,000 tons of meat and 4,000 tons of finished product stored in the refrigerator. In coming days, they intend to start up both the meat combine and the bread bakery. And if not today, then tomorrow the temporary bakery set up in an enormous tent will be producing its first Leninakan bread since the earthquake.

'Hundreds of Tremors' Monitored in Spitak

LD1401133889 Moscow TASS in English 1330 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Text] Yerevan January 14 TASS—The earthquake epicenter in Spitak does not calm down for a single day, reminding seismologists of its existence. Since the devastating quake, Yerevan seismic stations have registered hundreds of tremors of different force, while more sensitive devices of American and French specialists several thousand. In the past five days alone there were 28 earth tremors. Three of them registered force 5 to 6.5. The epicenter of the earthquake is monitored round the clock. Scientists of the Academy of Sciences of Armenia say that the pent-up energy inside the Earth crust is gradually diminishing.

Armenian Communist Officials Reprimanded

PM1701112089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 89 Second Edition p 3

[Report by L. Chakhmakhchyan, chief of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee General Department: "Responsibility for Irresponsibility"]

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has examined progress in fulfilling the 15 December 1988 CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Unlawful Actions of Certain Officials of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR."

It was noted that for destabilization of the situation, failure to prevent the kindling of ethnic strife, unlawful actions, inactivity, and a number of other violations, in December alone 13 leaders were expelled from the CPSU, 24 leadership workers on party, soviet, and economic organs and 12 leaders of law enforcement organs at city and rayon level were removed from their posts, and 68 party penalties were imposed. L. Bagdasaryan, first secretary of Gugarkskiy party raykom, and S. Kazaryan, chairman of Gugarkskiy Rayispolkom, were relieved of their posts and subjected to severe party proceedings.

It was stressed that many party, soviet, and economic organs showed a lack of resolution and passivity in a complex situation and failed to adopt principled standpoints. Gross violations of citizens' constitutional rights and disorders involving blackmail and threats took place in Stepanavanskiy, Idzhevanskiy, Yekhegnadzorskiy, Gugarkskiy, Krasnoselskiy, Araratskiy, Masisskiy, Amasiyskiy, and Noyemberyanskiy Rayons.

For failing to adopt resolute measures to normalize the situation in the rayon and prevent ethnic clashes that led to casualties and the mass exodus of the Azerbaijani population, Yu. Chshmarityan, first secretary of Stepanavanskiy Armenian Communist Party Raykom, was severely reprimanded, with an entry on his record. It was deemed inexpedient for R. Mirzoyan, chairman of Stepanavanskiy Rayispolkom and member of the CPSU, to remain in his post, and he was severely reprimanded, with an entry on his record. For failure to provide political leadership of ethnic relations in the rayon, which led to their deformation and intensive emigration by persons of Azerbaijani nationality, D. Ananyan, first secretary of Idzhevanskiy Armenian Communist Party Raykom, was reprimanded, with an entry on his record. L. Ordinyan, chairman of Idzhevanskiy Rayispolkom and member of the CPSU, was severely reprimanded, with an entry on his record. For an unprincipled approach which took the form of failure to prevent disruption of studies at educational institutions as well as failure to adopt measures to protect schoolchildren and students from the politically damaging influence of certain teachers, S. Akhumyan, Armenian SSR minister of public education and member of the CPSU, was severely reprimanded, with an entry on his record.

There was a severe reprimand for the recently appointed Armenian SSR minister of internal affairs, U. Arutyunyan, for failure to adopt timely and effective measures to strengthen the protection of public order and insufficient exactingness toward personnel. G. Grigoryan, Armenian SSR deputy minister of internal affairs and member of the CPSU, was severely reprimanded, with an entry on his record. For gross negligence in the selection and placing of cadres, G. Gukasyan, Armenian SSR deputy prosecutor and member of the CPSU, was also severely reprimanded, with an entry on his record.

The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau instructed party committees to take strict proceedings against Communists who connive at disuniting people on the basis of nationality, perpetrate extremist sallies, or kindle interethnic enmity.

Leaders Pay Last Respects to Deceased Academician

LD1601135589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Today, Moscow accompanied Academician Valentin Petrovich Glushko, chief designer, member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, twice Hero of Socialist Labour, Lenin State prize winner, on his last journey.

The Central House of the Soviet Army was decked out in mourning garb. There were numerous wreaths in the hall where the coffin with the body of the deceased is placed. One is from the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers. On crimson velvet are the awards which commended the services of the outstanding scientist and designer of the sphere of rocket and space technology to the Communist Party and the Soviet State.

Comrades Gorbachev, Vorotnikov, Zaykov, Ligachev, Medvedev, Chebrikov, Yakovlev, Lukyanov, Razumovskiy, Baklanov, the leaders of a number of ministries and departments, representatives from party, local soviet and public organization, and eminent scientists paid their last respects.

A meeting of mourning was held at the Novodevichiy cemetery where Valentin Petrovich Glushko was buried.

Yakovlev Interview on Restructuring, Disarmament

AU1601181889 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 16 Jan 89 pp 118-122

[Interview with CPSU Politburo member and Gorbachev advisor Aleksandr N. Yakovlev by Dieter Wild and Joerg R. Mettke in Frankfurt: "Disarmament Would Be a Real Blessing for Us"—date not given]

[Text] DER SPIEGEL: Aleksandr Nikolayevich, an American paper has described you as the "Godfather of glasnost;" a French paper has called you "Mister Perestroyka," and a German paper considers you to be the "free-thinker of Marxism." Which of the descriptions do you like best?

Yakovlev: I agree with neither the first description, nor the second. This belongs to the realm of mythology and legend. However, I gladly admit that I am an active advocate of restructuring.

DER SPIEGEL: What about "free-thinker of Marxism?"

Yakovlev: In my view, free-thinkers interprete Marxism in a dogmatic and arbitrary manner and have thus distorted it. I fight this kind of dogmatism.

DER SPIEGEL: Some of your opponents claim that you are a revisionist.

Yakovlev: In my view, Stalinism was the greatest and most irresponsible revisionism in the history of Marxism. Stalin gave Marxism a dogmatic character so that it finally lost its revolutionary strength. I would like to contribute to restoring the true content of Marxism.

DER SPIEGEL: You served as a front-line soldier during the war. Did you believe in Stalin?

Yakovlev: Yes, I sincerely and wholeheartedly believed in Stalin at the time. I was a young man, I entered the officers' college at the age of 17 and was sent to the front at the age of 18. I had no reason whatsoever not to believe in Stalin.

DER SPIEGEL: You were born in a small village near Yaroslavl in Northern Russia. How did you experience the collectivization?

Yakovlev: I was still at school, my mother and father were private peasants who had to drudge from dawn to dusk to feed the family. The collectivization first brought some relief. For this reason, the women in the village were very happy at the beginning. However, I can imagine that boys in richer areas had completely different experiences than those in our region which was so immensely poor. The only toy I had was a rubber dog, and I was happy when my father brought gingerbread from the town.

DER SPIEGEL: Did your impressions of the collectivization remain so positive?

Yakovlev: No, it is true that the devastation of the villages, the destruction of the peasants' minds began during the war, but it was continued later, despite the fact that there was no need to. This was an unparalleled arbitrary act toward the peasants, a policy that common sense is not capable of understanding. The most absurd thing was that taxes were imposed on fruit and berry trees and that every cow had to be supplied to the kolkhoz. I still remember the tears my mother cried when she was forced to give away her last cow. When I asked 6 months later whether it was not possible to get another cow, I received the answer: "What for, it is not worthwhile."

DER SPIEGEL: Did you stop believing in Stalin when he was still alive, or later?

Yakovlev: I probably did not really stop before his death. I was 30 years old and worked at the district committee of the party. When I learned of his death, I cried, as all the others did. My tears were really sincere. There were many who believed that without Stalin we would go to the dogs. Our minds and feelings were completely confused at the time.

DER SPIEGEL: Nobody questioned Stalin's policy?

Yakovlev: There where people who expressed doubts, but they were not heard by the mass of the population. My father, for example, the first kolkhoz chairman in the village, did not support Sta'in's agriculture policy. He resigned from his position and became a forester.

DER SPIEGEL: Did this influence your attitude?

Yakovlev: Yes, I consciously questioned Salin's policy for the first time after the war. I was injured on the front, and we returned without any mental taboos. Those who have faced death view life a little bit differently. When I was a student, Stalin published his linguistic work in which he claimed that the Russian language originated in central Russia. I simply asked myself: Why there, of all places, and not anywhere else?

DER SPIEGEL: Reformers and revolutionaries must believe in the success of their cause. In the debate on the mistakes of the past, you have always displayed realism. You would not be a realist if you did not have an idea what will happen when restructuring fails. Are you ready to talk about this?

Yakovlev: Yes, of course. I even agree with the analytical concept on which your question is based. We simply cannot afford to tackle the reforms without being convinced of their success, otherwise we would be political adventurists. As far as your question is concerned, we firmly believe that the conservative threat is the most serious threat to restructuring. However, it is imperative to continue to warn against a coalition between the two extremes, both on the right and left.

DER SPIEGEL: The conservatives want to turn back the wheel.

Yakovlev: The conservatives carry the burden of the past. Most of them are also pursuing selfish interests, but not all of them. Even the most wily conservatives know that, objectively, it is not possible to turn back certain things and that some things that were possible yesterday are no longer possible today. It is true that there is a certain nostalgia for the alleged order that never really existed in earlier days, but there is also the firm and unshakeable belief in the truth and in a personal mission.

DER SPIEGEL: Do these people not think about this?

Yakovlev: They refuse to understand that, if one is consistent in one's thoughts, only democracy, that is the power of the people, will maintain and ensure our political stability and unity. Did you also want to know whether I am afraid of a setback?

DER SPIEGEL: Yes.

Yakovlev: I am not afraid.

DER SPIEGEL: What do you think could happen if restructuring fails?

Yakovlev: The whims of history are unfathomable, and it is very difficult to make forecasts. There are many who reject restructuring for one reason or another; because restructuring does not have a good relationship with bureaucracy, for example—to put it mildly. restructuring deprives quite a few of their power, it pushes them to work, and it wants to abandon the practice of equalization. Bureaucracy, little work, and equalization are considered to be pure socialism by many. The truth is that these things have nothing at all to do with socialism.

DER SPIEGEl: A setback...

Yakovlev: ...might have very negative consequences. It would be the end of every form of socialism. For this reason, restructuring is our chance, in the socialist spirit. I think that this insight is constantly and rapidly growing.

DER SPIEGEL: What makes you think so, if there are so many who are opposed to restructuring?

Yakovlev: My optimism is a result of the fact that a new type of manager, a new type of enterprise manager and a new type of enterprise community are evolving. They work and think differently.

DER SPIEGEL: Is it not true that they also want to see results from restructuring, particularly because the supply situation has not improved so far but rather deteriorated?

Yakovlev: The supply crisis has been caused by the recent nearly uncontrolled increase in the money supply with which goods production cannot keep pace. In the sixties, for example, meat consumption per person was 40 kg, whereas it has risen to 62 kg today. We also had a lot of butter at the time, we had technical problems in storing butter, and consumption was very low. Today it is the other way around. Today we are seriously considering what measures to take in the sphere of public finances. One thing is certain, however: A currency reform, a depreciation of the Ruble is out of the question. Order must be restored through normal economic means.

DER SPIEGEL: How long do you think will it take to implement restructuring? Mikhail Gorbachev has periodically repeated the warning that the Soviet Union is now facing the most difficult 1 and ½ or 2 years. If you repeatedly ask people to wait for results, do you not risk that one day people no longer believe you?

Yakovlev: In 1985 we did not specify how long it will take us to realize our task. Quite the contrary, Gorbachev said that the most important and most urgent tasks must be implemented without delay, but that we would need many years to solve the strategic tasks. Unfortunately, people only remember the first part.

DER SPIEGEL: What has improved for ordinary consumers?

Yakovlev: Since April 1985, we have built more apartments, for example, than during any comparable previous period so that we think we will be able to realize our goal which aims at providing a home or an apartment for every family by the year 2000. The majority of letters that were addressed to the Central Committee concerned apartments at the beginning of the eighties. Today there are hardly any complaints in this sphere. The allocation of apartments has become transparent, people know today when they will get an apartment.

DER SPIEGEL: But when will the supply of consumer goods improve?

Yakovlev: We expect the material and moral investments to yield results before the end of this year. The West German economy also helps to advance the modernization process that is required to achieve this goal. DM500 million will be used in light industry, which is quite a lot. But this is only a small part of what we are planning. Projects which we launched 2 years ago, are beginning to yield profits.

DER SPIEGEL: However, there is not so much progress in other fields.

Yakovlev: The conversion of enterprises in the weapons industry will release enormous means within a short period: The elimination of 10,000 tanks also implies that old tanks do not have to be replaced, which means that capacities will become available for other purposes: This concerns raw materials, workbenches, and labor.

DER SPIEGEL: Provided that the process of detente continues, do you think that the East and the West will radically reduce military expenditure at a certain point?

Yakovlev: This would be a real blessing for us. The only thing that we are concerned about in this connection is the reaction of your market to such steps on the part of your own arms industry. In contrast with earlier times, we are today not only interested in our own well-being but also in your well-being. If there is something wrong with your economy, you get nervous.

DER SPIEGEL: The U.S. industry, which is no longer competitive in many spheres, would also profit from a reduction of military expenditure.

Yakovlev: You are quite right. What is happening in the United States? The arms race has been pushed to an extremely high level, but where did this get the United States? We did not analyze this thoroughly enough at the time, and allowed ourselves to be guided by fits of emotion so that, unfortunately, we drifted into the arms race. When the United States built a new missile we thought we needed the same one. When it had 5,000 nuclear warheads, we thought we needed the same amount even if one-tenth would also have been sufficient.

DER SPIEGEL: For decades, the Soviet Union accorded top priority to the goal of being a superpower, of being the strongest of the two superpowers. Do you, in the foreseeable future, consider possible a world where disarmament reaches such a level that the question of being a superpower becomes less important?

Yakovlev: I consider it possible even now. Let me say one thing: I am suspicious of the term superpower. I sometimes use the term in a mechanical manner, but I always try to use the term "the so-called superpowers." What is a superpower? Does it refer to the territory, the population, the production of cars, or even missiles? This would be absurd. It is beyond my comprehension why one power should want to be more important than another.

DER SPIEGEL: Relations between states used to be characterized by the striving for superiority, and still are today in many areas. Even within the Soviet Union, militant nationalism has erupted. Can the Soviet empire one day become a confederation, as demanded by the Estonians when they called for "sovereignty?"

Yakovlev: Let me state one thing: It is not correct that sizable forces within the Estonian society have called for a secession from the Soviet Union—practically or theoretically—with a separate government, separate armed forces, and so on. This has only been demanded by smaller groups. Just think of the demands that are being put forward by numerous fringe groups in your country. As far as the entire Estonian society is concerned, it is striving for economic independence to make more profit.

DER SPIEGEL: The Estonians want, above all, fewer Russians in Estonia.

Yakovlev: They are not against an increase of the Russian part of the population per se, but they are against the forced immigration of Russians in Estonia—yes. They think that this process has to be brought to a halt first and then to be turned back. This can be explained simply with the self-confidence of a small nation, which feels emotionally threatened.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you intend to take these feelings into account?

Yakovlev: Of course. I was in the Baltic states once. A considerable part of the questions that are being raised there are very sensible. Of course there is a borderline—it runs between national and nationalistic.

DER SPIEGEL: People normally do not distinguish in this precise, academic way.

Yakovlev: Nevertheless, one can make this distinction in a very clear and unambiguous way, also in the daily life of every nation. For instance: I could say I do not want to have anything to do with you personally—this is my right. But God forbid that I say I do not want to have anything to do with you because you are Germans. Then I would be a scoundrel. This is the transition from national to nationalistic.

DER SPIEGEL: So, what is to happen in the Baltic states?

Yakovlev: If the inhabitants of the Baltic states say: "Immigration from Russia should be braked, our national feelings are damaged," we do not have anything against this. However, if they say that the Russian as such disturbs them just because he is a Russian, I draw the line. I do not accept this. We have said this to the Estonians. They continue to demand complete economic independence in order to make their economy profitable. Regarding this we said: "Then let the economists do calculations on this first."

DER SPIEGEL: What is the result?

Yakovlev: Of course, the issue has not been removed from the agenda, but it sounds more moderate now after calculations have been made in the Baltic states. One thing is clear: Local responsibility and local rights have to be ensured to a greater extent than to date. The majority of the questions—perhaps even all of them—have to be solved by the governments of the individual republics—with their own initiative and at their own discretion.

DER SPIEGEL: Did you expect the nationality problem to become so explosive in the course of restructuring?

Yakovlev: It did, indeed, come a bit suddenly.

DER SPIEGEL: If one looks at the nationality conflict and the difficulties of reform in general—is it as bad as you expected? Or is it worse?

Yakovlev: We did not expect such vehement resistance. In the past we proceeded from the premise that conservatism would come to the fore in particular among the bureaucratic civil servants. However, now it seems to be very varied and very strong, also in the enterprises. The nationality issue also has very great variety. Tensions between Azerbaijanis and Armenians have nothing in common with what we are experiencing in the Baltic states. These are two different pairs of shoes. We are dramatizing neither the one nor the other issue. The decisive thing is that the general process is heading in the right direction. If we consider all this as a revolution—can you imagine a revolution without resistance? No, this resistance is absolutely natural.

SPIEGEL: If this new revolution was so necessary, does this not cast a shadow on the previous one?

Yakovlev: No. We are now starting to see the problems of socialism from a totally new qualitative level, no longer from that of impoverished and wretched Russia of the year 1917, but from that of an highly developed industrial country. What happened during the time in-between happened and cannot be eliminated from history. There is no way to escape our history—in the same way as you cannot escape your history.

DER SPIEGEL: You yourself once said that in the course of restructuring new contradictions would appear and they would no longer be harmonized but would have to be lived through. If one wants to fully exploit the leeway of dialectics, must there not also be an opposition in the country?

Yakovlev: Of course, restructuring as a process has led to new contradictions. Contradictions are endless. No one will dare to predict now which bunch of contradictions will arise in the future, contradictions for instance in connection with the rights of the local or cooperative communities or with freedom of conscience.

SPIEGEL: Is it also impossible to predict whether the ban on party groups will be maintained as it has existed—theoretically at least—in your party.

Yakovlev: You know, we have never discussed this as fiercely as at present. If I can express my standpoint, my opinion freely, why do I need a party group? Why do I then need discipline within the group? I am subject to my party conscience as I understand it. I want to remain free. We have so much to do that the formation of party groups would be a waste of time.

SPIEGEL: Aleksandr Nikolayevich, thank you for this interview.

Medvedev on Filmmaking, 'Pluralism of Views'

LD1601225889 Moscow TASS in English 2245 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—Vadim Medvedev, member of the Politbureau and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, has stated that in the course of the democratization and glasnost processes developing in this country "the range of opinions became broader and the struggle became more intense." Speaking on Monday at a meeting with creative workers and representatives of the labour collective of the Mosfilm Studio of Moscow, he said that "this process, healthy and positive by its nature, brings to a higher level the socialist pluralism of views. We favour the continuation of this process."

Medvedev pointed out that Soviet film-makers, the same as the whole of society, are living through a period of quest. "The ideological and artistic emancipation and the rejection of the administrative and command methods of management are the most important achievements on this way," he said. In this connection Medvedev called attention to the return to active use of the shelved films, to the close attention paid by film-makers to moral and youth problems.

"Some steps have been made in the organizing and economic restructuring of film-making. The idea of the consolidation of democratic principles in the management of film-making, the expansion of the creative and economic independence of film studios deserve approval. At the same time, the working out of a new model proved to be a difficult undertaking. The first proposals were amorphous in many respects and were not well thought over. Now they are being finished."

Touching upon the ideological and artistic sides of film-making, Medvedev pointed out that "there exists an obvious contradiction between the demand in new film-making and its present state."

"The artistic development of the past period of our life is taking place. At the same time, a period of our expurgation, of the comprehension of the past is dragging on. This period is necessary, but there exists a great public demand in a creative analysis of new phenomena in life, of new social processes which are of destiny-making importance for this country. A one-sided emphasis on negative sides of present-day life is alarming. We are not going to again urge film-makers to reflect perestroyka in a superficial and hasty manner. However, one should not overlook the main processes taking place in the life of society," Medvedev emphasised.

Delegates' Fate on Bribe Charges Queried

PM1301131589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 89 Second Edition p 3

[Unnamed correspondent report in response to reader's letter: "Glasnost Has No Secrets"; first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] Why does PRAVDA, which has lent impetus to the process of glasnost with regard to "cotton matters," keep quiet, in its items "Cobra Above the Gold" and "The Column," about the fate of those delegates to the 19th party conference who were charged with crimes? Secrets again? R. Makarov, Voronezh

In connection with the many such letters which have reached PRAVDA, our correspondent has turned to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Here is the reply we received:

"Since the 19th party conference the USSR Prosecutor's Office has also received and continues to receive many letters from citizens wondering about these people's fate. They are all worried by the question: Will the highly placed bribe takers not avoid responsibility? We can say that the investigation into them continues. Glasnost has no secrets. As the press has already reported, on 19 October 1988 four former leading workers of Uzbekistan were arrested, including two—Dzhabbarov and Radzhabov—who were party conference delegates.

"Last Wednesday, 11 January 1989, a former CPSU Central Committee department sector chief subsequently elected second secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee—Viktor Ilich Smirnov, who was a delegate to the 19th party conference—was arrested in Moscow on charges of bribery.

"The work of the investigation group is continuing and we will regularly inform the public of the progress in investigating the case."

Letter to Paper Deplores Travel Restrictions

PM1301123189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 89 Second Edition p 3

[Letter from Doctor of Medical Sciences Professor Yu. Bernadskiy, Kiev Institute department chief: "Like a Poor Relation; Report on Foreign Business Trip"]

[Text] Kiev—I am going on a foreign business trip. In recent years I have had over 25 invitations to various international congresses and conferences but the USSR Ministry of Health has given me permission to go to only eight. On each occasion this permission arrived at the very last moment. How can I prepare properly and edit my report in a foreign language in these circumstances?

And how many ordeals I have to suffer to receive "blessing" in my own institute. Although people everywhere are speaking of the simplification of the procedure, even now the cart is creaking and only just moving forward. On instructions from above, the character reference and recommendation is "compiled" and discussed first in the department, then at the faculty party bureau, then at a faculty party meeting. Then there is the trade union committee and the institute party committee, and only after that is the paper signed by the rector. But why can he not sign it immediately, without all the procrastination? The reason is to play it safe, the desire to make as many people as possible responsible for my trip, just in case. Of course this approach is a legacy of the notorious times when every scientist (and not just the scientist) was suspected of every mortal sin, including the intention to remain abroad.

But having received all the documents, I went on a scientific trip abroad. Because of the poverty of the USSR Ministry of Health my pockets were almost empty. I know from experience that in the eyes of foreign scientists we Soviet scientists look like poor relations.

I have recently received invitations from Australia and France. I very much wanted to travel to the remote continent. I had something to share with scientists there, and there is no harm in borrowing from their experience. But the absurd rule which exists—a scientist can travel to the capitalist countries only once every 5 years—made it impossible for me to visit Australia. I think the number of trips should be determined by how useful each trip is to the development of science in the USSR.

Now about what would seem to be trivia: The congress of symposium organizers concern themselves with my food, hotel, transport problems, and return ticket abroad. But whenever I am ready to leave Kiev the question of how to get a ticket arises. There are enormous waiting lines at the "Inturist" booking offices and I have to stand in line and spend time and nervous and physical energy. Yet it would probably be possible to open a separate booking office for people traveling abroad on business.

Finally, one last point: After the forum or conference, ties and contacts are made and the participants in professional meetings and scientific discussions write letters to each other. In May last year I received a report from a foreign colleague: He had received my letter which had taken... 6 months to arrive. Supposing this to be a misunderstanding, he soon sent a letter to me. But this letter took from June to November to reach Kiev. And why? Because although the letter had my home address on it, some communications worker had had the "idea" to send it to my institute, where it was opened and read by many people before reaching me.

I was admitted to the party in 1942. For many years I have been a professor in charge of a department. As a Soviet scientist I am far from indifferent to the way my party and my motherland look in the eyes of foreign scientific representatives. I am not indifferent to what they think about our science, health care, our censorship procedures, and communications system. Superfluous obstacles and barriers must be removed on the path of those who travel abroad to establish contacts and exchange scientific experience. This is a demand of the times.

*Creation of Single State Control System Viewed

WA18000338a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by A. Leshchina, chairman of Oblast People's Control Committee, and A. Sukhava, deputy chief controller-inspector, KRU [Counterintelligence Directorate] for Donetsk Oblast, UkSSR Minfin [Ministry of Finance], Donetsk, under rubric "People"s Control": "The Inspector Is Coming Your Way..."

[Text] **At the 19th All-Union Party Conference, mention was made of the need to create a single and integrated system of public and state control. The decision is a correct and long-awaited one. But how does one proceed in a practical way to create a single system? Because it must combine within itself not only the active participation of the public—the representatives of the enterprises—but must also be a state system, that is, it must first of all defend and protect the country's interests.**

State control has many vulnerable spots today. The fact of the matter is that its functions, for the most part, have been farmed out to the ministries, which engage in that work in a manner that is beneficial and convenient for them, worrying first of all about their own interests, rather than about the state interests. The same thing can be said about the other agencies that have been given the right of control—Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices], Gosstandart [State Committee for Standards], and the bank system. Each one organizes audits, as a rule, at individual enterprises in the branch.

In recent years an attempt was made in Donetsk Oblast to unite under the aegis of the people's control committee the actions of all the agencies engaged in inspections. As a result there was a reduction in the number of checkings, the abundance of which, we may as well admit, had recently begun to cause irritation among the economic managers. However, in the course of joint actions we realized that what is needed is not only the coordination of the inspection forces, but their genuine unification.

The existing departmental control has outlived its time. It is necessary to change the structure that has developed. Today the departments concentrate in their hands all forms of control: preliminary, current, and subsequent. That is, they check themselves. With this approach, certain costs are inevitable. We shall cite one example.

According to plan, the apparatus at KRU, UkSSR Minfin was supposed to carry out in September, jointly with the control and inspection department of Glavdonetskstroy, an inspection of the Donbassstroymekhanizatsiya Trust and its administrations. However, Glavdonetskstroy specialists did not want to cooperate with the KRU inspectors. They carried out an inspection a month earlier, confronting the Minfin controllers with a **fait accompli**: everything in the trust is normal, there are no violations, and here are the documents that confirm it.

Actually, everything in the documents was peace and quiet. However, this is precisely the situation when the decision has been made to express wishful thinking. In the course of a second checking, instances were discovered of figure-padding involving unfulfilled work volumes, the illegal payment of bonuses, complete confusion in accounting, attempts to conceal the volumes of planned profit, and hence the volumes of deductions to be paid into the budget. In a word, the departmental controllers, as the expression goes, had demonstrated in all their glory their incompetence and their lack of desire to penetrate deeply into the crux of the matter.

The situation, it must be noted, is a fairly widespread and typical one. It is no longer any secret to anyone that many departmental inspection services have become an obedient tool of the enterprise managers, who most frequently have no self-interest in any thorough, well-argumented checkings.

Where, then, is the way out? We propose creating in the regions single state control agencies by drawing on the departmental inspection services. That is, we recommend making the control truly independent and state control. In our opinion, such agencies ought to be created under the oblast soviets of people's deputies. That is what has already been done, for example, in Krasnodar Kray. The transition has been made there from individual checkings to comprehensive inspections of all the enterprises in a particular branch simultaneously. Such inspections make it possible not only to detect promptly the violations in the work performed by the enterprises, but also to see the developmental tendency in the entire region. The principle governing the checkings has itself been changing. The controllers not only locate the shortcomings, but also, in a well-qualified manner, on the basis of a thorough financial and economic analysis, suggest ways to eliminate them.

We also proposed organizing control on these principles in Donetsk Oblast. The proposal was supported at the oblast soviet. A letter concerning this was written to the republic's Council of Ministers. There the managers of the ministries and departments were asked for their opinion. And all of them rejected the idea offhand. Why? They said that the creation of this kind of subdivision under the oblast soviet would contradict the Law Governing the State Enterprise.

Is that really so? Of course not. No one is planning to take away all the control functions from the ministries. But if there arises the need to carry out a check or an inspection, then the specialists in the accounting office, the economists, and the production workers are completely able to cope with this at the enterprises. A one-time check at the request of the department can also be carried out by the control and inspection agency at the oblast soviet.

It turns out that there is yet another argument against our proposal. The carrying out of inspections by one and the same workers in various branches, according to the ministry managers, will allegedly lead to a loss by the inspectors of the knowledge of the specifics of production and financial activity.

The work practice of the Minfin controllers, when one and the same person is conducting an inspection of enterprises in practically all the branches of the national economy, convincingly shows the groundlessness of this argument. Moreover, the workers in the investigative agencies for some reason prefer to work with Minfin inspectors, and definitely not with the departmental ones. Last year, for example, inspectors from KRU for Donestsk Oblast, UkSSR Minfin, established at enterprises the concealment of payments to the budget for a total amount of 10 million rubles, but as a result of the departmental checkings the state had not received a single kopeck!

Another argument that appears to be unconvincing is the one to the effect that there will be a reduction of the managers' responsibility if the inspectors from the enterprises are no longer used. If that responsibility is based only on the inspectors, then this is abnormal.

Attempts to counteract our proposals can be explained only by the lack of desire on the part of the departmental managers to part with "their own" controllers, who are always by their side, compliant, and obliging.

The creation of a state inspection agency, we think, should be carried out in two stages: at first, the unification under the aegis of the soviet of all the departmental control and inspection services of the enterprises located in the oblast; and then their fusion together with the the Minfin KRU for the oblast. When creating such a single state controlling agency, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the inspections must be conducted by highly-qualified professionals whose knowledge and experience are on a par with the officials whom they will be checking. Therefore the work incentives for such inspectors must be consistent with this.

We are convinced that only a single, independent control and inspection service will become that agency which will genuinely concern itself with the interests not of individual departments, but the entire state.

Economic

Official on Economic Reform, Grain Figures

LD1601125189 Moscow TASS in English 1240 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] Moscow January 16 TASS—"The Soviet economic reform ideas have acquired not only political and legal corroboration, but are already being put into practice—this is the crux of the present situation", it was stated today by Academician Stepan Sitaryan, first vice-chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, who addressed a news conference today at the USSR Council of Ministers Information Department, devoted to new aspects of the economic reform in the USSR.

The materials, distributed to pressmen before the conference, point out that 76 thousand associations and enterprises worked on full cost-accounting in 1988, as against 2.5 thousand in 1987. Employed at these associations and enterprises were 51 million people, that is 39 per cent of the country's total labour force. Full cost-accounting enterprises now turn out 60 per cent of the country's industrial and agricultural production. Their production growth rates are 0.5 per cent higher than elsewhere. Their labour production grew 2.7 per cent during the past year, whereas the figure for enterprises not transferred to full cost-accounting had dropped by 0.7 per cent.

Replying to pressmen, Stepan Sitaryan stressed that such an economic factor as rent-and-lease had come to the fore and was gaining momentum in the course of the Soviet economic reform. Today it has gained a footing not only in agriculture, but in industry, construction, public services and transport too. More than 600 enterprises and organisations have been operating on this basis as of October 1, 1988.

"Cooperatives play an important role in the economic reform", Stepan Sitaryan noted. He pointed out that 48.5 thousand cooperatives had been registered in the USSR by October 1st of last year. The number of people working in them grew 5-fold last year, and the volume of work done—7.5-fold. The academician admitted at the same time that the Soviet economic reform was still in the making, that "many theoretical and practical problems were still vague and apparently incomplete". He mentioned the reform of prices as an example of this.

Academician Sitaryan said that according to preliminary estimates, the Soviet Union's 1988 grain harvest amounted to 195 million tons. This is somewhat less than in 1986 and 1987. At the same time, the average annual harvest for the past three years stands at 205 million tons.

'Experts' Note Inflation, Budget Deficit

LD1701120989 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 17 Jan 89

[Text] The Soviet Union has published data on the results of socioeconomic development in the country last year. The national income went up by 4.4 percent and the wages by 7 percent. Government funds for the advancement of education, health service, and housing construction also increased substantially.

Analyzing the results of last year's development, experts note, however, that the production of consumer goods and food lagged far behind the requirements of the domestic market. This unfavorable trend stimulated inflation in the country and increased budget deficit.

Problems in Diamond Cutting Criticized

LD1501215589 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Jan 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] There are spheres of economic activity in our country that were not talked about in the past. This applies to the diamond cutting trade. Yet this is an important source for bringing in hard currency to our country, and society has the right to know how matters stand in this field, too.

The joint stock company Rusalmaz has been involved in the trading of jewelry from the Soviet Union for 13 years.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent V. Dmitriyev] These little stones from Yakutiya, cut in Moscow and Smolensk, cannot be compared with the cullinan, the biggest diamond in the world, over 3,000 carats. But they are not inferior to the famous giant in their beauty and their brilliant sparkle. The biggest are not necessarily the most beautiful anyway: This is what the specialists say at the firm, or rather the joint stock company Rusalmaz, from where we are reporting.

Of the diamond cutting centers in the world, the Soviets have the strictest demands as far as grinding, the accuracy of the angle, and so on are concerned. For that reason, our output is in great demand.

These Belgian dealers—that is to say wholesale traders—have come from Antwerp, a town famous for its diamond cutting experts. They examine the Soviet stones carefully. The businessmen are satisfied. They say the traditional: mazal—this means the deal is struck. Both sides wish each other success.

The Rusalmaz society makes considerable deals which fill our treasury with hard currency. One of its partners is the Swiss firm Samurai, which has business relations with Japan and other countries in the East and trades in pearls and precious stones.

[Firm Director B. Saltzmann, in French fading into superimposed Russian] The diamond cutting trade is not quite an ordinary one. It is a very difficult matter. Soviet diamonds are known all over the world today and are in great demand. But I will be frank: You are often behind the fashion and for that reason lose profits, especially when it is a matter of jewelry pieces. You need greater flexibility, faster reaction to market demands. Another critical factor, if I may say so: Our partners in the USSR are too slow in making decisions. I think they need greater independence. [video shows stones, jewelry, experts, dealers] [end recording]

Agricultural

Gorbachev Addresses 13 Jan Agriculture Meeting

Opening Speech, Debate

LD1601110189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 15 Jan 89

["Rural Hour" program: 'Along the Path of Improving the Management of the Country's Agro-Industrial Complex'; opening speech by M.S. Gorbachev and subsequent debate at the 13 January CPSU Central Committee conference on improving agro-industrial management, over video showing leaders seated in the CPSU Central Committee Conference Hall —recorded]

[Excerpts] [Gorbachev] Comrades, our work in preparing a party Central Committee plenum concerning agrarian policy, which will be held in March, has entered a decisive stage. This will be an important plenum. I even think this adjective is insufficient to describe the significance of this party forum. This is determined by the fact that the cardinal direction of our internal policies will be discussed.

Essentially, when we speak of agrarian policy and the agrarian complex, we are dealing first and foremost with the food question—one of the most important issues facing any state. Naturally, this is a question we must resolve under the conditions of restructuring, using fresh approaches inasmuch as dealing with it, to put it frankly, dealing with it in full and in the required manner—even though no matter can ever be resolved once and for all—nevertheless, dealing with the food question has been dragged out. We are confident that we have the economic, social, and natural conditions to solve it.

When we speak of agrarian policy, we are talking about rural workers and their lives, the working class and the collective farm peasantry involved in this type of labor, that of grain production, without which, as I have already said, the existence of any society is inconceivable. Naturally, then, no agrarian policy can be effective, productive, and fruitful unlesss it takes into account the interests of the rural workers, the social, economic interests, cultural interests, a wide circle of interests in general of our society's citizens.

When we speak of agrarian policy we have in mind the special nature of this industry, of this agroindustrial complex, of this national economic complex—in that its functioning takes place in certain natural conditions. This is connected with nature, with direct contact with nature. This leaves an indelible mark on all the activity of rural workers. We cannot ignore nature; moreover, it is only on the basis of our community with nature, our respectful contact with nature, that we can confidently conduct agrarian matters, agricultural production, and everything that unites the agrarian-industrial complex not only today, but also tomorrow. Comrades, these are also big issues. Not everything has gone well here and many mistakes have been made, both in land improvement and in land husbandry systems under which we simply—speaking frankly—violated nature instead of understanding its particularities in each region and, I shall go farther, on each kolkhoz and on each field.

When we speak about agriculture and of the agrarian complex, what we always talk about in the first place—after the person, perhaps, although without this the person does not exist—what we talk about first is the land. The person is not going to exist if this factor is lacking. That is why the land, the land and the people are, so to speak, the concise formula of agrarian policy. A great deal depends here on how this interrelationship is resolved. We lost a good deal in ridding the country of the peasantry in the sense that we severed people from the land and the means of production and thereby dealt a hard blow to the entire agrarian cause, and, primarily, to people's relationship with the land.

Moreover, alongside the immense process of transforming the productive forces still getting underway in our country, the interests of the agrarian sector were not always taken into account, nor was it taken into account that the land must be approached with an attitude of great responsibility. Look what the losses are: Wherever there is a hydroelectric station there are also millions of hectares of flooded lands, lands which yielded output.

On water meadows, these water meadows still exist in places but many of them no longer exist. Moreover, this involves millions of hectares of the very best pastures from which many livestock products came. There, so to speak, is another blunder for you.

In short, you can see how vast this agrarian business is, how it affects the foundations of the life of our society. Well, finally, how can one conduct the business of agriculture without harmonizing it with the other sectors of the national economy or without maintaining the apporpriate relations? And here too, here, too, at one time it was historically essential to put pressure on the countryside to help create our industrial potential. But its circumstance was dictated by a specific historical period. It could not be considered normal. This had an effect on and deformed all agrarian policy, and therefore practice as well had a serious effect on how agriculture functions and on its results. And it is this situation which today we are examining and with which we cannot agree or tolerate. This raises the question of harmonization, as this is a dynamic process. The whole national economic complex and all its branches must develop dynamically, so we need to find mechanisms that will maintain this harmony and balance.

Well, of course, just look at how many distortions of all sorts there are in the agrarian sector itself. All this needs to be understood. We have put several questions at the center of these problems. There is the question of a restructuring, of a fundamental restructuring of eocnomic relations, of providing social facilities in the countryside, and of course the land question, the land question. The reason I am saying this is that the discussion we are having today is part of the great preparatory work being done for the plenum.

We need to come to the plenum very thoroughly equipped to evaluate any road we have covered and see all our achievements—and they are tremendous, tremendous—but also see the true state of affairs in today's agrarian sector so as, at the present stage, to propose an agrarian policy which, underpinned by achievements, renouncing mistakes, and correcting distortions committed in this important sector of our economy would lead to a fruitful policy in line with the interests of our society.

We must come to this plenum with a well-considered concept. This is politics; it is not a question of us setting out all the specifics at that plenum. No, and obviously; but we must create political prerequisites and draw up political guidelines that take everything into account and open the way for us to confidently develop this sector and resolve the food program as fast as possible.

Within the framework of these meetings on the eve of the plenum, and there have already been many of them, the state of affairs in this sector has been discussed, an analysis has been made, and the experience gained since the May plenum and in the past few years has been discussed, including the development of leasing relations, of various forms of contracting. Questions connected with the development, with the social development of our countryside, questions of economic interrelations with other industries and much, much more were discussed.

Today's subject, or more correctly the subject of today's conference, of this meeting—I believe all these meetings of ours proceed, so to speak, informally and frankly—is exchange, the open exchange of anxieties, concerns, and proposals that have accumulated. Perhaps only one sentence, five words, you understand, but it is important to take the floor and give your point of view. We must talk objectively and honestly so all this is aired. And the topic, the topic is connected with the management of agricultural production, with management—how it shold be implemented at the level of the koklhoz and sovkhoz, in that most basic link in developing leasing relations. The question arises in general of the destiny of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz. Here, too, so to speak, we hear different points of view. Our point of view is well-known and we defend it and I think not simply for the sake of some attachments to it, but on a substantive basis because we are convinced of the rightness of such an approach.

I think we must examine what this management or the interaction of primary links at the level of the rural rayon should be like. We are already seeing that such a process is going on, that the main thing is that at the kolkhoz and sovkhoz, on the basis of leasing relations, an internal cooperative, actually a cooperative of cooperatives, is emerging. This actually includes... [Gorbachev changes thought] it is clear that this can be achieved only on the basis of broad democracy. Already a number of rayons have already followed the same path as the people of Tula by setting up in the rayon a council that unites. A council of directors and of the leaders of these cooperatives—as they say, these councils—already determine all the policies and all interrelations and interaction and what needs to be done in order to bring out the potential of one rayon or another. The present agro-industrial committee apparatus occupies its true place: it helps to resolve issues.

As far as the rayon level is concerned, the issue already arising there is that the farms need help with how to market their produce, how to process it, how to form a cooperative association, how to conduct capital construction, so to speak, by joint efforts, and what issue to resolve immediately. This, it turns out, is the kind of help the kolkhoz needs, and not the kind where a representative of the apparatus teaches the peasant how to sow, plow, and so on. Now even the chairman of a cooperative or the board of the cooperative, of a kolkhoz or sovkhoz cannot give orders and dictate, you understand, to the cooperative member. He can do so only when some problems of an ecological, veterinary, or zoological-veterinary nature arise, when some general laws, so to speak, are touched upon. That is where the cry arose: Don't interfere, but help.

If that is so then the question arises: What about the oblast and kray level? Why are all the production subunits being preserved there to be in command?

These are the questions we want to put forward for discussion today. This is very important because at present, if we speak, comrades, progress, changes, restructuring on the plane we have been feeling toward, as life itself has prompted, are coming up against this, are coming up against this. [sentence as heard]

That then, is the theme of our discussion today. Let us speak frankly. What should we do? What should we do? We need, here and now, the process of improving economic relations and everything, the entire process of restructuring the countryside within the context of bringing out the potential of our countryside.

We have decided that we will now give the floor to Vsevolod Serafimovich Murakhovskiy. He will continue my comments in a specific context and after that there will be the exchange.

[Murakhovskiy] Comrades: In accordance with the decisions of the 19th all-union party conference and the July 1988 plenum on expanding the right of the union republics, the USSR Council of Ministers has prepared a proposal on improving the system of managing agro-industrial production in the country. They are directed at creating real conditions for the greater independence of the regions in resolving matters relating to ensuring food supplies, at removing excessive centralization in this matter, at granting wide-ranging rights to the basic production links—the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and processing enterprises—in their economic activity conducted on the basis of predominantly economic methods, and at promoting to the utmost the development of the cooperative movement in rural areas. Their aim is to bring into play more vigorously, on the basis of financial autonomy, self-management, and self- financing, the available reserves and possibilties of the regions for increasing agricultural production, and as a result to significantly improve food supplies to the population. Restructuring, as is well known, is a system that began at the top, and in many respects it reflects tendencies toward centralized management which took shape over the course of many long years. This applies to planning, pricing, the formation of centralized funds, and a number of other fundamental positions. There remains in the agro-industrial complex an aspiration to address the predominant number of issues at the upper levels of management.

The past years of the 5-year period have also shown that the current multilink organizational structure of managing agro-industrial production more and more contradicts the new principles of running the economy, especially in connection with the development in rural areas of the cooperative movement and lease relations. The numerous and sprawling apparatus of agro-industrial committees and associations in the localities has in essence retained centralist approaches to management, based on directives. The style, forms, and methods of its work in many respects bear the stamp of the previous activities, and moreover these shortcomings are inherent in the whole pyramid of management. At the same time, it is perfectly obvious that in beginning restucturing we were unable to avoid these shortcomings. But now, with the transition to predominantly economic methods of management, there arises the urgent need to introduce fundamental changes into the organizational-economic structure that has taken shape. This is also dictated by the fact that ahead lies the need to implement the policy elaborated by the party aimed at consistently expanding the rights of the union republics and the local soviets in resolving all matters relating to ensuring food supplies to the population.

All of this has led to the elaboration of proposals for the further development of the organizational structure of management of the agro-industrial complex, and to the construction of a system that might not only not weaken the integrational ties and managerial functions in the agro-industrial formations, but even substantially strengthen them. It must be said that such efforts, mainly in the production of the agro-industral complex and also at the rayon level, are already actively in progress. But wherein do they find specific expression, and what must be taken into account at the present time in improving the structure of management?

First and foremost, we must understand perfectly clearly that the fundamental link in agro-inustrial production was and remains the kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

It is necessary to emphasize this particularly, because statements have recently been appearing, some of them in the pages of the central press, to the effect that kolkhozes and sovkhozes are a defective way of organizing public production in rural areas. We cannot agree with this. Today, comrades, it is a question not of discrediting the kolkhoz and sovkhoz system, but of breathing new life into it—above all by doing our utmost to improve production relations and develop cooperatives within the farm and lease system, and by improving production relations within the kolkhozes ad sovkhozes utilizing the mighty potentials of that form.

It is very important at the present time that we are beginning to improve the management structure from below. By that I mean from our kolkhozes. Now, if we examine the rayons, we must understand that in the rayons, the organization that manages the economic activity of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes must be formed from below. It must proceed from the kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

The kolkhozes and the organizations serving these organizations... [Murakhovskiy changes thought] I would like to stress at this conference that at the rayon level we must now draw a line between economic and state management. So the soviet, which is elected by representatives of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the rayon, is an organ of economic management. And it seems to us that already at this level, we must exclude interference by other rayon organs in the organizational and economic management of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and preserve them only from the viewpoint of fulfilling the general tasks—the general tasks of creating conditions for increasing production, not giving orders, not counting heads, not counting hectares, but only dealing with matters relating, say, to creating the necessary economic conditions and providing an opportunity for the farms to show real initiative and enterprise in conducting their affairs.

Next, how do we see management at the level of the oblast, the kray, and the autonomous republic? It seems to us that the same principle we are proposing for the formation of economic management bodies at the rayon level should also be used for the formation of economic management bodies at the level of the oblast, kray, and the autonomous republic. Agro-industrial associations, agricultural combines, and firms that are formed in our country at rayon level delegate their plenipotentaries, and at meetings or conferences in the oblast, kray, and rayon, the council to manage the agro-industrial association of the kray is elected.

At this meeting we have tried to show the management struture in the oblast. So, the councils are elected and at the bottom here are the rayon associations. This is where that council is set up and a workers' apparatus is set up. [Video shows Murakhovskiy indicating relevant sections on large wall chart diagramming structure of management of agro-industrial bodies.] But the size of it will be decided by the council. It is to be fully maintained on the basis of financial autonomy and allocations from farms, therefore the comrades have the right to determine the number, staff, and remuneration, and again the workers' apparatus that is formed here...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] The main thing is the functions; they also determine the functions.

[Murakhovskiy] They determine its functions, and once again its main task is to serve the council, to help it work out strategic and tactical guidelines for the development of farms in the oblast.

[Podgornov] Nikolay Mikhaylovich Podgornov, director of the Avrora Sovkhoz, Grizovetskiy Rayon, Vologda Oblast.

[Gorbachev] The speaker after him will be Comrade Starodubtsev. [passage omitted on Podgornov comments]

[Gorbachev] Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Starodubtsev. Ivan Illarinonovich, Lukinov will be the next comrade to speak.

[Starodubtsev, identified from screen caption as V.A. Starodubtsev, chairman of the Novomoskovskoye Agro-Industrial Association of the Tula Oblast] I would like to conduct an extremely frank conversation about strategic errors and omissions in economic affairs and the management of the country's agro-industrial complex. Mikhail Sergeyevich, we must admit today that ideas of the bureaucratic system of management organs, and their watchful direction and control of agricultural and other enterprises and organizations are again being dragged up in the draft. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and producers of raw materials and foodstuffs are again viewed in the draft as objects for management by that system. That unhealthy persistence is utterly incomprehensible to me. Not a single country in the world uses such a system of management organs in the agro-industrial complex. On the contrary, producers of raw materials and foodstuffs have significant powers and rights in economic self-management. On the basis of coproduction and integration, they form their own cooperatives and agro-industrial associations, which they manage and own, and they enjoy dividends from their activity. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately, no fundamental restructuring of management is envisaged in the draft. Today, as I understand it, the participants in the meeting should not only criticize but should also propose versions of a fundamental restructuring. Evidently, we must today recognize that it is necessary to delimit the functions of state and economic management in the country's agro-industrial complex. Rayispolkom, gorispolkom, oblispolkom, and krayispolkom soviets of people's deputies, and the councils of ministers of autonomous republics should, in particular, exercise municipal functions in the budgetary financing of the country's agro-industrial complex and in developing the social infrastructure of the agro-industrial complex.

In this connecton, I propose the abolition of the post of first deputy chairman of the council of ministers for autonomous republics, and also of the kray and oblast soviets of working people's deputies in charge of the production and economic development of the agro-industrial complex.

Virtually all enterprises and organizations of the agro-industrial complex in the rayons are subordinate to oblast management organs, with the notorious dual subordination. A new resonant bureaucratic rattle, to use Vladimir Ilich Lenin's apt expression, has been created. The thirst to command and not to produce output has again defeated common sense.

We in Tula Oblast, after a long and difficult search, have, we think, chosen the correct direction. The model of the "Novomoskovskoye" agro-industrial association has been made the basis at rayon level. Similar agro-industrial associations have been set up in the majority of rayons. The difficult process of bringing them into being is now being implemented.

We have studied the draft decision attentively several times. It is very difficult to find answers in the draft to many burning questions concerning development of the agro-industrial complex. Proposals for giving production stimuli to kolkhozes and sovkhozes, a system for budgetary allocations, and payments not tied to increases in production of output and effective use of production potential, primarily of the land, have not been put in systematic form. We need a well-balanced system for using state financing for development of the agro-industrial complex that stimulates output of food products. The points in the draft that set out the rights and powers of cooperatives and of the farming units being established upon the basis of lease and cooperative contracting need to be formulated more clearly and precisely. As you can see, the draft decision is in need of serious reinterpretation and analysis and of a more in-depth approach to solving many economic tasks in the agro-industrial complex.

I would like to use this opportunity today to address the leadership of our country with the point that it is time, all the same, to change approaches with regard to our country's agrarian sector. The thinking itself must change totally. The countryside has been waiting too long for assistance from industry. At one time, for many decades, the countryside waited too long for asssistance from industry. At one time, for many decades, the countryside gave everything to build towns, factories, and public works. Today we are waiting for industrialists to come to our assistance now with greater enthusiasm and help us to solve the most burning and difficult food problem in the next few years. [scattered applause]

[Gorbachev] Comrade Lukinov, Ivan Illarionovich, vice-president of he Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, academician. And will Comrade Grossu please be ready.

[Lukinov] I am going to quote the results of basic research we have carried out over recent years in our institute—and I head the Economics Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. We have made a careful analysis of the trends and movements in expenditures for production, prime costs, prices, and profitability of production, ranging from the extractive branches of industry to the manufacture of consumer goods, including the agro-industrial complex.

What, then, do these results and this research show? It amounts to this: Over this period of 25 years—perhaps a little less, 23 years—over this period there has taken place, Mikhail Sergeyevich, what I would call a global increase in the cost of public-sector production. And this global process of making production more expensive begins with the extractive branches of industry. The agro-industrial complex is certainly not in first place in this respect, agriculture is certainly not in first place. It begins with the extractive industries and then I would say it snowballs in a chain reaction and spreads to all spheres of production at all stages of economic circulation.

In order to support what I am saying I am going to have to give a few figures—you are going to have to excuse me, I know that you don't like listening to figures—but I am going to quote a few figures in order to make it absolutely clear what we are talking about. During that same period—and where prime costs are concerned I am beginning with the fuel and power complex—with oil, prime costs of production of oil increased 5.3 times, and wholesale prices of oil rose almost 6 times; natural gas—the prime costs of natural gas increased 7.5 times, by rather more than 7.5 times, even, and the wholesale price rose almost 8 times—the price for a cubic metre of gas; but iron ore went up 3.4 times.

And what else? Well, another thing I would also like to mention particularly is the fact that for all building materials the increase there was about 2.5 to 3 times. Agriculture, too, made an appropriate contribution here, but it was far from the leading contribution because where it was concerned prime costs and prices rose just 2.2 times. Unfortunately, the problem of equivalence, or more accurately the problem of nonequivalence, continues to exert very serious pressure and very serious constraints upon the agrarian sphere. The issue amounts to this, that for a long period of time agriculture really did serve as a kind of investment donor—that so-called indebtedness, as they say—and what's more, this took place exclusively through the system of nonequivalent prices.

What we must do, then, is activate structural and investment policy in a serious way. As far as the structure and the change in the structure of management that has been reported today is concerned, I believe that of course it must be further improved, but it must be improved primarily from the viewpoint of changing the methods of management and changing the functions of management. Accordingly, these big new schemes—we always make a very good job of drawing up these schemes, but we must not let it appear as it did in the Krylov fable, no matter how you arrange yourselves on the chairs...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] You're not going to be any good as musicians.

[Lukinov] Yes, you're not going to be any good as musicians. Let's not have that kind of thing when we change this structure. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

[Gorbachev] Comrade Semen Kuzmich Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, has the floor. Comrade Kunitskiy will get ready.

[Grossu] Respected comrades, respected Mikhail Sergeyevich! I would like to say, right from the very beginning and directly, that the administrative-bureaucratic system that has taken shape today, with the command and arbitrary methods of management, is totally divorced from the producers and the consumers. It possesses no flexibility and totally lacks economic methods of management. As a result of such a situation, manifest contradictions have arisen between the producers, who, under the influence of the laws on cooperatives and on the state industrial enterprise, are persistently paving for themselves a road of economic independence, and the upper echelon of management, as before, is acting by administrative methods, as it has no other methods.

As confirmation I would like to cite just one example, although many could be cited. All of us have energetically supported the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on combatting drunkenness and alcoholism. However, as a result of individual distortions in implementing the resolution, under pressure from an incalculable number of commissions, over the 1984-1985 period alone, 89,000 hectares of vines were uprooted in the republic. Vine production went down over these 2 years from 1.246 million tonnes to 474,000 tonnes, or by 2.6 times. One year later, that is in 1986, the commodity output of the grapes and wines subcomplex fell, compared to the 1984 level, from R2.5 billion to R1.5 billion—that is, R1 billion were lost. Profits in industry decreased five-fold, and the turnover tax by 1.7 times, or by more than R500 million. Immediately, some 300 specialized sovkhozes became money-losers or had low profitability, and even after the adoption of a resolution by the Central Committee Politburo that speaks of the need to rectify the mistakes committed with regard to viticulture, I have to say that no one from the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee even breathed a word, let alone apologized. On the contrary, sooner than anything they were forever saying in the corridors that up to now there has been a smell of wine from Moldavia. The farms, most unfortunately, agonizingly began to restructure themselves, and began to climb out of the most serious situation that had arisen; and today out of 300, only 30 remain are losing money or making only low profits.

How many stereotyped and untested directives have there been pertaining to agro-technical, technological, and livestock matters, and which have nothing whatsoever in common with the conditions in the territories where particular kinds of crop are grown? We are deeply convinced, therefore, that it is already necessary to transfer management of the agro-industrial complex or the agro-industrial complex of a territory directly to the local soviet and economic bodies in the localities, under conditions of complete financial autonomy and self-financing. This will have the strongest effect and will be the most correct solution for improving the management organization of the agro-industrial complex. Certainly under such conditions there will be considerably fewer mistakes in the leadership of the agro-industrial complex, and the advantage to the state from this will be considerably greater and considerably higher.

[Gorbachev] A question for you in order to make it clearer: When you say transfer to the localities, what exactly do you mean? Do you mean the republic, the oblast, or the rayon?

[Grossu] The territory. What I have in mind is that the management of agriculture in the oblast, the kray, and the republic should be transferred directly to local economic and local soviet bodies.

[Gorbachev] Where?

[Grossu] In the localities.

[Gorbachev] The management?

[Grossu] The management, yes.

[Gorbachev] To direct it, nevertheless?

[Grossu] Not direct, but to lead, to coordinate, [laughter] that is, to coordinate directly. I would like to say, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that this is part and parcel of the overall transfer of the management functions in the territories, of the economic problems territory-by-territory.

[Gorbachev] It depends on what you mean by the transfer of these functions. When Comrade Starodubtsev speaks I understand what he wants. And although he resorted to polemics, there was a lot in common between him and the rapporteur.

[Grossu] But I will also say, Mikhail Sergeyevich, I would like to put it like this: Targets, or orders, or sales for the various types of output should be set for the republics, and that should be the limit of agricultural management from the center. That is what I have in mind.

[Gorbachev] The floor is given to Comrade Konstantin Viktorovich Kunitskiy, general manager of the Ramenskiy Agricultural Combine, Moscow Oblast. Afterward, no doubt Comrade Gulov from Rostovoblast will speak in more detail. [pasage omitted on Kunitskiy supporting agro-industrial combines and associations and saying various considerations must be taken into account in deciding where to set them up, while the decision should not depend on orders from above.]

[Kunitskiy] In particular, we must trust the kolkhozes and sovkhozes as the basic cell. You know, some of our academics have gone so far that they are now writing and saying that kolkhozes should be disbanded, that the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are incapable of solving the food problem. Our kolkhoz peasants were right in what they said on the 10th [date not further specified]. I entirely agree with them: We must seek conditions and opportunities, the presence of a collective, and the ability of that collective, and press forward with our task. The only thing I am in favor of is that there should be as few snags as possible in our work.

[Gorbachev] Good. We give the floor to Comrade Viktor Anatoliyevich Gulov, chairman of the Pobeda Kolkhoz, Matveyev-Kurganskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast.

[Gulov] At present the kolkhoz is one of the last rungs in the state system. The interests of kolkhoz farmers come last. Right now I stand...[Golov changes thought] If, for instance, my role as a manager is changed, I don't run around the kolkhoz now and give orders. On the other hand, I am now under pressure from the cooperatives. Here's an example. We sold 240 tonnes of hybrid corn for seeds. But the ministry of purchases only paid us the rate for the ordinary grade and they say: Let's bring it up to standard—in December it was still lying out in the open—let's bring it up to standard and sell it to someone, and only then will we pay you the money. Before this would be easy to do. But now all the cooperatives think that the proceeds from sales go only to them. And they say, you make up the wages as you see fit. This...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] This is where we come up against the quota.

[Gulov] This is under the contract, Mikhail Sergeyevich, this is under the contract.

[Gorbachev] If it's under the contract, under the contract all right.

[Gulov] They put it like this. We shall bring it up to standard, then we'll sell it, and only then will we pay you.

[Gorbachev] If it is under the contract, the farm must be protected.

[Gulov] Or the case of meat combines. We handed our produce over to the meat combine. They spend 3 days reexamining it, and there is embezzlement along the line. Then we are paid only for the meat that ends up in the refrigerator.

[Gorbachev] The enterprise must be made part of an association, and that will be the end of it. This was 20 years ago, I understand.

[Gulov] As I was saying, it was easy before it went via the kolkhoz farmers. Now, to be specific, kolkhozes are counting every penny. So let them have some money.

[Gorbachev] The meat combine should also have a financial stake, so that...[Gorbachev fails to complete sentence]

[Gulov] [passage omitted on Gulov discussing need to provide incentives to hog breeders to increase produciton of pork, and criticizing idea of price increases on bread or meat which may help farmers but that hit ordinary workers] We have particularly encountered this since 1 January when we went over to self-recouping and self-financing. Everything has been left the same but the prices for machinery—a combine used to cost 18,000 [currency not specified] and now it costs 48,000. Well, what if one follows the principle, I have enough barns, they are empty. So, should I store away all the grain and wait until the price for grain is 30 kopecks? That is wrong, don't you think? This should be resolved too, but from both sides.

[Gorbachev] Listen, Viktor Anatoliyevich, these Canadians first bought 27 combines from us, then another 30 combines for $90,000 dollars...

[Unidentified voice, interrupting] Ninety nine.

[Gorbachev] Ninety nine. But dollars for all that. [Gorbachev smiles, laughter from audience]

[Gulov] Dollars, Mikhail Sergeyevich; there was a long conversation here yesterday at the Union Council of Kolkhozes.

[Gorbachev] Long, of course.

[Gulov] A lot of proposals were made there. Speeches were of course made by kolkhoz chairmen with a lot of experience. Proposals were made about how we should have dollars. But I would like to end by quoting Karl Marx. The best master is a free master. But for a master to be free he has to own land, plan production himself, and be in charge of his own produce and income. If all this exists, one can of course expect good things.

[Gorbachev] The floor is given to Comrade Vladimir Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, an academician of the V.I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences:

[Tikhonov] Everyone knows that although slogans of independence have been proclaimed officially and the need for them has been proven, independence still does not yet exist, and this is very sad. I believe that probably a very precise formation, a precise formulation, of the functions of state management, which have now been presented in general outline in Comrade Murakhovskiy's report, will all the same also help us advance along the path of intensifying the economic independence of kolkhozes and sovkhozes and, I should like to stress, other cooperatives and, I should also like to stress, some of those enterprises and individual peasant farms which are, obviously, beginning to appear in the country.

I should like to dwell very briefly on the following in this connection. A whole series of reproaches and maybe even accusations has been expressed here against scientists who are allegedly discrediting kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Comrades, that isn't true. I have not seen those imaginary scientists among, say, my fellow economists, who would say that kolkhozes are no good for anything at all and that they must be removed, as has been heard here today. There hasn't been anything like that.

What are we dealing with? No major economic system can exist only on large, highly concentrated enterprises—not one. We will never manage to obtain the necessary proportions and, at the same time, dynamism in those proportions if we continue to focus our attention only on a high level of concentration of production. In any economic system—and this is shown by world experience, it isn't my conjecturing—there is always a unity of large-scale, medium-scale commodity, small-scale commodity, and even noncommodity enterprises. All our life we have focused our attention only on gigantism in both industry and agriculture. We believed that only large enterprises produced high results. We received a structure of our national economy which today does not only not reflect the real structure of the people's needs for food products—and not only end-consumers but also consumers in production—it does not reflect, I repeat, not reflect only the public need for food products, but on the contrary our stable structure unfortunately is still continuing to move and develop past these needs.

How else can our chronic illnesses be explained? Once it was only tractors that we didn't have. These tractors appeared, but now there are no plows, and then there are no harrows, or machines, or combines. Well, anything you like is in some kind of permanently short supply. Even now the farmer receives not a system of machines but only individual parts of that system. I'm not even talking about what the equipment is like. Is there even a system of machines or, what is more, comprehensive equipment, or a technological system in the processing sectors of the country's industry? We still don't have it. Why not? Because highly concentrated large enterprises, pointed in just one direction by the plan, cannot change their structure without incurring losses by adjusting themselves to the requirements of those who consume that output.

Why is it suddenly necessary for us to talk now about superiority—kolkhozes and sovkhozes, or small cooperatives, or individual family farms—for, after all, there hasn't yet been any competition between these forms, free and businesslike competition between partners who enjoy equal rights?

At the same time, in the fall I had occasion to travel through the northwestern and northern areas of the Non-Chernozem Zone. You know what ruins are; I won't tell you what they are. Of course, this is not the same land, they are not the same farms of which Comrade (Starovoytov) writes in (Lyutemskaya Gallery). It's quite a different picture. Will we be able to renovate these depopulated areas by orienting ourselves now toward the creation of kolkhozes? I am sure that we will be unable to. How can we renovate them? We can renovate them through an intelligent policy, including one of resettlement, through creating there small cooperatives, on the basis of renovating small villages and, in some cases, farmsteads. Will this really harm the sovkhoz or kolkhoz or, shall we say, the socialist state?

And so, Mikhail Sergeyevich, these thoughts occur to me in this connection. How are we, under the conditions of this system, to guarantee the economic independence, I would say the economic inviolability of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz by another manager? What economic and legal basis ought to be the guarantee of these rights? In my view, one comrade from among the speakers spoke very well when he said: The kolkhozes must be the master of the land, not exploiters of it. And sovkhozes should be master of it as the object of their management, and not simply exploit it. What legal document should there be here? In my view—and this could probably be the second step after this system—in my opinion, the second step will be the separation of ownership of the land as a unit of a farm from state ownership of land. And then the relationship—yes, and the strengthening of the independent ownership of land by the kolkhoz or sovkhoz through a definite legal document or contact—and then the relationship between the state and the kolkhoz will, in my view, be crystal clear. The state as owner of the land will implement its right of ownership by obtaining a fixed payment for possession of this land. [murmurs from audience]

You have become agitated about the payment, comrades. Here are some examples. I have recently, for some reason, been receiving very many letters. Here's one of them. A lessee collective of young farmers decided to lease 750 hectares on conditions which, in my view, were advantageous for the sovkhoz. It was land which was overgrown and not being worked in the north of Kalinin Oblast. The sovkhoz director said to them: Take it for R1,200 per hectare per year. Well, that's not a rent, it's not even quit-rent, it's simply robbery. I have myself seen that sovkhoz report.

[Gorbachev] if you obtain a harvest of 40 quintals there and sell it...

[Tikhonov—interrupting] You are right. And nothing but straight losses from each hectare. But R1,200—this is also a manifestation of monopolism. How should it be? Mikhail Sergeyevich, I think that you are asking me a question, but you probably know the answer better than I do. The course that you at one time put forward very boldly is a course toward the virtual breaking-up of production within the kolkhoz without destroying that kolkhoz, and of consolidating these fractional parts as economically independent collectives, or as families. This is what you have called leasing within the farm. I would like to say one thing: It seems to me that we will not be able to hold out on leasing within the farm alone. In my view, we must extend leasing relations not only to agriculture, but to the national economy as a whole. And in my view, Lenin's thesis about a structure of civilized cooperators means, comrades, not just a structure of the cultured and educated, but a structure of juridically free, individual, and collective producers of goods who are economically independent. And so, in my view, the system of leasing relations could serve as a very good and durable form for the economic realization of socialist property by the state, by enterprises, and by individuals working in these financially autonomous collectives. So, in my opinion, the way to monopolism here is the path of developing leasing.

[Gorbachev] The path of struggle.

[Tikhonov] Thank you.

[Gorbachev] The floor is given to Comrade Arnis Antonovich Kalninsh director of the Research Institute for Economics of the Latvian Agroindustrial Committee, Academician. Comrade (Postnikov), please be prepared to speak next.

[Kalninsh] In principle, leasing is only an intermediary link. The possibility of developing such a managerial structure on farms has been determined by the fact that considerable areas of agricultural land, of the state fund, and of the forest fund of sovkhozes and kolkhozes have not been used or have been used inefficiently. Many former farmstead buildings in the rural area are standing empty, too. This structure can potentially provide up to 25-30 percent of the value of all agricultural products. And one should particularly stress that farm economies should be highly mechanized and intensive, more or less specialized, and own—on average—20-40 hectares of intensively cultivated land. At present, however, a number of artificial barriers to the development of agriculture have been created. Although the Latvian Council of Ministers adopted the 4 November decision last year on peasant economies that gave an essential impetus to the development of this form of management, this direction has for various reasons not been duly developed. Owing to various instructions by union departments on the issues of prices and finances, certain restrictions have been imposed on this direction. Thus, farming enterprises pay higher prices for equipment and for a number of other material and technical means than sovkhozes and kolkhozes. This is inadmissible, and, therefore, the development of a draft law on farming enterprises is being completed in the republic. The farmer wants to have guarantees. Further, these guarantees should be transferred to the republican constitution. Then the farmer will be confident that the land will be used not only by him, but by his heirs, too. As we analyze all those different forms of management at their most basic level, we should keep in mind the simple axiom: Unified prices for selling the product and unified prices for purchasing any material and technical equipment should be introduced, whatever the managerial structure. No form of discrimination should be tolerated. There should be competition and a free and natural choice of the most efficient managerial structures.

[Gorbachev] The floor is given to Comrade (Viktor Ivanovich Postnikov), general director of the Stavropolskoye Broiler Production Association. Comrade Plyutinskiy, please be ready.

[(Postnikov)] [passage omitted] I would like to correct myself today concerning something. At the 19th conference I displayed a sort of leftist deviation; I said there that the ministry was superfluous, and so on. I think that, of course, I made a mistake, of course, [laughter] and I convey my apologies to all because, of course, this was wrong. There should be the ministry, because to say things like that is simply incompetent. The ministry should run its affairs, the agro-industrial complex, too; there are such things from top to bottom in the country! We must have a leadership because—take, for example, the problem of the RSFSR agro-industrial complex: A lot of innovative things are accumulating there, and to use those norms and experiences I must pay and maintain that apparatus as its member.

I have some doubts now, Mikhail Sergeyevich, about another issue. I see that the slogan: All power to the Soviets, I mean our political restructuring, is being regarded by Soviet organs, especially locally, at the rayispolkom level, in the following way: Your enterprise should give us R300,000; they make such decisions. We are the authority now, and if you breathe air, give us the money. [laughter] Of course, both kolkhozes and new formations should unite for joint actions. We represent agricultural combines, for instance, and we have set up an agricultural consortium in Russia, Mikhail Sergeyevich, which includes 30 of the best agricultural combines. For what purpose? We are examining the situation. For example, we could take the Yeliseyev shop in Moscow [largest food shop in Moscow] if we are allowed to and turn it into an exemplary trade venue in order to undermine the monopoly of trade, which nobody has yet been able to provide an alternative solution for. We are already making arrangements...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Perhaps, you too will store products under the counter. [refers to major scandal in Brezhnev's time involving the shop's management]

[(Postnikov)] No way, Mikhail Sergeyevich. All our products are wrapped, with the price written on them, so that the shop assistant says: Give me R250 because I cannot steal from you. And we give her R250 as her salary. [laughter]

[Gorbachev] Here is an honest attitude!

[(Postnikov)] Well, there is yet another issue to be mentioned in this connection. I think we should think over, before the plenum opens, the issue of protecting precisely the interests of our enterprises which are the primary link of the economy. Everything begins with money, from the fact that it is being taken away from economies. Take centralization up to the very top. There are many reasons there, too. What independence can there be and what is there to talk about if money is being taken from collectives without permission? Therefore, this should be stopped, or some legislative act should be introduced. The finances of a given enterprise should be inviolable, and all mutual relations with the leadership, from top to bottom, should be based on that. Because, those who commit violations have great power; you see, this is the difficulty. Raykoms or rayuispolkoms commit violations. They call you in and say: Hand over the money.

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Raykoms have other functions now.

[(Postnikov)] Let us hope so. [laughter]

[Gorbachev] Comrade Plyutinskiy, Vladimir Antonovich, chairman of the Zarya agro-firm in Rovno Oblast. [passage omitted on Plyutinskiy's comments]

[Gorbachev] One must go to the plenum and answer the main questions. If we do not answer the main questions at the plenum, then, you understand, it will be the kind of plenum we don't need. So we must come to shore. And I think that if we take tiny little steps here, so to speak, if we're frightened all the time and tangled up... But we all have colossal experience, experience from which lessons must be drawn. We must move, but how?

[Plyutinskiy] We mustn't be afraid, Mikhail Sergeyevich. [passage omitted on Plyutinskiy discussing how Lenin taught that we must use whatever good experience there is, and how in Hungarian shops one can find 20 types of sausage on sale, while the situation in the GDR is similar]

[Gorbachev] Nikolay Ivanovich Kucherenko, leader of a lease-contracting collective running a milk and produce livestock unit belonging to the Progress Kolkhoz in the Sasovskiy Rayon of Ryazan Oblast.

[Kucherenko] [passage omitted] I never thought I would appear on a platform like this: All I thought about was my work. But this year has been a successful one for us. We have ended it—27 people used to work with 225 head of cattle; now we have 430 head of cattle which we work with 13 people, 13. My wife and two sisters work there. Such people—I have heard that there are a lot of kolkhoz chairmen here—well there were very many unnecessary people among these 27 people and they grabbed us by the lapels and said give up lease-contracting, give up the livestock unit. Why? I'll tell you, they actually knifed one of my people on the livestock unit. We asked that he be shot, they gave them 8 years, they attacked me with a knife. I took away the knife. I lashed out at him with a whip. The head of the militia took away the knife. He assembled us all together. Fifteen days later I get a document, I've still got it in the side-board—Institution of criminal proceedings refused. But i'm not the kind of chap to bear a grudge, and now he's talking to me again, the one whom I hit with the whip. We've completed the year...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] Nikolay Ivanovich, what's happening on the unit? What are they doing there?

[Kucherenko] I got carried away, Mikhail Sergeyevich, I'll tell you all about it. What's going on with the livestock unit? People were fighting for their jobs, they weren't working for their jobs, they were getting money. Take the laboratory assistants for example.

[Gorbachev] No doubt they were also pinching fodder.

[Kucherenko] Yes. The laboratory assistant. The chief milk-maid kept five pigs, you understand, five pigs kept by one milkmaid. And what does the laboratory assistant do on the livestock unit? She comes and takes some milk, she does 30 minutes' work in the morning and 30 minutes' work in the evening, you understand, and gets R140 pay. [passage omitted on Kucherenko telling of artificial insemination staff who get 160 roubles a month for doing virtually nothing]

[Gorbachev] One hundred and sixty roubles! [laughter]

[Kucherenko] Yes, R160 in pay, you understand!

[Gorbachev] Comrades, we are laughing at ourselves!

[Kucherenko] I'm just telling it as it is, I've never been on a platform like this.

[Gorbachev] You're saying what has to be said, what has to be known.

[Kucherenko] [passage omitted] In total, in 1988 we obtained in round figures 250,000 in clear profit, which means that each one of our workers produced R23,000. The people think that I'm some kind of Rockerfeller, you know. [laughter] But what kind of Rockerfeller am I when I get to work at 0500 and leave at 2100. But judge for yourselves what lease-contracting is: There was a livestock unit, lagging behind, worse than any other. In December we were visited by 3,000 people, 3,000, the whole of Ryazan Oblast came to see us and I see how every chairman and director tries to take up lease-contracting but people don't want it, people don't want to. A director comes along from a kolkhoz nearby and he says I've brought the milk-maids to see you, they want to go over to lease-contracting. They ask what's the pay in your unit? We say R400, the rest depending on final results. They say R400? I can do the milking and go home and i'll get R400. You understand. And the chairman says that we've inflated the wages when there was no need to do so!

[Gorbachev] Nikolay Ivanovich, is the whole of your kolkhoz on lease-contracting or not?

[Kucherenko] No, just my own enterprise, just my livestock unit. I'm waiting, Mikhail Sergeyevich. We're now on self-financing, and I think we're going to force all these idlers to do some work. You understand what it's about.

[Gorbachev] Quite right.

[Kucherenko] They tell me I'm Rockerfeller and I feed them. But my own pockets are empty. That's what it's about.

[Gorbachev] When you have an island of lease-contracting inside, and all around envious people like are roaming about prepared to grind you into the dust.

[?Sherbitskiy] They're not decent people!

[Kucherenko] No, but I consider that the lease-contractor can in no way be divided from the kolkhoz, in no way. [passage omitted]

Further on Opening Speech

LD1401230089 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1915 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, 14 Jan (TASS)—Ways of improving management in the country's agroindustrial complex on a democratic basis in conditions of actively developing new economic relations have been examined at a conference at the CPSU Central Committee, which was held on 13 January.

Opening the conference, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said:

Our work in preparing a party Central Committee plenum concerning agrarian policy, which will be held in March, has entered a decisive stage. This will be an important plenum. I think that even that adjective is insufficient to describe the significance of the forthcoming party forum. This is determined by the fact that the cardinal direction of our internal policies will be discussed.

When we speak of agrarian policy, of the agrarian complex, we are dealing first and foremost with the food question—one of the most important problems facing any state. This is a question which we must resolve under the conditions of restructuring by using fresh approaches, and resolve it as needed, to the full extent. We can all see that the solution to the food problem has been dragged out. but we are confident that we have both the economic, social, and natural conditions to solve the problem.

When we speak of agrarian policy, we have in mind that we are talking about people engaged in growing grain, we are talking about their lives, the peasants of the kolkhozes and the working class. And, of course, no agrarian policy can be effective, productive, fruitful, if it does not take into account the interests of the rural workers—social, economic, and cultural; in general, the broad circle of people's interests and aspirations.

When we speak of agrarian policy we have in mind the particularity of this sphere, of this national agroindustrial economic complex—the fact that it functions in certain natural conditions. The industry is related to nature through its direct contact with it. This has an enormous impact on all the activity of rural workers. We cannot ignore nature; moreover, it is only on the basis of our community with nature, our respectful attitude to it, that we can confidently conduct and develop agricultural production, not only today, but also tomorrow. Comrades, these are big issues. Not everything has gone well here, and many errors have been permitted—both in land improvement and in land husbandry systems. Speaking frankly, sometimes we have simply violated nature instead of understanding its particularities in each region; and, I shall go farther, on each kolkhoz in each field.

When we talk about agriculture and the agrarian complex, we are always talking of the main thing—the land and the people on the land. Land and people—that is the brief formulation of agrarian policy.

Much is linked here. We lost a good deal in ridding the country of the peasantry in the sense that we severed people from the land and the means of production and thereby dealt a hard blow to the entire agrarian cause, primarily to people's relationship with the land. Moreover, in the process of transforming the production forces within the country, the interests of the agrarian sector were far from always observed, nor was it taken into account that the land has to be approached with an attitude of great responsibility.

Look what the losses are like: Whereever there is a hydroelectric station there are also large tracts of flooded land lost. And after all, these water meadows and pastures provided food. Moreover, it is a matter of millions of hectares of the very best land, on which many farms based their livestock farming. There's another blunder for you.

In short, agriculture is a vast thing, touching on the basis of the life of our entire society; and it is imposible to deal with it without harmonizing with the other sectors of the economy, or maintaining the appropriate relations. At one time it was historically essential to put pressure on the countryside and enlist all its resources for the creation of industrial potential. This circumstance was dictated by a specific historical period; but this situation has become the norm for us. It has deformed all agrarian policy and therefore, practice as well, and has had a grave effect on how agriculture functions and its results. We cannot agree with or put up with such a situation. This raises the question of harmonization and equivalency. The whole national economic complex and all its branches must develop dynamically, interlinked with each other. And we need to find mechanisms that will maintain this harmony and balance.

Just look at how many distortions of all sorts there are in the agrarian sector itself. This needs to be understood. We have put several questions at the center of these problems: questions of the fundamental restructuring of economic relations, of providing social facilities in the countryside, and of course the land question. I am saying this because what we are talking about today is part of the great preparatory work that is being done for the plenum.

We need to come to the plenum thoroughly equipped to evaluate the road we have covered, our achievements, and to draw lessons from the blunders we have committed. We have to see the true picture of the state of affairs in today's agrarian sector in order to propose a modern agricultural policy which—backed up by its achievments, rejecting mistakes, correcting distortions in this important sphere of our national economy—will lead us into fruitful work that will meet the needs of our society.

We must come to the plenum with a well thought-out concept. This is politics. We are not posing the task of solving all concrete questions at this plenum. But we must create political prerequisites and work out guidelines that will take everything into account and open up the way for us to confidently develop the agroindustrial complex and for the quickest solution to the food problem.

Within the framework of such meetings as today's, and there have already been several of them, the state of affairs in various sectors of the agrarian sphere has been discussed, an analysis has been made, and the experience gathered since the May (1982) plenum of the Central Committee has been assessed, including the experience in the development of various forms of contracting, leasing relations, the social reconstruction of villages, economic links with other branches, and much more.

The purpose of our meeting today is an informal, frank, and open exchange of views and proposals relating to the problems that have accumulated. You can say just a few words, but it is important to give your point of view. We have to talk objectively and honestly. The topic of our conversation is connected with the management of agricultural production and how it should be at the level of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz, in that most basic link in the development of leasing relations. We hear different points of view about kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Our point of view on their role and importance is well-known. We defend it not simply because of some sort of attachment to it, but on a substantive basis because we are convinced of the rightness of such an approach.

We have to examine what the management and cooperation of primary links at the level of the rural rayon should be like. For example, a process is going on whereby a cooperative of cooperatives is formed within the kolkhoz on the basis of developing leasing relations. This can only occur on the basis of broad democracy. Using the experience of people from Tula, in a number of rayons councils of directors and the leaders of cooperatives are being set up. These councils determine all the policies and all the interconnections in order to bring out the potential of one rayon or another. And in this instance, the apparatus of the agroindustrial complex plays its true role of serving the council and helping to resolve issues.

Today the rayon level is faced with questions of how to help the farms market their produce, how to process it, how best to tackle capital construction through joint efforts, what issues require priority solutions, and in which areas to engage in cooperative activities. This is the kind of help the farm needs, and not the kind where a representative of the apparatus teaches the peasant how to sow, plow, and so on. Now even the chairman of a cooperative or of the board of a kolkhoz, or the manager of a sovkhoz cannot dictate to the cooperative member and give him orders. He has his say in the matter when problems of an ecological or veterinary nature arise, when matters relating to scientific-technical progress are touched on. The slogan of the day, as it were, is "Don't interfere; help."

Further, how are things going at the oblast level, the kray? Why do they still have all the production subunits whose task is to command? So, in the rayon, the kolkhoz, the sovkhoz, the correct solutions are being found, while at the level of the oblast, republic, or even center, a large command-bureaucratic apparatus is still being maintained. What for? So that some senior official who does not really know what is happening on the farms can give unnecessary and at times harmful instructions.

These are all questions we will elucidate today. This is very important, because restructuring is now taking place and great changes are underway. We have elicited much that is useful and that has been prompted by life itself. But all this is coming up against obsolete forms of management, to which many senior officials and specialists are still clinging. They cannot be bothered to pay attention to solving the country's food problem quicker.

We must stir our specialists into greater activity. People understand that the specialist is needed. As soon as they begin forming lease relations and setting up a cooperative, they invite into their collective a specialist who knows his job and knows how to work.

That then, comrades, is the theme of our discussion today. I appeal once again: Let us speak frankly. What should we do, and how can we improve the process of economic relations, the whole process of restructuring in the countryside, so as to open up its enormous potential in practice?

Concluding Speech

LD1401232289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 14 Jan 89

["Concluding speech" by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at a conference on improving management in the agro-industrial complex held at the CPSU Central Committee on 13 January—recorded]

[Text] I would say that every meeting we have takes us deeper and deeper into the problem, and this is true of today's conference as well. Our meeting has been a frank discussion. In some cases, the speeches have been good ones and in others not so good; but this does not alter the general picture: that this has been a very useful meeting that has again provided a new signal, new momentum to reflect and fully think through all the issues we must bring up at the plenum. This time, comrades, we must make no mistakes in drawing up at the regular plenum of the party's Central Committee, in drawing up a progressive agrarian policy commensurate with the country's current requirements and capabilities. We must make no mistakes. It is in order to avoid such mistakes that we hold these meetings.

It has been said here, comrades, that it is not just a matter of these schemes and structures, etc. Of course not. Comrade Lukinov began by saying that a comprehensive approach is needed; there is no panacea or any one level that can be used to resolve everything in this enormous complex. This goes without saying, comrades. I merely wish to emphasize that here in the party's Central Committee and outside it, around the country, there [TASS International Service in Russian at 1915 GMT on 14 January transmits a similar report on Gorbachev's concluding speech at the conference on improving management in the agro-industrial complex held at the CPSU Central Committee on 13 January, which at this point adds the following: "...Central Committee and in the government and throughout the country, there..." (providing alternate TASS Russian wording)] has been a broad exchange of views on restructuring economic relations in the countryside, on matters relating to social policy in the countryside, on matters relating to scientific backup for the agrarian-industrial complex, and on matters relating to the further development of productive forces on the basis of introducing machinery systems and new progressive technologies.

We have launched an enormous program concerning the processing, the food industry, and have already brought in many industries, our defense industries, and so on. I am not going to list them all. When we were in Orel we looked into the specific issues in the region and throughout the complex. So, there is a serious debate underway. Apart from that, meetings are being held in connection with the documents and the work on them. Yet today-...[Gorbachev changes thought] At all conferences, of course, we discuss, one way or another, the entire agroindustrial complex and all of its problems. But the emphasis is placed on organizational forms and on approaches on how to influence the functioning of this enormous national-economic complex so as to obtain...[Gorbachev changes thought] in order for it to begin operating more efficiently and produce quicker returns on all that we have invested and are investing in it, so as to more rapidly achieve a solution to the food problem.

It is for that reason that plans have made their appearance here. It is for that reason that there is discussion here with the accent on this part of the problem. And why, Comrades? For everything we were saying before this, including and primarily the restructuring of economic relations, it gets stuck, you know, either, well, how do we intend to bring out the potential on collective farms? Through restructuring of economic relations, through giving the person an incentive, through the provision of facilities for those living in the countryside, and so on and so forth. But to a large extent this is tied in with the methods of working with this complex, both at the level of the farms and at the rayon level, and also at the level of the oblast and the republic, and at the center. I would like now, therefore, not to return to those questions which were discussed here earlier. I just want to concentrate my short concluding remarks on these problems that are linked with management questions.

I think that we were approaching this question correctly now in beginning with the collective and state farms, with a view to making it possible for every collective and state farm to develop its potential through lease-contracting, contracting through economic independence. That, in my view, is correct. And when we make that kind of approach and when we start our deliberations from those particular standpoints, then in my view we arrive at the main thing, the fact that all issues in economic management have to be concentrated there, here. And nevertheless it seems to me that we see the main area: By virtue of the fact that the main bulk of farms in our country are collective and state farms, the main road, no doubt, towards bringing out their potential is still—as you reminded us when we were speaking—in revealing this potential, as it were, through the system of cooperatives, which operates under full cooperative conditions, under full lease-contracting conditions; it is independent, too, but it is linked by means of an agreement and definite economic relations.

I am convinced, comrades, that the person who, while thinking and worrying about the best solution to the food question, goes for the collective and state farms in an aggressive way, as they say, that he might, perhaps, be proceeding from the best motives. But I have to say here that a lot has been said that we cannot accept—it is neither scientifically founded nor is it confirmed by life, including the practical experience of the last few years. In my view, indeed, if we take this road of internal restructuring of economic relations within the collective and state farms—and this includes even the fact that if someone considers it necessary to transfer the state farm, to return to a collective farm, a cooperative—I am sure that in the state farm, too, everything can be redone and that a route can be taken to a cooperative: All variants and all moves are possible here, so to speak.

I think we shall see later that all these cooperatives functioning on definite contractual bases and on definite economic mutual links simply need this so they can be sure that someone is taking care that fuel is arriving, someone is taking care that spare parts are coming in, and someone is thinking about sales. And then people can live. And so all these cooperatives pool their efforts by assigning tasks or acting in such a way as to create a certain social infrastructure. So there are all these questions and we can now make all our big state and collective farms begin to play a real role, and to do so in the interests of the rural workers. And that means in the interests of the country, too, since we are uncovering their potential and producing greater output.

So I think that anyone who attacks the collective and state farms has simply not thought it through, hasn't sorted it out and this, evidently, must be said bluntly.

This does not exclude the fact that various forms may arise alongside these. Therefore when, and Comrade Kalnynsh tried to say this most systematically here, saying how many farms there will be that according to their data and estimates will be strong today, they will (?make a contribution) relying on the fact that they already have something and by using, not destroying it they will add to the experience they have. Well, good for them! I'm sure that these farms, too, will in the end strive to introduce leasing relations, to include all these elements. Without fail I'm sure. It will be like doing so to find one's second wind. It is essential. But let them arrive at this themselves. What can we teach a chairman who is a hero twice over? It's all the more difficult for him if he's a father figure, and then, you know, suddenly there's leasing and they're talking about partners, but he doesn't want to be a partner, he want's to be a father figure. [laughter] Well, let him be a father figure [words indistinct] Let him be a father figure—good for him!

This isn't the point. There is a group of farms which follows a different path or other approaches. And it is indeed correct that they shouldn't forget that they can build new relations and integrate properly now with the individual sector. And you can integrate the individual sector with a collective or state farm without building new accommodations, complexes, these huge complexes; and you can produce an increase quickly since each farmstead can, along with its own cattle, take another two or three. It's all the same to it whether its looking after two piglets or four. If there's a contract and it works, moreover, the children and the old women will start to do a bit of work. So it will be like what happened in Hungary. You see, it's all united, like a single piece of machinery. It must not be divided. Huge opportunities for the integration of all this are now opening. And finally, there are comrades who use agro-combines, agrofirms etc. Let them do so, I believe. [TASS at this point also adds the following: ..."so, I believe. These forms have the right to exist. They have proven their effectiveness, got great work underway, and there are good results. I do not doubt that they will come to conclusions about the need to assimilate leasing relations. Life is prompting them to arrive at such a conclusion. Everyone must come to this conclusion; this process must be set in motion. As a whole, I would put it like this: the processes have been put in motion correctly at the level of the primary link, comrades. It is necessary only to consolidate all this, give guarantees, and—as has been said here—the necessary guarantees do not yet exist. This is a dangerous symptom—if the lease holder does not have confidence, if he does not have the opportunity to defend leasing and work with a high return. When a person has a wage and he satisfies his material needs, then for him work is a creative process not based on being goaded and shouted at. Moreover, here lies the colossal sense behind everything that we want: for a living to be made through leasing and for the person to develop.

"We and you must care about the lease holders. It is not enough that leasing is progressing with difficulty, but these innovative people are also being called kulaks and Rockefellers—whatever you like. And this is all because many people, particularly idlers, do not like the fact that leasing is destroying the morals and habits of the stagnation years, when working any old way it was possible to receive decent pay and—let us be blunt—even take things from the communal stock. The final result did not even interest such people. This, comrades, is why it is necessary to defend the lease holder. A law on leasing is being prepared in our country. It will cover all branches of the national economy. But we have directed that in the preparatory framework of this law the matter of leasing relations in rural areas and regularizing them by decree be separated out, so that there should be a law protecting lease holders. People will undertake the new work more boldly if there is reliable legal protection from the state. We are on the right path.

"As for management bodies at other levels—in particular, the rayon section—as I have already said, we should proceed along the path that has been prompted now already by the experience of a whole number of regions whereby collective and state farms, all enterprises, set up their council on the basis of cooperation and along voluntary lines. This makes it possible, on a democratic basis, to discuss and tackle problems relating to the development of the rayon: how to interact, how to exchange experience, seed, and selection material; how to organize sales; how to build; with whom resources should be shared in order to help out one weak farm or other. Of course the council should have the necessary apparatus to perform its function. And since the farms themselves will maintain it, they will think about what they need and what it should be like both in terms of quantity and quality.

"Therefore, it seems to me that everything is clear with the rayon section. I support the thought that not only collective and state farms, but also all processing enterprises, apart from those that have oblast or republican significance, should become part of this complex at the rayon level. The rayon council is being set up to give assistance to farms in every way that can relieve their work and resolve matters relating to all-round service. Taking account of the restructuring of management on the level of farms and of the rayon, the oblast and republican apparatuses must be freed of all structural subdivisions that try to give orders on how to work on the land and on the stock farm. Only those elements should be retained in the apparatus that harmonize and coordinate relations between farms and other parts of the national economic complex of the oblast, kray, and republic, formulate the prospects for social and economic development, and raise the effectiveness of agroindustrial production.

"All this must be thought through and the right conclusion reached. It is not the name that matters, but the functions. There must be a change in the functions of the apparatus with regard to our conclusion about the main element, the collective and state farm: what it should be like and on what principles it ought to function. A change in the functions, structure and methods of the work of the apparatus will require appropriate experts and scientists capable of working in the conditions of life's new demands.

"A number of important and fundamental questions, which require further study, remain today. These relate to planning, the organization of material-technical supply, and interrelations between central and local Agroprom bodies. But the principle is clear to us: As far as the management sphere is concerned, functions must be changed, from the rayon to the center. We already have quite a number of ideas, although much must still be thought through. We also need to set clear-cut tasks and goals drawing on accrued experience, tried by science and practice and leading us to acceleration in the resolution of the food question.

"We are on the right path. The way must be cleared for collective and state farms through economic restructuring, through the social restructuring of the countryside, through the modernization of its material and technical base and the harmonization of relations between industries. We shall have to tackle this. I just wanted to stress these main directions along which we should be thinking and crystallizing our ideas in decisions. Let us close our conference on that. I believe that what we have said will provide a good impetus for taking the processes of restructuring further." (supplying variant TASS Russian wording)] This form, too, has the right to exist. It has proven its efficiency. It, too, must be considered.

Also, people who really do not want to give up power have gotten ahead there. Still, we must thank them for having gotten great work under way, for which there are good results. I think they will come around; it is not in vain. They occupy these posts with intelligence. Their intelligence and life as it unfolds around them will prompt them to come around to the same conclusion to which Comrade Postnikov came. I have known Postnikov for a long time; I do not know for how many decades. He also does not like to share power; he has never shared it. But now I find myself looking—you would not recognize Postnikov! [unidentified voice in background says "a democrat" followed by laughter]

So, he is sharing. And you are coming. Everyone must come, must come; but this process must be advanced. I would, therefore, put it like this: The process has gotten under way correctly at the level of the primary link; this is the right direction, comrades. We need only, I think, consolidate all this, as Nikolay Ivanovich said. I, or Comrade Trubin, Vyacheslav Petrovich, said that there are nonetheless no guarantees, no guarantees. That is worrying: 5 years and who comes in then? All in all, comrades, that is a dangerous symptom. If the lessee has no confidence...[Gorbachev changes thought] Not to mention how Nikolay Ivanovich over there had to defend himself with a whip in order to defend leasing, you understand. This is essential, comrades, in order to simply achieve your potential as a person, with dividends, in your own interest ultimately so that you have money.

It is interesting to put in the work, simply to develop your potential as a person. Once you have all this, and the level of earnings is such that whatever demands are satisfied—not, so to speak unnatural demands—then what? The work is the most important thing, it is the most creative process. It can be so when you work without being goaded, not for targets, and without being shouted at, but when you are displaying your own skill, and so on. Moreover, here lies the colossal, so to speak, sense behind everything we want: for people to earn through leasing, for the person to develop.

It is very good, as Nikolay said, that there should be fewer idlers. I would like, you know, to come back to what Vyacheslav Petrovich said: We have to remove this anxiety. It is not enough that leasing is, with difficulty, progressing, but these people are being called kulaks, Rockefellers, as you can see, and whatever, whatever you want, and so on and so forth. And this is because everything that has, you understand, exhausted our kolkhozes and sovkhozes is being destroyed.

Look, why is a former laboratory worker on this unit fighting? Because she was working for around 30 minutes a day, skimming the fat during milking; she got her salary and, of course, quite probably illegally made use of the opportunity of having combined fodder, so to speak, at her disposal. I do not want to call her a thief, but there certainly was waste on this unit, that is clear. [voices heard in background]

That is why the lessee must be protected, must be protected. And this is what we have agreed: The law on leasing is under preparation, a law that will cover all branches of the national economy, comrades; but we have decided, in the framework of the preparation of this law, to separate out the question of lease relations in the villages and regularize it with a decree. And with this decree to give it a solid form so that it would be a law, so to say, that would protect the lessee, and I will tell you straight out, that would mean the others would move more boldly, since there would be legal protection, reliable protection from the state. So it is obvious that we are on the right road.

Here the question has been asked: What is it all about? Who will do it after all? Just look how many obstacles there are. First of all there are all the people who have made very few efforts or shown much conscientiousness whether in arable farming or in stockbreeding, but nevertheless got paid unwarranted bonuses on top of their pay. Under lease contracting this won't work; you have to have an end product. So it won't suit them. This is not only, so to say, specialists or economic planners who are salaried, but ordinary people as well, those about whom our comrades here from lessee collectives talked. This needs to be borne in mind. But nevertheless the main obstacle—perhaps I am repeating myself, perhaps I'm saying it for the tenth time, and I felt today, too, that we are all of one mind—is the problem, is the attitude of specialists and economic planners. All of them are on firm salaries, salaries which at one time we improved radically, and therefore now for them to enter a leasehold collective and work as lessees work, sometimes continuously for months at a time, especially when things are just starting up—a specialist is needed to head it after all—probably he would rather get a salary, plus have a car at his disposal as a chief specialist. He has certain resources, a certain share of power, everything's fine for him. Yes, things are fine for him, perhaps. And we don't want things to be worse for him. But things are not absolutely fine for us in the country, in society, in the towns, and not only in towns, but everywhere, as far as food is concerned.

And so today we must think; and when we have reached the conclusion, we will proceed from that. What will we find? We will find a legal mechanism that will urge on the specialists as well. In other words, it is clear to us at the primary level that this is what must be done. That is where our fate must be decided. As for the management bodies at other levels further on, the rayon section, I think we should take the road indicated by the experience of Comrade Starodubtsev and others who have taken that road. However, in this instance I am not casting doubt on the experience of the agricultural firms and combines. However, for most of our farms—the ones that make up the bulk of the agrarian sector, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes—this route is evidently already proving itself. For a completely voluntary, such as how it is within the kolkhoz, transfer to leasing and the setting up of interfarm collectives and cooperatives—or whatever, it is a local matter—here too all enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes on the basis of interaction and on voluntary principles should get together and create their council to discuss the problem of a region's development; how to interact; and how to exchange both experience, seeds, and selection material. And then there is the main question: What will happen regarding sales? How will we build? Where and what should we build in common or on our own? Who needs support: sharing resources, getting a weak farm out of trouble, helping, providing a prop. That is what the council should decide democratically.

Subordinate to the council, there must be the necessary apparat to work to serve the council. It would be the kind of apparat needed by the council. Since they would be paying the farms themselves,., they will think about what they need. Therefore, it seems to me that everything is clear regarding the rayon section, too, and I support the notion that here enterprises, not just kolkhozes and sovkhozes, should be involved in this complex at the rayon level; the processing enterprises, too, should be involved, except those which have oblast or republican designation. In other words, a maximum of issues should he solved here, comrades, and this, as a matter of fact, is the main section.

In connection with this, if we recognize that even the rayon, the rayon council is created with the aim of helping the kolkhozes in all that would alleviate their work and to resolve the issue of services in particular sales, hardly anyone would ask someone to go give instructions as to when someone or other should be sowing—that is out of the question—or that the oblast management should on some basis have an apparat that sends people to sow, control, plow, etc, thresh. Why? Why? How does this specialist somewhere or other know better what to do on a specific farm? Rubbish! All the more, therefore, should the oblast and republican apparat be free from all the sections, all the structural subdivisions that are trying to issue orders as to how to work on the land and on farms.

All of this must be eliminated, leaving only those links that must harmonize relations between farms and other parts of the national economic complex, harmonize with the whole life of the kray, the oblast. And the main thing, in all of these matters, is the rayons, which must correctly help distribute, consult, that is, do everything democratically. Again, it is up to the rayons to meet and decide democratically what they need. In any case there must be this structure, and for this reason why do all of these things have to be maintained in Russia, all these agricultural things. It is not needed; none of this is needed. Influence must be exerted at the level—by the way, I don't know what to call it, perhaps one can leave it out. The point isn't in the name, but in the functions. And so, I would say, the functions must be changed in conformity with our drawing a conclusion about the main link—the collective and state farm, how it should, on what principles it should function. And so, change the functions, and that means, having changed the functions, change the structure of the apparatus. That means another specialist is needed, a lawyer, an economist, and so on, a scientist, and so on—that is, those who are able to carry out the new functions.

This must be thought over, and I don't want just now to subscribe to one or another point of view. It must be thought through and a conclusion reached. Only I haven't understood—opinions haven't taken shape yet. On one side, they seem to be saying, well, planning. What planning? Say, put everything on the national economic complex; everything is given to the republic, and the republic will deal with it.

I haven't understood whether this is how everyone feels or not because the memoranda are different. For example, especially where material and technical supply is concerned, some say because Gossnab [the State Committee for Material and Technical Suply], as such, is divorced from this, when something is allocated to the state agroindustrial complex, Gossnab washes its hands of it. And so when the timber doesn't come through or the cement doesn't come through, Gossnab doesn't answer for this. It has been allocated, they say; you try and get it, carry it out. But doing battle with Gossnab—that's a job! As they say, you'll get a hernia doing that! [laughter] It has worn down better men that you, you know! It's worn the country down! [laughter] And it will quite simply wear down the agroindustrial complex as well. And so you have to think, you have to think and let Gossnab really answer for everything—then, you will see. But then you get these barriers and Gossnab starts up immediately: It has nothing to do with me! But others say, won't the agroindustrial complex actually sink, and then Gossnab will strip it even more in favor of other sectors.

So what do I want to say? That there are matters which must be thought through. For example, yesterday I asked Comrades Ligachev, Nikonov, and Murakhovskiy two questions, and that's where we remained, with these questions. Well, the first one: the mixed feed industry. A proposal is being advanced, as is well known—didn't you notice?—that there should be no Ministry of Grain Products. [murmurs in reply] You did notice. So, you don't object? You have no objections then. But further: This ministry, as far as I know in detail who does what, is engaged in carrying out transportation throughout the country in order to make this mixed feed. So, you have been given both the works and the mixed feed. Make a living and do not turn to anyone else. So I want to say that, for example, corn, grass meal, and oil seed meal are all in the south and they go around the whole country. Well, we have to think about this—fodder is a serious matter, comrades—or else it may be too late. Or the food industry, the processing industry. Anyone who is now engaged in it, as it were, is in touch with all defense sectors, enterprises, all this, with the builders. This is simply a misfortune in our country today. Maybe sometime in the future (?this will not be the case), but today I asked these questions: How shall we find a way out? They do not know.

Therefore let us do it like this. We had a talk. The principle is clear to us that we must change the functions of the bodies, beginning, beginning with the rayon indeed, and going right up to the top. But we still must hit on the functions and structural subdivisions in light of these functions that we must have. That is, if you talk, as it were, about this part which refers to the management sphere. I would put it this way: We have already put together many ideas. There is still a lot to think over. I think that a formulation of the tasks and goals is needed. How can we have an agrarian policy without goals? It should advance some sort of goal, some sort of task, after all. The people should ask: What was the point of this plenum? To shake up the outlines again, or some other thing? But what should the country expect? Once the tasks appear, the tasks must be...[Gorbachev changes thought] the person assigned the task will ask how it is to be carried out. The question also arises about this and that. Probably, we talk and talk, and probably you cannot get by without this. But when the tasks and resources appear, then we have all these mechanisms taking into account what we gained over this period both through experience and scientific discussions and practical discussions.

In short, we now have the final stage, and we must try to understand a great deal, a very great deal. But I think we are on the right path. We must open the path of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz through economic restructuring, through social reconstruction of the village, through the modernization of its material and technical base and the harmonization of the relations between the agro-industrial complex and other industries. This is what we must tackle.

I just wanted to stress these chief directions that we must think about and crystallize these ideas in decisions. This time I think we will end the conference at that. Thank you for taking part, and I think that the fact that we have talked here, and for all those that have participated, this will be a good incentive for setting these processes in motion without even waiting for decisions. All the best to you comrades. [applause]

Ligachev, Top Leaders at Conference

LD1301190489 [Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 13 January carries a report on the CPSU Central Committee Conference held on 13 January. The radio report notes that the following took part in the conference: Vorotnikov, Ligachev, Medvedev, Nikonov, Ryzhkov, Slyunkov, Chebrikov, Shcherbitskiy, Yakovlev, Biryukova, Vlasov, Lukyanov, Maslyukov, Razumovskiy, Solovyev, Talyzin, Baklanov, and USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairmen Belousov, Voronin, and Silayev.

Weather, Crop Status for Early January

PM1701122589 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Jan 89 p 2

[Agrometeorologist N. Ignatova report: "The Weather and the Crops"]

[text] Unusually warm weather prevailed in the first 10-day period in January over most of the European territory of the country. Intensive thaws caused the melting and compacting of the snow cover. There was no snow in the fields or not exceeding a depth of 5cm southwest of a line joining Riga, Mogilev, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov and Krasnodar. The minimum soil temperature at the depth of winter grain crop tillering nodes and grass root necks ranged by and large between zero and minus 5 degrees in most of the rayons of this zone. The soil temperature in the Ukraine (except for the western oblasts) and also in Rostov Oblast, where the soil for the most part froze to a depth of 30-50 cm, which is somewhat more than the mean perennial levels, was near the optimum at the aforesaid depth. It was only in individual rayons in Sumy, Kharkov, Poltava, Cherkassy, Kirovograd, Nikolayev, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Rostov oblasts that it dropped during a period of severe frosts at the beginning of January and ranged from minus 12 to minus 14 degrees. This is close to the critical levels for soil temperature.

Overwintering crops in the other rayons of the European part [of the country] were covered by snow, which reliably protects crops. The minimum soil temperature at a depth of 3 cm remained between zero and minus 2 degrees in the east of Estonia and Latvia, over most of the territory of the northwest, north, and central regions, and also in the north of the Volga-Vyatka region and in the western half of the Ural region, where the snow cover on the fields of winter crops was more than 30cm deep and the soil was frozen to a depth of less than 20cm and in some places was in a state of thaw. Plants continued to intensively expend nutrients for respiration. Conditions predisposing the plants to rot persisted here.

The presence in the east of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia, the northern, central, and eastern oblasts of the Ukraine, in a number of rayons in Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, and Rostov oblasts, and also in individual rayons in Orel, Voronezh, and Volgograd oblasts of an icy crust contiguous with the soil that grew somewhat thicker and amounted in the main to 2-3cm and to more than 5cm in places is an unfavorable factor for the further overwintering of winter crops.

The prevailing warm weather has made for a further reduction of fruit crops' winter hardiness. Fruit crops may have suffered damage to the flower and leaf buds, the first and second year growth, and also to the bark and wood in the Volga-Vyatka and Ural regions and in the northeast of the Volga region where frosts reached minus 35 to minus 38 degrees and the minimum temperature on the snow surface dropped to minus 38-43 degrees. The minimum air temperature dropped to dangerous levels for citrus and subtropical crops in areas of the subtropical rayons in the western area of Georgia and Azerbaijan during a cold spell recorded at the end of the first 10-day period in January.

Winter grain crops in the Transcaucasian republics were in a state of winter dormancy.

The weather turned considerably colder in the crop-farming regions of western Siberia in the second half of the 10-day period. Air frosts reached minus 35 degrees but they became less severe at the end of the 10-day period. Winter grain crops and perennial grasses in the zone where they are cultivated were under a snow cover of 15-30 cm for the most part.

The first few days of the 10-day period were warm in the Central Asian republics. A maximum air temperature of 6-15 degrees was recorded. Then the temperature dropped and there was precipitation, primarily in the form of snow. A snow layer formed with a depth ranging between 2 and 20 cm in most regions. On most days the winter grain crops were in a state of winter dormancy. The minimum air temperature in individual rayons in Tashkent, Andizhan, Samarkand, and Bukhara oblasts and Kara-Kalpak ASSR ranged from minus 15 to minus 20 degrees, which may have damaged the buds that had opened earlier on stone fruit crops and ornamental plants.

Agricultural Developments 7-12 Jan

LD1401020589 [Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 7-12 January. GMT times of broadcast are given in parenthesis at the end of each item.

7-11 January

No fileworthy items monitored.

12 January

Ryazan oblast stockbreeders considerably increased meat production last year, supplying almost 16,000 tonnes above the plan. (1200)

Ukrainian farms have nearly completed the preparation of seed for spring sowing. All seed has been brought up to condition for sowing. Almost 50 percent more seed corn has been prepared than planned. (1200)